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THE LEGISLATURE AND 
THE CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 
AND PRICES 
PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"Legislative zeal is one of the outstanding d1aracteristics 
of the DJm.inion. Fran early days tbe legislature has shown 
its readiness to dea l wit.ri economic and social problerrs, 
and the field of restrictive practices is no exception to 
this rule. But even by New Zealand standards an unusually 
large nurrter of enactrrents have been introduced for the 
ptlrp:)se of controlling restrictive practices, and the wide 
variety of rrethods adopted by this legislation is equally 
exceptional." 
1
.. 1 
Co .ung2 
The history of legislative intervention in the area of 
. i 2 . commercial pract ces begins late last century with the 
setting up by statute of state-owned enterprises to compete 
with the private sector in the insurance and trustee fields. 
Since that time there have been no fewer than nine enactments 
3 
concerned with competition and prices in the market place. 
These enactments portray the history and development of a 
legislative framework which is oriented essential:y to an 
1. Collinge, J. , 'Ihe Law P..e~a-1::_inq to the Co:r:!:T-oL of ~~"!=ion - Restricti"VC: 
Trade Practi02s and MJnoQOlics in Ne::1 Zealand ( J.96 9) , p . 60 • 
2. Tne term 'comrercial practices ' for convenience is u.sed throughoi..;t this 
paper to refer collect.i.\•2:i..y to r estrictive pra_ti02s and trade 
ccrrbinations . 'Ihe latter will be used as distinct term:.; ¼TK.ffe appropriate . 
3. See A;:-.,pendi.x A. 'Ihis nurrber inch:.des or;ly princ.ipr1.l Acts end d:::)GS not take 
aco::iunt of l c!gjsJabon pcJ.sscd s~c.i.f:iw~ly to r.2et ,,1a.r.tirr..: requi:cen¥C'.ni..s . 
~:= '. ~·~Llt''.GT·-1-1 
administrative approach having the occasional departure towards 
the judicative. In the most recent, the Commerce Act 1975, 
Parliament has sought to combine elements of both approaches by 
creating an administrative structure subject to a system of 
judicial control and providing for certain commercial activities 
to be illegal per se. Central to this Act is the establishment 
of a tribunal, whereby the Le gislature has isolated from itself, 
and from executive government, the function of supervising and 
adjudicating on such practices in the commercial sector as, in 
terms of the legislation, may be restrictive on competition and 
against the public interest, while yet not choosing to allocate 
original jurisdiction in this area to the courts. 
2 
The Commerce Act and its predece ssors reflect Parliament's 
belief that the free enterprise market is in the public interest, 
and over th e last .seve nty y ears Parli ament has sought to e stablish 
the cond itions where compe ti tion in all sectors of commerce would 
be maximised. 
Although a r a nge of pos s ible detriments arising from an 
absence of compe tition h ave be e n r e cognised in statute, 
historica lly the overriding co ncern o f the Le gislature has been 
the main t enance of r easonable price s, inte rve ntion being 
based p rimarily o n the a s sump tion tha t any i nhibition to 
competition in t rade represents a threat to prices and, 
con s equently , t o the public at l a r ge . The existence o f p rice con~ro l 
as the fundame ntal admi nisL::-ative issue h as lent to th e succession of 
legislation a continuity at least in substance. Alongside, 
there emerged in legislation two separately identifiable 
substantive issues - restrictive trade practices and trade 
combinations. 
The accepted complementarity between, on the one hand, 
the structural and behavioural characteristics of the market 
place and, on the other, the level of and trends in prices 
is now recognised in the Cormnerce Act which provides for a 
combination of controls through the functions of one 
administrative body, the Commerce Commission. 
While it is possible to identify in t he history of the 
legislation a,consistency of economic thought, it is also 
true to say that in the development of manner and form 
there emerged certain elements to which the Legisla t ure 
periodically returned, re-enacting them either as the y first 
appeared or in a different form. It is not claimed that 
this tendency represented any purposeful development in the 
mind of the Legislature, nor would such purpose be looked for 
given that the legislation concerned spa ns a pe riod of 
experiment in New Zealand and overseas in socio-economic 
intervention by Parliamen t. But a close exami nation of the 
statutes on commercial practices reveals in the various 
constitutional and procedural provisions enacted a number of clea
r 
precursors to the 'new' legislative era beginning with the Trade 
Practices Act in 1958. To this extent the pre-1958 developments 
can be regarded as a base for the later legislation which built o
n 
a process described by Collinge
4 
in elaborating upon the comment 
quoted above as one of 'trial and error'. 
4 
Since 1958 a distinct trend in procedure has emerged - as the 
scope of the legislation has expanded so the provisions relating 
to 
p r ocedure have become more detailed. It would appear that Parliam
ent 
has accepted the wider regulation of commerce as the basis for a 
greater degree of procedural specificity. When the Trade Practice
s 
Act placed in the hands of an independent adrr.inistrative tribunal 
the wide surveillance, of commercial practices a new direction for 
procedural questions was created - questions which have assumed 
importance in the general development of administrative law 
and which it is the intention of this paper to explore, in the 
historical context. 
The central issue is the significance of the method chosen 
for the determination of issues arising from the legislation. 
The value of an administrative body capable of establishing 
principles and guide lines for the conduct of trade can be argued 
aga inst or seen in conjunction with the a lte rna tives (the 
4. Collinge , op . cit., p. 62. 
5 
Minister, a department or the courts). If more than one method 
subsists, to what extent are different procedures prescribed? Who 
decides on procedure, in the first instance and as it evolves? 
Given that the legislation on commercial practices cuts across 
common law principles, what safeguards are provided to counter 
the abrogation of existing rights? How is a balance achieved 
between the public interest and the interests of traders when there 
is a conflict, and to what extent may the parties concerned make 
out their case in respect of the public interest? 
These, and other relevant, questions impinge largely on where 
the tribunal is seen to lie in the administrative and judicial 
processes. The provisions for the early tribunals on price s and 
commercial practices suggest that the Legislature regarded the se 
bodies as strictly part of the administrative machinery. Such an 
unequivocal distinction has been rejected as a matter of 
administrative law
5 
and the courts, if only for policy rea sons, h a ve 
found the administrative - judicial dichotomy to be of little 
relevance. Although still customarily entitled "administrative 116 , 
tribunals are now endowed with a substantial judicial element which 
carries a recognition that certain basic procedural principles must 
be observed. 
5. e.g., Report of the C.Orrmittee on Adminis trative 'rribunals and Inqffiri es (1 957) 
Omd 218 , para . 40. 
6· One writ"3r i n administr ative l aw has preferred to discard altoget'le r t he 
adjectiva l use of the word "acJmi.nistrative " iI1 connection with tribunals . 
Fowkes , D., I ntrod 'Ction to J\drninistrative Law (1972) , p. 60. 
6 
The recent legislation on commercial practices indeed reflects 
a greater degree of acceptance of the importance of procedure. 
But the attendant questions were not answered immediately or 
simultaneously by the Legislature, for which a number of reasons 
can be found. 
First, it is to be expected that in applying the relatively 
unexplored area of tribunal administration (predominantly a post-war 
development) to a wide field of commercial pract1ce Parliament 
would prefer to retain a high degree of procedural flexibility 
thereby allowing scope for practical experience to suggest the 
appropriate areas for statutory detail. Second,over the last two 
decades the relevant body of administrative law h a s undergone 
considerable adva nce as a result both of an increasin g willingne ss 
on the part of the courts to extend the ambit of their involvement 
I 
in admi nistra.tive matters, 
7 
and of systema tic studies unde rta ken i n 
the context of the general tendency of legislatures in New Zealand 
and other countries to allocate to tribunals rather than to ~1e 
courts jurisdictions newly created by sta tute. Further, regard 
must be had to the changing nature of parliamentary p rocedure, 
espe ci a lly in the role of select committees. In the history of the 
legislation on commercial practices up to 1970 only two of eleven 
Bills (includi ng amending Bi lls) were re fe rred to a select committe e 
7. Liversidge v Anderson [1942 ] A.C. 206 c f A11isnJ.ric Ltd v Fore i gn Co~nsation 
Corrmission_ [1969] 1 All E .R. 208 ; £'~ade v S:-:j_µi [1959] N. Z.L.R. 996 ; 
Padfield v Minister of Aoricultu.,".'C [1968] A.C . 997 . ---- .....=.;... __ _ 
7 
for consideration, and in each of these cases for periods of only 
one month. Since the introduction ·of the Trade Practices Amendment 
Bill in 1970, every such Bill has been subject to the comparatively 
lengthy examination of a select committee and since 19 7 4 to· 
committee hearings in public. Concomitantly the amount of time 
spent by Parliament on the Bills has increased progressively from 
one day (Monopoly Prevention Act 1908) to nineteen months (Commerce 
Act), a trend which can not be explained simply in terms of the 
greater length of more recent legislation. (Appendix A illustrates 
these points in detail.) 
The relevance of parliamentary scrutiny to the major questions 
of admi nistrative law is affirmed by Thomas: 
"A develq;:,ed system of administrative law canmt be 
solely concerned with the judicial function or 
restricted to the l aw relating to the judicial 
review of administrative action only. 'lhe other 
two branches of govenment must also be examined; 
the l egislat ur e as the bcx:1y resp::nsible for the 
enabling l egi s l ation and the Administration as the 
branch responsible for the inplementation of that 
legislation . 
• • • [I]t is because the administrative process 
is so largely based on statute, that the content and 
form whi m l egislation t akes not only determires its 
structU1.-e but also has a vi tal impact on the operation 
and f air r.e s s of the administrati v"e precess itse l f • • • • 
Consequently , the c.egree to which Parliament scrutinizes 
legis l ation , particularly the so-called machinery 
provisions , will have a direct bearing on the powers 
conferred on the Administration, the manner in which 
those po'¼-ers will be exer cised and the form and 
real.i. ty of t he citizen ' s right to relief should those 
pcwers l:e a::;used . "8 
8. 'Iho.inas , E.W., Parlianentarv Control of the l\dm.inistration of Central 
Go·,;e1.-rn-..... nt - Fc:ct: or Fiction? F .W. Guest Merrorial Lecture, - ···- ----
11 Scpt.E.rrbcr 1975, University of otago. 
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The more recent opportunities available for Parliament to 
study the legislation in detail undoubtedly has ensured that 
matters considered extend beyond the purely substantive; and 
greater public involvement increases the likelihood that such 
questions as safeguards will be encompassed. The latter point is 
amply illustrated in the case of the Commerce Act, to which reference 
later will be made. 
Before proceeding, it may be emphasised that the succession 
of legislation on commercial practices and prices should not be seen 
in isolation from the economic and political background which has 
influenced the decision to intervene and the shape of the machinery 
provisions. The objectives and scope of control sought by 
Parliament from time to time reflect not only a general tendency 
towards legislative solutions of economic problems in New Zealand, 
but also a response to the changing face of corrLmerce. In political 
terms, the introduction of legislation and its amendment can be 
related to changes of government, although a substantial degree of 
consent about the objectives sought is revealed in the political 
history - not, perhaps, surprisingly given that the issues of price 
and competition find a uniform philosophical acceptance in New Zealand 
society. Further, the New Zealand legislation has borrowed from 
similar developments overseas. There are few countries in the 
western world \•?hich have not legislated for the control of commercial 
9 
practices, and in this respect, also, legislative developments in 
New Zealand find a background of influence. 
The variety of method, and the extent of its statement in 
statutory form, invests the history of commercial practices 
legislation with an unusual interest when taken as a case study in 
the evolution of administrative law as viewed by the Legislature. 
The succession of provisions and equally their rejection reveal, in 
particular, the issues which guided Parliament in its choice of an 
administrative structure with judicial requirements. 
It is the aim of this paper to examine the nature of 
parliamentary intervention in this area of economic life and to 
attempt to show, against a background of developing administrative 
law: why Parliament saw fit to intervene in matters previously , 
encompassed by the cormnon law; what sorts of constitutional and 
procedural provisions found statutory expression, and the adequacy 
of these provisions in terms of what is generally now consideYed 
necessary or desirable for tribunal systems; and how the dilermnas 
confronting Parliament in adopting an administrative approach were 
resolved , especially with respect to the allocation of 
administrative - judicial tasks set by the legislation and the 
implications of more detailed statements of "rules" in a situation 
of expanding surveillance of commerce. 
10 
The primary concern will be with constitution and procedure. It 
is not intended to assess the merits of the legislation, that is, 
whether it was effective in fulfilling the legislative intent. This 
would be, essentially, to argue the extent to which the respective 
long titles were realised. Rather, the discussion will focus on the 
nature of the framework devised to provide for the objectives sought 
by Parliament, with reference to the substantive law where this is 
necessary to provide a context. 
The adoption of a legislative solution to an economic problem 
necessarily raises issues which are many and diverse. Within the 
ambit of this paper it is not possible to consider every such issue , 
and especially their individual ramifications. The exploration of 
the nature of parliamentary intervention in this area will be 
confined largely to those principles that have become developed and 
entrenched in modern administrative law, so far as it has e volve d, 
- and which are therefore common to a wider field. For reasons 
suggested in the foregoing it will be useful to consider the history 
of intervention in two periods - up to 1958, and from 1958 to the 
present time. In this context some comparison can be made with 
the Securities Commission as provided in the Securities Advertisin g 
Bill currently before Parliament. While there is a degree of overlap 
between the substantive aspects of the proposed Commission and tho s e 
pertaining to the tribunals which have been a lready established to 
deal with commerci a l practice s, of considera bl y more interest are 
the simila rities and dif fe r ences in the con s t i t utions and p r oced ure s 
11 
of each, and what further contribution to the growing body of 
administrative iaw is made by the Legislature in this, historically 
most recent, move. 
PART TWO 
LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION IN 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES AND PRICES 
UP TO 1958 
12 
To obtain an intelligible account of the present system of 
legislative control over competition and prices it is necessary to 
look back only as far as 1919 when, under the Board of Trade Act, 
an administrative body was created with investigatory and 
inquisitorial powers in respect of industrial and commercial 
behaviour. The preceding legislation is, hmvever, important, not 
least because it indicates a disposition on the part of Parliament 
towards providing controls in this area of economics. There is also 
found in the legislation before 1919 the outcome of Parliament's 
early attempts to settle the question of 1:.-;ho should be the decider 
in the reconciliation of public and private interests, if not the 
ordinary courts under the conunon law. For it was dissatisfaction 
with the way in which the courts had dealt with restraints in trade 
that motivated intervention by means of legislation. 
The Common Law 
In the late nineteenth century the position at common law was 
that. restraints of trade could be enforced only if reasonable in 
respect of the parties to the restraint and the public interest, 
a doctrine which was crystallised in the Nordenfelt case, where 
Lord Macnaughten said that 
" .•• restraints of trade and interference with 
individual liberty of action m:ty be justified by 
the special circumstances of a particular case. 
It is sufficient justification, and indeed it is 
the only justification, if the restriction is 
reasonable - reasonable, that is, in reference 
to the interests of the parties cx.mcerned and 
reasonable in reference to the interests of the 
public, so frarred and so guarded as to afford 
adequate protection to the party in whose favour 
it is irrposed, while at the sarre tirre it is in 
no way injurious to the public." 9 
13 
'rhis position was reached by a process of slow evolution from the 
prohibition imposed by the Elizabethan courts on monopolies and 
contracts in restraint of trade. The seventeenth century saw a move 
away from complete , prohibition. In 1711 Lord Macclesfield, reviewing 
the whole f ield, recognised the possibility that contracts in parti a l 
restraint of trade might be valid, provided they were supported by 
'd . 10 adequa te consi eration. In the nineteenth century the decisions 
of the courts refl e cted the classical economic theory of freedom of 
commerce which po s tulated the absence of restrictions on contracts 
and proprietary righ t s except where essential for the preservation of 
those righ t s for othe rs. Adherence to the 'laissez-faire' doctrine 
9 Nordenfel.t v Maxim 1':ordenfelt Guns and Armn.mition Co Ltd (1894] A.C. 535, 565. 
Als o, 111,::.son v Provid2!~t Clcthing and Su-pply Co Ltd . (1913] A.C. 724. 
10. Mit chQl1 v P.evnolds (1711) 1 P W.rrG 181. 
11 
is illustrated in Printing & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson 
"It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend 
arbitrarily those rules whim say that a given 
. contract is void ~s being against public policy, 
because if there is one thing which rrore than 
another public policy requires it is that rren of 
full age and conpetent understanding shall have the 
utrrost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held 
sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. 
'Iherefore, you have this pararrount public policy to 
consider - that you are not lightly to interfere 
with this freedom of contract." 
14 
The presumption behind this doctrine is that parties to an agreement 
are of equal bargaining strength and that what is agreed between them 
is a free exercise of will. 
With the Nordenfelt case such a condoning of contracts became 
subject to their meeting a test of reasonableness. The Victorian 
courts said that restrictive covenants were lawful if they satisfied 
three tests, these being that 
(i) the restraint must not be greater than is necessary 
to protect the interests of the party in whose 
favour it is granted - there must be an interest 
(ii) 
(iii) 
meriting protection; 
it must be justifiable as being in the in~erests of 
the party restrained; and 
it must not be contrary to the public interest. 
Despite the recognition of public interest in restraints of tra de~ 
this test of reasonab l e ne ss was in f act applied to a limited extent . 
11. Printing 5, T' um3ri ca_L ~~9i_§terir.c;_Co v Sc=i1r-_2~ (1875) L. R. 19 
Eq 462 pc!r Jessel _t,.~~-
15 
A range of contracts prejudicial to competition continued to be 
12 
upheld by the courts. Further, the law of torts did not operate 
to protect trade rs adversely affected by the restrictive practices 
of competitors. In cases brought under the economic torts the 
courts found that tort liability for restrictive practices and trade 
combinations depended on establishing either that the purpose of 
the practice or combination wa s unlawful, or that unlawful means had 
b 1 d h 1 h
. 13 
een emp oye . In t e Mo g u Ste ams i p case, brought on the ground 
of conspiracy to injure through the imposition of a boycott on 
shippers refusing to enter an exclus ive dealing arranqe ment, the 
Court of Appeal d e cide d th a t there was no cause for action because 
the defe ndants had done nothing in itself unl awful, nor was their 
objective - to extend their own trade a nd incre a se profits - unla wful : 
" they have done nothing rrore agai nst the 
plaintiffs than to pursue t o the bitt er end a 
war of co~ etition waged in the interest of 
their cwn trade . " 
In other words, economic s elf-interest was sufficient justification 
for the actions o f th e de fendants. 
The reluctance o f t he c o urts to addre ss themselves direct ly to 
12. For exarrpl e , ~owlinqs v Ger.cral Tr2ding Co [1921) 1 K.B . 635 (concenu ng a 
collus i ve b idd.ii1g agreer,ent) ; Auto-1'!.ar t (Lc:!cdon) L td v Cnilton (1927) 
43 T.L. R. 463 (a "blaC'k-; . .isU11g
11 case) . 
13. Mogul Stearr.2hip C\) Ltd v r c(;regc2_s_C-ow_£ Co e t al [1892 ) A. C. 25, 32. 
Also , Ware &-L'e l'reville Ltd v ~:Ot.cr Trc1.c:L-=- A.c:sociat.icn [19 21] 3 K.B. 40. 
16 
the broad question of the public interest,'and the consequent absence 
of any effective overall check on trade restraints, largely prompted 
legislative intervention. In another respect, also, the common law 
failed to be an effective protector of the public interest. In so 
far as both parties to a restrictive practice were prepared to observe 
its terms, it would not come before the courts. A person who, as a 
member of the public or otherwise, was not a party could not impeach 
a contract before the courts, because of tl1e doctrine of privity of 
contract. The Legislature sought to overcome this failing, as will be 
seen, by intervening to provide, in most cases, for an official or an 
official body to act on behalf of the public in questioning any 
commercial practice. 
For these broad reasons Parliament was not content to leave to 
tl1e common law the . reconciliation of private and public interests in 
matters of competition. 
Having the motivation, the Legislature found justification for 
intervention in terms of economics. With the fading of the 'laissez-
faire' era competition became an economic force to be protected and 
positively encouraged. It was inferential that appropriate steps be 
taken to deal with influences which might discourage free 
competition. Such action was seen as especially important in New 
Zealand where the market was, and is, characterised by a small scale 
and range of en te rprise a~d production. The Government and Parliament 
17 
were of one mind in the view that in the restricted commercial 
environment, which in itself presented a limitation on competition, 
it was essential that there should be as full an exercise of 
competitive rights as possible, unfettered by artificial 
restrictions. Unlike the courts, Parliament considered that when 
competition was restricted and prices threatened (whether 
identifiably or not), a prima facie case for control existed. In 
this respect the Legislature believed it was following 
" ••. the ccmron consent of civilisation that 
trade must be controlled, . • • ". 14 
Because of the diffidence of the courts towards these issues the 
controls needed to be legislative ones. 
Indirect Intervention 
It would not be apparent from a knowledge only of the present 
legislation on commercial practices that initially Parliament showe d 
a reluctance to permit interference with the freedom of traders. 
But the first form of intervention was in fact indirect. The 
early legislation introd~ced to deal with competition and 
prices aimed to check private monopolies by providing a 
competitor in the ma1:ket, viz, the State. The establishment by Act 
in 1869 of the Gove rnment Life Office was followe d by the Public 
Trust Office Act 1872 and the State Fire Insura nce Act 1903. The then 
current view , tha t i n t e rfere nce with comme rce shou ld b e mini:na. l and 
14. N.Z.P.D. (1919) Vol. 184, 906. Hon. Sir Francis r-.e l l on t he Board of Trace 
Sill 1919 . 
beneficial, was revealed in the debate on the 1869 Bill when 
the Colonial Treasurer said: 
"'Ihere was no doubt that the law of supply and 
demand should not be interfered with, ex02pt 
in extraordinary cases, by the Governrrent, 
but it had been found in England that, in 
dealing with many of the practical questions 
that arose out of the social and political 
condition of the country, that law could 
sanetirres be lr>...neficially infringed. 11 15 
18 
Even this moderate approach met with disagreement among members, 
and direct government trading was not universally welcomed. The 
effect of these measures on prices, however, would seem to have 
amply justified them a s a means of regulating prices. For 
example, the State Fire Office began opera t ing in J.905 with 
premiums 10 percent be low the ruling rates set by the private 
companies' 'ring'. The latter immediately reduced premiums on , 
houses and chattels by 33 1/3 percent, which was in return met 
by the State Fire Office. (This outcome is of interest in terms 
of the potential effectiveness of later legislatio~ which 
recognised price regulation as an alternative and back-up to 
free competition.) 
Still, the Legislature did not find in indirect intervention 
a satisfactory means of ensuring that where the fr e edom of traders 
or combinations of th em conflicted with the public interest, the 
15. N.Z.P.D. (1869) (L.C.), Vol. 7, 673 
latter would prevail. In 1908 a direct approach was sought 
to resolve such conflicts in law~ 
Direct Legisl a tive Inte rvention 
Direct intervention in any area through legislation places 
a requirement on Parliament to address itself to specific 
policy and drafting questions. It must consider 
whether or not offences will be created 
the nature of the structure to be provided, 
especi a lly how r e sponsibilities will be 
allocated 
where shall lie the onus of proof 
the ambit of the statutory provisions 
the defi~ition of terms. 
Successive ena ctme nts de aling with commerci a l practice s a nd 
prices from 1908 reveal tha t these legislative issues were 
19 
decided in diffe rent ways and to varying extents. These are now 
considere d. 
Monopoly Prevention Ac t 190 8 
As the first sign ificant legislative e xpression of 
Parliament's b e l i ef i n d i rect intervention in this field, it i s 
not r emarkable tha t th i s Act, which crea t e d e conomic remedi e s for 
monopo l y s ituations , was of limited scope . A cons olid ation o f 
t wo earlie r enactment: s, the Act co ve r ed , i n t wo Pa rts, 
a gr i cultura l imp lements , and f l our and othe r pro d u c t s . Despi te 
20 
its restricted ambit, however, its provisions exhibited an interesting 
contrast in approach. 
To deal wiU1 agricultural implements (their manufacture, 
importation and sale) a board of inquiry was established with the 
function of investigating complaints, regarding the prices of and 
competition from imported implements, from local manufacturers made 
to the Minister of Customs. The board consisted of a Judge of the 
Court of Arbitration (the Chairman), the Presidents of the Farmers' 
Union and the Industrial Association of Canterbury, and two persons 
appointed by the Governor-General representing the Trades and Labour 
Councils and the Agricultural and Pastoral associations. The board 
met only when summoned by the Minister, and reported to him 
recorrunending the re lief, if any, to be granted. The board's reports 
were required to be laid before Parliament. In contrast the 
wholesale prices of flour, wheat and potatoes were to be investig a ted 
by the Court of Arbitration acting on the direction of the Governor-
General. For this purpose the merr~ership of the Court was 
supplemented by a representative of the Agricultural and 
Pastoral societie s. If prices were found to be unreasonably high 
the Court had to recommend the Governor-Gene ral exercise his 
powe r to declare the impor tation of the commodity duty free. No 
attempt was made to define, or lay down guidelines as to, what were 
'un fa ir' conmeti tion and I unreasonably' high prices. As .. 
observed by Collinge, "Not surprisingly, the machinery of the Act 
does not appear to have been used to any appreciable extent. 16 
The Act was also conspicuous for its removal of the right to 
private actions being brought in respect of the areas covered -
a feature which pertains to all subsequent legislation on 
restrictive practices, trade combinations and prices. 
Commercial Trusts Act 1910 
In a marke d de p a rtur2 from the approach adopted in the 1908 
17 
Act, from the law of New Zealand, and from prevailing economic 
18 
precepts, the Commercial Trusts Act was passed for the direct 
repression of monopolies. The Act favoured agreements being 
checke d by law r ather than by administrative action, i n which 
respe ct the Legisla ture ch ose generally to follow the American 
anti-trust laws and, for the provisions of the Ac t , Australian 
legisl a t i on passed ·fou:i::- yea rs previously. Some conside rat i on of 
how Pa rli ament dealt with this measure is wor thwhile because in 
21 
the long term movement towa r ds administrati ve contr ols it represe n t s 
something. of a n abe rratio n, and yet the 'illegal per se' path 
~s not wholly d i scarded i n later legislation. 
16 . Collinge, op . ci t. , p. 39 . 
17. 'l'his point was made in the debate on the Bill by Hon . Dr ,J.G. Findl ay : 
11 
••• the law i n NcW Zealand , although it decl ares an agreerrent to combine 
arrong empl oyers, manufacb..1rers or mer chants void, c:ces not rriake it criminal. 
This Bill marks a divergence from t hat rul e . " N. Z.P .D., (1910), Vol.153 ,p . 293 ~ 
18. E.g. , in M3rc...1i.ants ' h<,£ociation v R (19J.3) 32 N. Z.L.R. 537, 550, the opi nion 
was expre~dthat the o·ii:onces cr;ated by the Act had intrcduced "an 
cxten.si ve d2parture frrn1 the eoonomic cloctrines of rrc-re rrodern tirres. " 
22 
Four offences were created by the Act, but only two -
exclusive dealing agreements and refusals to deal - were prohibited 
outright. Monopolies were prohibited "if of such a nature as to be 
contrary to the public interest" while price fixing by commercial 
trusts was made illegal where the price so fixed was "unreasonably 
' 1119 h b d . high . T ese tests were to e etermined by the courts. Finding 
difficulty in specifying what constituted the public interest the 
Legislature agreed to leave this as a matter for the discretion of 
20 
the courts ; and recognising the impossibility of laying down a 
prescribed rule to determine whether a price was reasonable or not, 
the term "unreasonably high 11 (as used undefine d in the Monopoly 
Pre vention Act) was defined ve ry generally as one which "produce s 
or is calculated to produce more than a fair a nd reason a ble rate o f 
. . ,,21 
comme rcial profit. Penalties for offence s consisted of fin e s, 
I 
but in addition, under section 13, the Supreme Court could grant a n 
injunction against the continuation or repetition of th e offence . 
P r oceedings under the Act could be commenced only by the Attorne y-
General on behalf of the Crown. 
While an extreme measure, the Act can b e expla ined in terms o f 
the economic circumstance s of the time . Th e debate on the Bill in 
19. Sections 5 and 6. 
20. In the N'.ercl1ants ' Associ ation case, s upra n. 18, the Court o f Appeal gave 
'public interest ' a broad interpretation . Finding a prirra. facie detr:irrent 
to t he public i nterest in the prire effect of the nonoi_X)ly o:mcerr.cd, the 
Court consi dered as countervailing factors , at pp J::251-1252, tl:e extent to 
which the rronopoly might b2 1120:::ssary to prev>ent ( :struction cif t he 
industry or to scci..ll:'e efficient distribt. tion of the product . 
21. Section 8 . 
' 
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both Houses concentrated in very great detail on the effect on prices 
of the development of the trust, seen largely as a product of major 
inventions in steam, communications and transport, and the division 
and co-operation of labour, which demanded big economic units. 
Hon. Dr Findlay, Minister in charge of the Bill in the Legislative 
Council, highlighted the significance for the provisions of the Bill 
of economic factors when he said that 
"'Ihe present Bill, and what it inplies, is a syrrptom . • • 
of the evolution of our industrial world; and you 
cannot understand - you cannot justify - this law unless 
you go b<=>...hind it and try to get sorre grasp of the 
operations which rrak.e it a necessity in this country as 
elsewhere. • • • "22 
The severity of the Act is the reason for the limit which was 
placed on its application. A small ntunber of major conunodities only 
were included in the Schedule. The Legislature saw the importance of 
specifying itself the commodities to be cove~~d by the Act, and also 
considered that the Schedule should be extended only at the will of 
. 23 
Parliament. 
Although there was agreement that the machinery provided by 
the Act was sufficient for the purposes, the <lebate on the Bill 
revealed certain reservations held about its likely practical effect. 
In particular, it was felt that there would be difficulties in 
enforcing penalties as trusts tended to find ways of eluding such 
22. Supra, n. 17. 
23. Only one att.8rrpt was made during the debate to extend the Sd1edule -· to 
beer. This was defeated on a division. N. Z.P .D. (1910) , Vol. 153, p. 15. 
24 
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punitive provisions. Further, it was expected that only in clear-
cut cases brought under the Act would a verdict of guilty ensue. 
25 
.Border-line cases would probably not be caught. 
of the Act would in practice be indirect: 
"'lhe great bulk of our repressive laws have an 
indirect effect. 'lhe fact that you have an 
Act of this kind on the statute-book will be 
of value .... It ma.y have a preventive effect, 
and if it has it \vill be justifiable. 
11
26 
The main effect 
These expressions of qualification about the practical effect 
of the Act almost foreshadowed the outcome of the Crown Milling 
27 
case which demonstrated its major weakness - that the statutory 
formulae for determining matters of economic import were too wide 
for the ordinary courts to handle effectively. This well-known 
case dealt with two main issues, namely, whether a partial 
monopoly was created, and, if so, wh e ther it was contrary to the 
public interest. The first was conceded in the New Zealand 
Supreme Court which found, however, that the partial monopoly was 
not against the public interest. A majority of the Court of 
Appeal, taking an a pproach which viewed, as a matter of law, any 
monopoly or monopolistic t ende ncy as being pernicious in itself, 
reversed the l a tte r decision of the Supreme Court which was, 
however, r e stored on appea l t o the Privy Council. 
24. N.Z.P. D. (1910), Vol. 152, p . 643. 
25. Ibid . , Vol. 153, p . 297. 
26. Ibid., p . 298. 
27. R v Crcwn Millir•o Co Ltd (1925) N; Z. L . R . 258 (S .C.); ----- --~ ----
758 (C.A. ); [} 927] A.C. 39 1 (P.C .). 
25 
The Privy Council decision raised a number of points which, as 
later discussion in this paper shows, found a subsequent response 
from the Legislature. These are summarised by Robson thus: 
"'Ihe Privy Council considerably restricted the 
scx,pe of the question by saying: 'It is not 
for this tribunal, nor any tribtmal, to 
adjudicate as bebv-een conflicting theories of 
poll tical econo!l¥. ' 17 'll1ey thought that the 
legislature had in view that there might be 
cases of rronopoly or o:mtrol which would not 
be contra....vy to the public interest. 'Ihat a 
IIDnopoly was contrary to the public interest 
had to be established in each particular case 
of prosecution. 'Ihe burden of prcof was llp'.)n 
the Cro.m. • • • II 28 
Following its discrediting by the Crown Milling case the Act was not 
used again despite earlier attempts to strengthen its operation by the 
setting up of machinery for investigating and reporting to the 
Minister on alleged ,infringements of its provisions. 29 For the 
Legislature, the case was a confirmation of the efficacy of the 
alternative, administrative, approach, already embarked on in the 
Board of Trade Act of 1919. 
Board of Trade Act 1919 
By passing the Board of Trade Act Parliament simultaneously 
affirmed its belief in legislative intervention in the regulation of 
industry and trade, and made its first perfectly clear decision to 
provide for an administrative method of intervention : 
28. Robson , J.L., (ed.) , New Zeal_a.r.d : Toe D2vc,1oprrent o:: its Laws and Constituticn 
(19G7) , 290. Fcot..n.ote 17 r.cfers to Cro:·m ,1illin,J C<? Ltd v ~ [1927] A. C. 394, 402 . 
29. Cost of Livi..11g Act 1915, sect.ion 6 (a). 
II •. anything that is required to prevent excessive 
prices . . . should be provided by a sensible law on 
the statute-book. 'Whether it be pro'fi teering, or 
exploitation, or anything else of the kind, there 
should be legislation to enable the country to deal 
With it, II 30 
"It is absolutely essential . . . that there Itn.1St be 
an independent body of persons . . • to provide the 
inforrration . . . to enable the public, w'hether it 
be Parliarrent or the public authority, to prohibit 
or to satisfy itself that no iniquity exists. Here, 
then, we have ... the cardinal and essential 
oondition precedent - narrely, a cxnpetent tribunal 
to inquire • . • " 31 
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The Act arose out of wartime experience with the administration 
of regulations, and from its predecessor the Cost of Living Act 1915. 
The 1915 Act established a Board of Trade with the limited function 
of investigating and reporting on matters of corr~erce. Reports 
were made to the Governor-General. As a means of regulating 
commerce, especially in respect of prices, this machinery proved to 
- be inadequate, as indicated by the absence by 1919 of any occasion 
on which the regulation-making provision relating to the powers of 
Borough Councils was invoked. Under the 1919 Act a further Board, 
similarly constituted but with stronger powers, was set up, 
consisting of the Minister of 'l'rade and Industry as the chairman, 
and four members appointed by the Governor-General. 
Both inquisitorial and investigatory functions were co~ferred 
30. N.Z.P.D. (1919), Vol. 184, 561. Rt. Hon. Sir J.G. Ward. 
31, Ibid., 908. Hen. Sir Francis Bell. 
on the Board, the former to be conducted judicially. The purposes 
of judicial inquiries and investigations included, inter alia, the 
obtaining of information for the prevention or suppression of 
monopolies, unfair competition and other practices detrimental to 
the public welfare, and for the proper regulation in the public 
interest of the prices of goods and services. 
32 
' Essentially, the 
reason for conferring these two distinct functions on the Board 
were to enable it, 
(i) to conduct inquiries into specific matters 
(on its own motion, on reference from the 
Governor-General, or on a complaint) and 
adjudicate; and 
(ii) to conduct gene ral investigations either if 
the hature of a matter considered by judicial 
inquiry appeared to merit a more wide-ranging 
examination, or if a general investigation was 
suggested by the nature of a matter raised as 
being more appropriate than a judicial inquiry. 
In respect of its powers, a signi f icant development wa s the 
revocation of the 1915 provision that t he Commissions of Inquiry 
Act 1908 should apply to the Board's e xercise o f its functions. 
This was found in pra c t ice to be unsat i sfactor y and on the Board's 
reconsti t u tion it was r e place d with spe ci f ied powers relating to 
32 . Sections 13 and 23 r<:?spectiv2ly . 
J the conduct of inquiries and investigations. Here, perhaps, can be 
• 
.. 
• 
.. 
identified the first occasion on which Parli'arnent could be said to 
have turned its mind directly on, and resolved, certain matters of 
procedure. These were: 
(a) Meetings should be held in private (section 21). 
This was seen as a necessary adjunct to the 
receipt and consideration of evidence concerning 
private business. The Act provided, however, for 
the publication by the Board of information which 
it considered might be in the public interest, 
subject to the proviso that published evidence 
not be the basis of an action for defamation, 
(section 34) . 
(b) Evidence could be taken on oath, and witnesses 
summonsed, (section 14). Possible incrimination 
was not an excuse for declining to give evidence, 
(section 16). This provision was based on 
numerous precedents in New Zealand legislation, 
and was to be found in the Monopoly Prevention 
and the Commercial 'l'rusts Acts. 
(c) Delegation was permitted of all or any of the 
Board's powers to an individual member or group 
of members of the Board, (section 18). 
29 
(d) The parties to an inquiry included any person 
whom the Board deemed to have sufficient 
interest in the result, and parties could 
appear personally or by representation, 
(section 19) . 
Each of these provisions represents an area of procedure to 
which the Legislature was to return, in most cases in more detail, 
in later enactments. The Act was silent, however, on the question 
of appeal and review. Given the discretionary nature of the Board's 
powers and the fact that the chairman was to be the Minister of 
Industries and Commerce, it would appear that little existed in 
the way of safeguards against decisions made, especially since the 
courts in subsequent cases showed caution in 'trespassing' on 
spheres of ministerial activity and, in cases concerning the 
adrrQnistration, have tended to invoke or at least refer to the 
existing checks provided by the political system through ministerial 
. . . 33 
responsibility. 
A particularly striking feature of the Act was the extremely wide 
power conferred on the Governor-General for making regulations. 
While it is true that some specific powers for the Board were laid 
down in the statute, much deta il was left for determination by 
regul a tion - the source of strong contention in the debate on the Bill. 
33. For ex&rpJe , Liv~_rs id({_e v P.nderson [1942) A. C. 206, 222 
per Visco1..·nt M2.ugham, .Jl°1d 279 per Lc!'.'d Wri.g'.1.t ; Pagliara v ~ttorney-Ger-era J. 
[197 4] 1 N.Z .L. R. 86, 95 rer Quill.ic:.:..:1 J. 
30 
The regulations were, in fact, used extensively, for the very reason 
of deficiencies which emerged in the course of the Act's operation. 
Apart from fixing prices, for which regulations obviously would be 
a convenient tool, regulations also established further machinery 
for the supervision and control of trade. The Board of Trade 
(Onion) Regulations 1938,
34 
for example, provided for: the 
appointment of an Advisory Committee to advise the Minister on 
variations in minimum onion prices, members to be paid fees; the 
registration of onion growers and merchants; and offences for the 
failure to comply with the Regulation. The government's reliance 
on regulations tended to increase, and the provision was retained 
on the dissolution of the Board in 1923 and in the Industries and 
Commerce Act 1956 which repealed the Board of Tra.de Act. 
The Act also created offences, viz, hoarding, if the effect 
was to raise prices, and the selling of goods at unreasonably high 
prices. The Legislature did not see fit to extend the definition 
of '~easonably' beyond that employed in the Commercial Trusts Act. 
Prosecutions could be brought only with the consent of the Board. 
The Board of Trade was abolished in 1923 by the Board of Trade 
Amendment Act, and its powers were vested solely in the Minister 
who could delegate tc any officer of his department any of those 
powers of judicial inquiry and investigation, as originally conferred 
34. S.R. 1938/25. 
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on the Board. An Advisory Board was appointed, with provision for 
assistant members to be co-opted for their expert knowledge. A 
further Board of Trade was set up under the 1950 Board of Trade Act, 
with primarily advisory functions, but deriving from the customs 
rather than the industries and commerce field. 
With the apparent convenience and especially the flexibility 
of the administrative approach, combined with the effective negation 
by the courts of the 'illegal per se' approach of the Commercial 
Trusts Act, it was almost inevitable that the Legislature would 
continue to adopt, and build on, the former. That there was a risk 
connected with the granting to an outside body of powers to regulate 
m~tters of considerable economic importance was recognised by the 
Legislature. With the establishment of the Board of Trade much 
was entrusted to the quality and independence of the membership, and 
35 
to the extent of the powers conferred. Subsequent legislation 
indicates the ways in which Parliament responded to these concerns. 
Prevention of Profiteering Act 1936 
In an attempt to remedy statutory deficiencies in the legislation 
providing for profiteering, the Prevention of Profiteering Act was 
passed in 1936. The move to more strictly regulate pricing practices 
was taken in the context of a range of post-depression economic 
35. See N.Z.P.D. (1919j, Vol. 184, p. 909. 
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policies, and simply made it an offence to sell or offer to sell 
goods or services at a price exceeding by an unreasonable amount 
a defined "basic price". 
In the debate on .the Bill the Minister in charge pointed out 
that its provisions could equally have been created by regulation 
under the Board of Trade Act, but considering the public interest 
in pricing matters this course consciously had been rejected in 
favour of a separate enactment, allowing full public discussion. 
36 
In fact, the Bill did not depart from the earlier Act (as amended 
in 1923) in so far as the Minister retained control, proceedings 
being initiated only at his direction. Where it differed 
significantly was in the provision for special judicial tribunals 
to be set up, ad hoe, by the Governor-General to determine cases 
arising, jurisdiction to be exercised by a Stipend iary Magis t rate
37 
who was to be gui'ded by more precise criteria in deciding wh e th e r 
profiteering had occurred than had been laid down in previous 
legislation. The Magistrate was, further, permitted to consider 
. . . th . 38 evidence beyond that legally admissible in o er proce edin gs, a 
provision which, in relation to legislation on commercial 
practices, had first appeared in the Commercial Trusts Act in 
connection with proceedings of the Supreme Court in recovering 
penalties. 
36. N.Z.P.D. (19 36), Vol. 24 6, p. 137. 
37. Se ctions 5(1) and 6(1). 
38. Section 10 . 
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The Act was never tested - it was repealed in 1947 without 
any proceedings having been initiated. The explanation for this was 
to be found not in the adequacy or otherwise of its provisions, but 
in the procedure followed by the Minister and his department - not 
laid down in the Act - in seeking through conciliation a voluntary 
curtailment of prices by persons investigated after a complaint. 
Departmental records show that a nurrber of investigations were made 
under the Act but that in all cases the persons or companies 
concerned voluntarily reduced prices on an approach from the 
department, thereby avoiding the need for proceedings to be 
. . d 39 1nst1. tute . In practical terms the success of conciliation was 
a matter of considerable significance, to be adopted ~ormally in 
later legislation. This aspect, rather than the Act itself, marks 
the Prevention of Profiteering Act out in the evolution of an 
administrative ap~roach to the control of commercial practices and 
prices. 
Industrial Efficiency Act 1936 
,Also in 1936 the Industrial Efficiency Act was considered and 
passed by Parliame nt, conce rned less directly than previous 
legislation with commercial practices and prices and more with the 
supervision and regulation of industrial development. As sugge ste d 
by Robson, however, the Legislature would h ave considered the 
complementary nature of these substantive aspec t s: 
39. From evlclenre presented by G.D. Stringer in a paf€r prepared for the Diplcma 
of Public Ac]mi[)J_stration , Victoria Ur..iversity of ~,'ellington , 1973, 1-'.spects 
of Direct Prire Control. 
''Questions of rronopoly and price control inevitably 
raise those concerned with irrlustrial efficiency. " 
4o 
Of greatest interest in the present context was the nature of 
the machinery created for the broad objects of the Act, based on 
a registration and licensing system administered by a Bureau of 
Industry. The system was heavily bureaucratic, effectively 
providing for absolute control by the Minister with some 
consultation with outside interests through the presence in the 
Bureau of special members appointed as representatives of producer 
and employee groups. (Ordinary members were public servants with 
relevant expertise.) The Bureau was responsible for compiling 
registers of industries on the direction of the Minister who could 
. . . 41 
then declare any registered industry to be subject to licensing. 
Licence applications were to be made to the Bureau which granted 
34 
licences in its discretion, subject to certain guidelines laid down. 
Here, the standing provision of the Board of Trade Act 1919 was taken 
a step further with an additional specification regarding the 
opportunity to present evidence. Section 15(2) read: 
urn considering any application for a license ... the 
Bureau shall give to the applicant and to all other 
persons who in its opinion will, whethe..r directly or 
indirectly, re materially affected by its decision, a 
sufficient oppor~unity to produce evidence or to make 
representations to the Bureau . . . " 
Further, a requirement that reasons be given made its first appearance 
in the evolution of the l egisl ation here under consideration. On 
refusal of a licence the Bureau had to notify the applicant, stating 
40. Robson, op. cit., p. 303. 
41. Sections 13 and 14. 
35 
. . 42 
reasons for the decision. 
Another innovation was the provision of an appeal right, for 
any licence applicant aggrieved by a decision of the Bureau and for 
h b 1 f h 
. . 43 any ot er person y eave o t e Minister. The right of 
appeal was circumscribed, however, by virtue of the Minister 
functioning as the appeal body. This had the curious effect that 
the Minister adjudicated upon the decisions of an administrative 
body on matters which he referred to that body by declaring that 
the licensing procedure was to be applied. No appeal lay against 
the Ministe r's declaration that an industry should be licensed, but 
such a declaration made it unlawful for an industry to carry on in 
business without a licence. As the Appeal Authority the Minister 
was required to take into account not only the general purpos e s o f 
the Act, but also the ''economic necessity of securing efficiency 
. . . 44 and co-ordination in industry." The appeal cases were, 
accordingly, a virtua l declaration of the goverr.ment's economic 
policy, the factors which were taken into account in determining 
45 appeals having included the desirability of a balanced economy, 
the protection of d omestic industry,
46 
and the ills of destructive 
. . 47 
competition. 
The Act tended , in o pera tion, to contradict its intent by 
42. Section 18. 
43. Section 21. 
44. Section 21(4). 
45. Deci sion of 3/12/ £15 of Irrlustrial Appeal Autlx)ri ty in appeals by 
M. Michelin and Co Ltd arid Others . Unrep::,rted. 
46. Decision of 16/4/-15 cf Ir.du.stria.l Appeal Authority in appeal by .AnB.lgarrated 
WirelAs~· (Austrc:l.::i.sia) Ltd. Unrep::,rte:L --------· 
47. Decision of 28/1/4.6 of Ir.a.l1:.::trjal Ap~a.l Authori ty in appeal by 
!:'CXl!3Juve Shoe _:,1 -1~;11fact1rrir.9 Co Ltd . Unreported . 
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fostering existing industries irrespective of their efficiency. 
Its administration, as Robson noted, "did riot develop in the 
• d b ' II 48 fullness envisage y Parliament, perhaps for the reason of its 
being held closely in the hands of the Minister. Nevertheless, 
some precedent in respect of procedural requirements was established. 
The Act was repealed by the Industries and Commerce Act 1956 
which provided for the continuation of licensing for those 
industries licensed under the 1936 Act, subject to the Minister 
being able to release any particular industry from the earlier 
. . . . 49 
licensing provisions. 
Control of Prices Act 1947 
In the disturbed economic conditions of post-war times the 
Legislature returne d again to the direct question of pr.ices in the 
' 
Control of Prices Act of 194 7 which created the most detailed system 
for price control yet enacted. In respect of concept and detail 
the Act can be regarded as the forerunner of present legislation in 
the area with which this paper is concerned, both because of new 
provisions which became settled procedure, and because of the way in 
which the Act drew into a format which still subsists elements of 
earlier legislation. Like the Board of Trade Act, this Act 
combined administrative controls of a judicial and investigatory 
nature with offences , but ministerial invol veme;i t was lessened 
and, for the first time , Parliam~nt saw the appropriateness of 
public hearings. The importance of the measure was such as to 
P.obson , op . cit. , 309 . 
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ensure that the Bill was referred to a select committee for 
consideration. In moving its referral, Hon. Mr Nordmeyer described 
it as 
"a very far reaching rreasure, and it v.Duld be 
unwise for the House to proceed wit.hit until 
the public had had an op:i;:ortunity of 50 
considering it and rre.king representations." 
A wide range of organisations responded to the opportunity to be heard, 
as a result of which the Industries and Commerce Committee proposed 
some important amendments, to which reference is made below. 
The main feature of the Act was a Price Tribunal, initially set 
. 51 
up under emergency regulations but now removed to the sphere of 
more permanent administration. No qualifications were specified for 
members, and despite the argument of an Opposition member, that 
II 
I 
the tribunal is still a :i;:olitical 
tribunal. The members are ap:i;:ointed during 
the pleasure of the Govenurent and can re 
rerroved from time to ti.-re at the will of the 
Governrrent. 1152 , 
no provision was made for security or continuity of tenure. This was 
a contradiction of membership provisions of earlier legislation, 
especially as in the Board of Trade Act where special emphasis was 
placed on expertise and representative interests, and on a five-year 
tenure. 
50. N.Z.P.D. (1947) Vol. 278, p. 431. A request frorrt an Op:;:::osition rranl:er that 
the Industries and Comrerce Corrmittee be open to the news ncdia for tie 
hearing of evidence was unsuccessful. 
51. Control of Prices Errergency Regulations 1939, S.R. 1939/275. 
52. N. Z .P .D. (194 7) Vol. 279, p. 256. Mr Watts. 
The functions of the Price Tribunal were, inte~ alia, to 
make price orders (section 15) 
issue price approvals (section 16) 
investigate complaints received directly 
or referred by the Minister (section 10) 
institute proceedings for price offences (section 10) 
issue by notice in the Gazette exemptions 
from price control (included at the instigation 
of the select committee but transferred to the 
Minister in 1956) (section 18). 
A distinction can be made (and was made by the Minister introducing 
the Bill) between the judicial and administrative functions of the 
Tribunal, but it is also the case that the Tribunal had a 
38 
legislative function in making price orders and issuing price approvals· 
which could have general application throughout the country. 
Wider powers for obtaining evidence than were previously seen 
were granted to the Tribunal, including access to such books and 
documents as required, the power tc require returns of information 
from producers, manufacturers, distributors and retailers and to 
53 inspect stocks and take samp l e s. For the purposes of its 
investigations the Tr i bunal could take evidence on oath; and in 
respect of the giving of incriminating evidence identica l provisions 
54 to those of the Board of Trade Act were enacted. · These were seen 
as neces s2ry powers to gi ve Ed.feet to the intent of the Act , although 
5 3 . Sections 11 , 13 and 14 . 
54 .. Sectic,11 12 . 
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submissions to the select committee objected strongly to the extent 
of the powers so conferred, and held that that concerning 
incriminating evidence was repugnant to the common law of the 
land. 
No right of appeal against decisions of the Tribunal was 
granted, but on matters delegated to the Director of Price Control 
under section 39 (later the Secretary of Industries and Commerce) 
the Tribunal took on an appellate function, determining appeals in 
such manner as it thought fit. The Director's decision remained in 
force pe nding the outcome of an appeal. 
The provision for delegation (of all or any of the Tribunal's 
powers) was prompted largely by major difficulties experien c e d 
under the preceding price administration system. Much criticism 
was voiced before 'the select committee of the long delays that had 
accompanied price applications, and in practice the de partme nt had 
carried out most of D~e p ricing work with the Tribunal functioning 
mainly as the appellate body. Enforcement, too, had been a proble m. 
With statutory de legation the department was able to build up the 
numbers of sta f f employed in price control, as shown in its annual 
reports, to 206 in 1948 and 240 in 1949. The scheme was further 
assisted by the use of district offices to handle applications for 
price increases. Thus it was expe cted that such matters as did not 
require a p ub lic hearing a nd which f e ll into fairly well-define d 
cate gories could be g iven speedy att e ntion. 
The provision for public hearings was clearly the most 
significant innovation to be found in the Act, representing a 
complete reversal of earlier legislative provisions, and of the 
provisions of the 1939 Regulation which required hearings to be in 
private unless the Tribunal ordered otherwise. Under the latter, 
the Tribunal had seen fit to open its hearings to the public in 
only a few cases, reflecting the general view that the operations 
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of the business community should remain private. Mr Watts, a member 
of the Industries and Commerce Committee, reiterated in the House 
the 9bjection raised in submissions to the inconvenience that 
public hearings would cause: 
ft • . a date must be fixed, and witnesses must be 
called and warned to apr:ear at a certain tine 
resulting in all the paraphernalia and delays 
associated with public hearings of any dispute, 
either in our Courts or before a judicial 
tribl.Il1al
1
• 'Ihe effect of that will be greatly to 
delay the work of the tribunal. ... 1155 
The House chose, however, to favour the benefits of public access 
to proceedings on pricing issues over mere expedience. The Tribunal 
was given the discretion to sit in private and prohibit publication 
of proceedings, and on the recommendation of the select committee 
the bond of secrecy was imposed on mewbers and staff of the 
'b 56 Tri unal. 
The Act did not follow the Industrial Efficiency Act in 
requiring that the Tribunal give reasons for its decisions, but the 
55 • N. Z .P .D. (1947) , op. cit. 1 p. 526 . 
56, S2ctions 5(5), 5(6), and 8. 
' ' 
emphasis on public hearings was interpreted by the courts in cases 
brought against decisions of the Tribunal as requiring the Tribunal 
. . . . . 57 
in its procedure to act Judicially. 
As mentioned above, offences were also created under this Act, 
including the by then standard price offences of black marketing, 
hoarding, refusals to sell and profiteering. In respect of the 
latter, once again the Legislature declined to expand on the 
definition of 'unreasonably' high prices, as being those which 
produced, or were calculated to produce, more than a fair and 
reasonable rate of commercial profit. Thus this still was left to 
the courts to decide, as a matter of fact. The courts were given a 
further task of factual determination in respect of the offence of 
exceeding maximum prices that might be charged on goods subject to 
price approvals. The maximum price was described in the Act as the 
lowest price charged for other goods of the same kind when sold in 
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5 8 
substantially the same quantities and on substantially the same terms. 
The existence of these conditions, under section 22(a), was determina ble 
by the courts. In addition, section 22(b) placed on the defendant the 
entire burden of proving that his prices were based on variations from 
conditions applying in the market for the same goods which were 
substantial. In subsequent legisla tion on comrnercial practices the 
question of where the burde n of proof lay in any proceedings became a 
central issue. 
57. Notably, F .E. Jackson and Co Ltd v Price Tr i bunal (!\b . 2) (1950] N.Z.L.R. 433 
58. Secti on 20. 
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A large number of successful prosecutions were brought under 
the Act. The department's annual report for 1950 records a total 
of 3,661 convictions for breaches of price-control measures between 
early 1940 and 31 March 1950, fines totalling £16,377. 5s.
59 
In 1954 the Tribunal on the Minister's request, held an inquiry 
into the policy of price de-control. In the course of the inquiry 
the relationships between the Tribunal, and the department and the 
Minister, were brought into focus, some interests arguing that the 
Tribunal should be guided by the course of policy laid down by the 
60 
Government. In a decision on a price order the Tribunal affirmed 
the view that it was from the 1947 Act 
"under which duties, functions and rx:,;,1ers are confen·Ed 
on the Tribunal by tl1e legislature that the intentions 
of the leg·islature must be gathered. The Tribunal is 
established to carry out the purposes of the Act urrler 
which it is constituted .... Policy as to the 
continuation, 0..tension , or discrimination of price 
fixation for the purposes of price control is to be 
spelled out of those factors which have their basis in 
th Ac ot ut f 1 t . . h 1161 e t, n o o e ec 1oneermg speec .es . . . . 
In the same inquiry the Tribunal suggested a revised role for price 
control in the future, based on its opinion that where free and open 
competition was operating effectively, it should be unnecessary to 
59. Departrrent of Industries and Corrrrerce, P..nnual Report for Year ended 
31 March 1950, A.J.H.R. (1950) Vol. N H.44, p. 28. 
60. Stringer, op. c.it., p. 30. 
61. Price Order 3592. 
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fix prices. The factors cited as possible impediments to competitive 
62 
conditions were monopolies and restrictive trade practices. To this 
extent the Tribunal predicted the substantive shape of the legislation 
which was to be enacted ~ithin four years, providing for an 
orientation towards commercial practices and prices which emphasised 
the former. 
Summary of Developments 1908 to 1958 
The foregoing survey of the methods chosen by the Legislature 
to deal with the questions of market structure and behaviour serves 
to disclose the thrust of constitutional and procedural developments 
antecedent to new legislation in 1958 which, though substantially 
innovative, reflected this background. In exactly fifty years the 
Legislature had progressed in three clearly identifiable ways: 
(i) From an initial reluctance to intervene Parliament, 
disenchanted with the courts, affirmed its belief in 
legislative machinery to regulate commercial practices 
and price levels. 
(ii) While specific market situations prompted the earlier 
legislation Parliament later responded to the perceived 
need for general controls which anticipated 
circumstance s which might be against the public interest. 
62. Stringer , op. cit., p. 33. 
(iii) Prohibitions and criminal sanctions gave way to a 
recognition that market restrictions and certain 
pricing practices might not necessarily be 
detrimental to the public interest, and that, 
indeed, in the New Zealand context a more 
permissive approach was appropriate. 
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This pattern of development was accompanied by the emergence 
of provisions for constitution and procedure which by no means 
met the demands of modern administrative law, but at least 
evinced the acceptance of the Legislature, that administrative 
controls should carry certain procedural requirements. In this, 
Parliament was prompted increasingly by the claims of the 
private sector which insisted that if controls were to be imposed, 
I 
then some safeguards should be provided. 
The reasons for the apparently piecemeal approach on the 
part of the Legislature to matters of substance and procedure 
over this period can readily be understood in terms of, 
respectively, the changing economic conditions an~ especially the 
special circumstances of war, and the wider context of the 
evolution of administrative law. 
By 1958 it was no longer necessary to look to the failings 
in the common law to find the motivation for legislative 
intervention in the field of conITTercial practices and prices. 
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The principle had become firmly entrenched· and further int
ervention 
had its own momentum. Neither was legislation by then req
uired to 
assist the Government in its policies for a controlled eco
nomy which 
had been the basis of the earlier tendency of retaining in
 the 
hands of the Minister a large degree of control and discre
tion. For 
these .reasons it was possible for Parliament to turn to th
e 
consideration of a more coherent legislative framework for
 
intervention in this area and to direct attention towards 
questions 
of manner and form as much as to substance. 
Whether such a possibility was realised can be seen in the
 
ensuing legislative history. Before this is considered, s
ome 
general discussion of tribunals - the factors that govern 
their 
choice and the procedures by which desirably they should b
e governed 
will be useful. Against this discussion can be assessed t
he important 
tribunals established under, first, the Trade Practices Ac
t of 1958 
and, later, the 1975 Commerce Act. 
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PART THREE 
THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 
Why Tribunals? 
In situations where decisions have to be made to se
ttle 
disputes where the interests of individuals confli
ct with the 
pursuit of the wider public interest, and where it
 is desired that 
the decision-making process involve the applicatio
n of certain 
criteria to particular cases, the New Zealand Leg
islature has been 
ready to confer jurisdiction on tribunals for the 
implementation of 
its legislative plans. Besides their use in the a
rea of commercial 
practices, as evidenced in the preceding section o
f this paper, a 
comprehensive survey of administrative tribunals in
 1965 identified 
61 tribunals, including appeal authorities, create
d by s t atute.
63 
The administrative tribunal stands between the cou
rts, at one 
end of the decision scale, and the executive gover
nment, through the 
Minister concerned, at the other. In terms of con
stitutional 
arrangemen ts and by reference to competence and re
sponsibility the 
tribunal as decider presents a number of advantages
 over both. 
As a sys tem for administrative adjudication in com
parison with 
the courts the advantages of the tribunal have been
 neatly summarised 
in the 19 5 7 report of a cormn.i. ttee set up in the Un
ited Kingdom, known 
63 · I:epartrrent of JL1.sti02, 'Ihe Citizen a>1d Paiver : J\ rrninistra
t:i.vc Tribunaln (1.965), 
. ~.---- -·- -----·-
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as the Franks Committee, to inquire into tribunals and 
inquiries: 
" . there are daronstrable s:i;:ecial reasons which 
rrake a tribunal rrore appropriate, namely the neErl 
for cheapness~ accessibility, freErlom from 
technicality, expe:iition arrl expert knONlErlge of a 
particular subject." 64 
In elaboration of these much quoted criteria it may be s
aid 
that a primary consideration is that the tribunal is no
t bound by 
the rules of evidence that constrain the courts. Not on
ly are 
tribunals free from the practice of the courts of placin
g a strict 
construction on the words of a statute, but they ma y, th
rough a 
process of investigation, supplement evidence put forwar
d by the 
parties with information obtained of their own accord. 
Neithe r are 
tribunals bound by precedent. These are important featu
res given 
that tribunals have been chosen most often to deal with 
matte rs o f 
social and economic concern wher e , because of changes br
ought a b o u t 
by government policy or spontaneously through society's d e
v e lopme nt, 
it is appropriate to consider different factors in diffe
rent cases 
or to consider the same factors in different lights and 
to 
determine que stions in the light of prevailing social an
d economic 
conditions; and are significant for tribunals exe rcisin
g both 
appellate and first instance jurisd iction. They may als
o b e seen 
as p a rt of the logic of privativ e c l ause s to exclude fur
ther review 
by th e ordina ry courts. 
In r e s pect of accessibility and exped i tion t r i b unals a re
 
a dvantaged by their ability t o operate l ess f o rmally tha
n the 
6 4 • Cmrrl 218 , op . cit 'I par a. . 38 . 
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courts. It will often be provided in the constating enactment that 
a tribunal may regulate its own procedure,
65 
although such a 
provision will need to be seen against any procedural rules laid 
down in the statute or regulations made thereunder, and, 
importantly, against the principles firmly established in the common 
law for the observance of natural justice (discussed below). 
Further, a tribunal may be enabled to adjust its procedure, where 
appropriate and where a better result may be achieved, to dispense 
with formal hearings and the associated procedural requirements. 
This is well illustrated in the conciliation process provided unde r 
the Trade Practices and Commerce Acts. 
Whether the advantage of "expert knowledge of a particular 
subject" pertains to a tribunal will depend on its constitution. 
As seen in the evolution of an administrative app roach to conune rcial 
practices and prices, it was not always provided that members 
should be ~p pointe d for the relevance of their knowledge a nd 
experience. It may also be noted that the establishme nt of 
specialist courts as, for example, the British Restrictive Practi c e s 
Cour t , will achi e ve the same end. 
As an a lternative to ministerial decision-making the tribunal 
h a s the overriding advantage of independe nce- · p rovided, of cours e , 
that its constitutio n is such as to f r ee it from ministeri a l 
d irection . Th ere wi ll also sometimes be the l e ss meri t o r ious benefit 
tha t t he creation o f a n a dminis t ra t ive t ribun a l ma y r elieve t he 
GS Cf Price 'l'ribuna l , Control of Prices Act 1947, sec+....ion 7. 
workload of a minister and his department and remove the burden of 
making difficult decisions. But the allocation of powers between 
ministers and independent tribunals will depend not so much on the 
apparent advantages of the latter as on the extent of policy 
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involved in the area of administration. If the policy considerations 
are major it is accepted in public opinion and conceded by the 
Legislature that under our political system certain actions and 
decisions should remai~ in the hands of the minister; where the policy 
is small or may be reduced to a set of guiding rules the decision-
making properly can be left to a tribunal. This can be appreciated 
by reference to the circumstances of the controlled economy which 
existed in New Zealand throughout the period of the two world wars 
and in each post-war period. As suggested earlier in this paper, the 
strong policy interest of the government in matters of p ricing and 
competition in the private sector was found to be justification for , 
their being kept under the close ministerial supervision, even when 
delegated to an administrative body. By 1958 when the Trade Practices 
Bill was considere d only the very broadest policy was at issue - the 
promotion of free competition in the interests of the economy and 
b~e consuming public - and ~~is was given in the terms of the 
legi s lation. 
From the foregoing it would appe ar that the administrative 
tribuna l is a particularly appropriate instrumer-t for decision-making 
in th e a r e a of trade and p r ices. On the one hand, the subject matter 
is economic in orientation, a nd t he advantages of the tribuna l as 
compared wi th t he courts c ome int o p l ay . On the o t her, the decision s 
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required to be made have major implications for the viability of 
private comme rce and for the general well-being of the community and 
should be taken independently of political pressures. For tribunals 
exercising either original or appellate jurisdiction there is a further 
advantage, one simply of practicality. In creating new areas of law 
Parliament inevitably increases the scope for decision-making. It is 
difficult to envisage the ordinary courts dealing with the sheer volume 
of work involved. But while in New Zealand and Australia
66
the tribuna l 
was in fact the method chosen, in the Unit e d Kingdom the Legislature 
preferred to place the supervision of trade practices with the courts, 
b bl . h. h . . . 67 y esta is ing t e Restrictive Practices Court. Following upon an 
increasing trend towards the creation of administrative tribunals, the 
British Parliament responded with an "outstanding e xample" 
68 
of a 
return of jurisdiction to the courts. The Restrictive Trad e Practices 
Act declared c e rtain trade agreements to be against the p ublic inte r est 
and void, but state d that such agreements would be valid if prove d 
by the parties not to b e so, in the light of crite ria laid down in 
the Act. In this respect it wa s not dif f ere nt from the Ne w Zea land 
approach which continue d to p rovide for speci f ied prohibitions, but 
an additional and stringent r equirement wa s that issues for decision 
be r e duced to the judiciab le, that is, que stions o f fact which the' 
Court properly could de cide . The Court would of course have the 
same, or a gre ater, a d vanta ge as an admi nistrative tribunal as 
regards impartiality, but wa s e xp ecte d a l so to create certainty and 
pred ictabil i ty by means o f a body of s olid c ase l aw b a s e d on t h e 
66 . Tr ade Practices Act 1965-197L1 {Camrcnweal th) . 
67. Restrictive Trade Prachces Act 1956 . 
68 . Stevens, R. B. and Yarrey , B. S. The F.es~ricb VE:__ Practices Court : A Stlrly of the 
J udicial Process a.~d Economic Policy (1965), p . 9. 
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' . . d d b 1 · 69 principles lai own y Par iament • The decision to rely on the 
judges was further based on a belief, strongly expressed in the 
debates on the Bill, in the effectiveness of the law as a II dynamic 
70 
force in modern problems" , a presumption not echoed in the 
New Zealand Legislature since the passing of the Commercial Trusts 
Act in 1910. 
rn· its choice of a court to deal with restrictive practice s
71 
the British Parliament took the point of the Franks Committee, that 
11 as a matter of general principle . • • a decision 
should be entrusted to a rourt rather than a 
tribunal in the absence of special rons i der a tions 
which rrake a tribtmal nore suitable." 72 
The "special considerations", quoted above, were found by the 
New Zealand Legisl a ture to point to the administrative tribunal, 
I 
in this as in othe r jurisdictions, rather than to the courts. 
Tribunal Procedure 
A central concern of the Franks Committee was procedure which, 
it was thought, should be laid down clearly in statutes which cre ate d 
tribuna ls. The exhaus t ive analysis by the Committee of what was 
desir able p roce dure for tribunals, givEn that they were not courts, 
stimula t e d inte r e st in tribunal proce dure in other countries. 
69. Ibid . , p . 14. 
70. 199 H.L . Deb . (5th Ser .), rol . 350 (1956) . Lord Ki lrnuir. 
71. It is of i nterest to note t hat nonopolies are not refe-:!rr ed to the Court . In 
mntra,:, t , they are Su'f'Crv~sed by the .Monopolies Ccmnissi on , an administrati\·e 
l:xx.i.y set up by the f.bno?)lies and Res trictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) 
Act 19'1 8 , wi t .h investigato1-y and aclvisor; functions only. 
72. Cmnd 218, op . cit. , para . 20 . 
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73 The Justice Department report in New Zealand was a direct result. 
It surveyed the c9nditions and procedures of New Zealand 
administrative tribunals, and the opportunities for judicial review 
that were provided, against the recommendations of the Franks 
Report, and found a wide variation in standards: 
"It must be admitted that the present pattern is 
not coherent nor sinple and there are unsightly 
knobs and excrescences upon whidl surgery should 
be taken. 11
74 
The Justice Department Report went on to say, however, that all 
tribunals should not necessarily have the same constitution, 
procedure or opportunities for judicial review: 
11 , be , , ,.75 Each case, we think, must treated on its merits. 
The implication was,that not all the conclusions a rrived at by the 
Franks Committee ought necessarily be applied in New Zealand. 
Keeping in mind the three requirements considered fundamental by the 
Franks Committee, namely openness, fairness and impartiali~y, the 
Justice Department Report identified a number of characteristics 
which should be observed by tribunals in the inte rests of natural 
justice. Summarised, these were that 
73. Op. cit . 
the public be adequately informed of the rj gh t 
to apply to the tribunal 
the parties be infomed of the c.:1se to be rret 
a minimum peri od of n:Jti ce prior to a hearing 
be prescr ibed 
7 4 . Ibid. , p . 4 . 
7 5 . l bid. , p . 5 • 
- hearings generally be in public 
parti~s be all<:Med legal representation 
the tribunal have power to sub,1?0e11a witnesses 
and, on its discretion, to administer oaths 
cross-examination be permitted in oral hearings 
the parties be inforrred of appeal rights 
reasons for decisions be given 
tribunals be enabled to award costs. 
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Having thus covered the common law principle of natural justice in 
respect of a fair hearing the Department proposed that impartiality 
should be ensured by 
the appointment of at least the chairman by 
the Governor-General, or the Govemor--Gereral 
in Council after consultation with the Minister 
of Justice 
the avoidance of representation of special 
interests in the rrerrbership of tribw,.als 
tenure of a fixed term, with standardised 
grmmds for renoval from of £ice. 
The Department also felt that it would be desirable for other 
tribunals to follow the existing practice of some, of publishing their 
decisions, and that selected decisions of the more important tribunals 
' h b b . . . 76 mig t e pu lished in the one series. 
As to existing appeal provisions the Depa1 ·tment' s survey revealed 
wide variations which it classified into five types ranging from the 
absence of any appeal right on fact or merit (which included the Price 
Tribunal) to appeal fro~ the decision of a tribunal direct to the 
76. 'Jhis point has been taken up with the publication of the ~w Zealand 
hJmi.nistrative Reports , beginning in 1976. N.Z.A.R . (1976) Part 1. 
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Supreme Court. Recognition was given to the possibility that an 
appeal procedure could counter the advantages of using tribunals as 
compared with the courts, especially by causing delay. The Franks 
Cornrnittee did not admit of such a possibility, finding that the 
right of appeal had the three merits of making for correct 
adjudication, helping to ensure consistency in decisions and giving 
the appearance of fairness. This Committee argued that generally 
there should be a right of appeal from a tribunal of first instance, 
to an appellate tribunal, on questions of fact and law and on the 
merits of the decision. Points of law should be appea.lable in the 
courts. 
As bodies exercising judicial functions tribunals had always 
been subject to review by the courts, by means primarily of the order 
of certiorari requiring the tribunal to rehear tl1e case, deciding it 
in accordance with correct legal principles as indicated by the court. 
This had not always been the case for the exercise of administrative 
functions, but a decision of the House of Lcrds in the case of 
Ridge v Baldwin
77 
in 1963 clarified the position with respect to 
administrative decisions, Lord Reid affirming that the rule of 
natural justice, that a person was entitled to a hearing, must be 
applied equally to administrative decisions as to judicial hearings. 
The response of the Legislature to the insistence of the courts 
that administrative decisions could be reviewed was to enact the 
so-called "privative" clauses which purported to deprive the courts of 
jurisdiction. Such clauses often are found in New Zealand legislatio~ 
77. [1963] 2 All E.R. 66. 
55 
contrary to the recommendation of the Franks Committee that they be 
abolished in order to secure judicial control by means of the 
78 
remedies of certiorari and mandamus. The courts, however, have 
construed statutes in such a way as to strike down these clauses. 
For example, in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission
79 
it was established that if a tribunal misconstrues the provisions 
empowering it to act, this is an error of law going to its 
jurisdiction, in which case a privative clause cannot operate to 
exclude review by the courts. 
In the matter of review by the courts it is relevant here to 
note the much simplified procedure for obtaining review introduced 
by the Judicature Amendment Act in 1972, designed to replace the 
complex procedures of the prerogative writs. The new procedure 
has been freely used, and bears directly on the question of 
safeguards inherent in the system of decision-making by administrative 
tribunals. 
A question which has dominated the interest in tribunal procedure 
for a number of years is whether a code should be laid down to 
specify and standardise procedures. The Franks Committee stopped 
short of such a proposal, recommending instead some permanent 
machinery for the general supervision of tribunal organisation and 
procedure . The Council on Tribunals was enacted in the Tribunals and 
78. 'Ihe Fra.11."lrn Comnittce vie.,.1 \;' as endorsed by the Australian Corrrronwealth 
Administrative n._vi ew C.om:nittce (1971), Pa:r-L Paper 144/1971. 
Pecomrcndation 14 . 
79. [1% ~l) 1 All E. R. 20 8 . 
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Inquiries Act of 1958 for this purpose. With similar, but somewhat 
broader, objectives an Administrative Review Council was recently 
established in Australia under the Administrative Appeals Tribun.al 
Act 1975. In New Zealand this function is fulfilled to some extent 
by the Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee. In contrast, 
America has had an Administrative Procedure Act since 1946 which lays 
down certain basic rules of procedure to be observed by all 
administrative agencies; and in Australia draft legislation 
providing an administrative procedure code is under consideration.
80 
A code of procedure for administrative tribunals in New Zealand has 
been mooted. G.S. Orr argued that 
"the nurrber and irrp:,rtance of our tribunals is such 
that the enactrrent of a statute dealing specifically 
with their procedure and ]?O\'~rs in a general way is 
overdue. 11 81 
This view was in paLt based on the tendency in New Zealand 
~egislation for procedure in respect of evidence and cross-examination 
to be covered generally by reference to the powers of Commissions under 
the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908. Orr's opinion was that 
"'lhe Cornnission of Inquiry Act 190 8 was not enacted 
to regulate the powers of administrative tribunals, 
then in their infa."'1cy, but those of ad hoe inquiries. 
'Jhe incorporation of the pr ovisions of a statute enacted 
for another purpose is an unsatisfactory rrethod of defining 
the pov..-ers of administrative tribunals. 11 82 
80 . See First Annual Report of the Administrative Revi ew Council (1977), 
ParJlarrenta....ry Paper 306/19 77, pp. 11-13, for a discussion of this 
legislation. 
81. Orr, G.S., _Report of l\cfutinjstrativc Justice i n Ne -,., Zealand (196 4) , para .197. 
82. Ibid. 
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A more recent study, however, favoured an alternative approach 
whereby detailed rules for each tribunal would be provided in the 
constating Act, largely on the grounds that a general code would not 
create any more certainty in procedure than found in the conunon 
83 
la\-.1 • 
From the various reports and cases it is evident that tribunals 
may no longer be regarded as a 'short-cut' method of decision making. 
Whatever their advantages, they may not omit procedures for the 
observance of natural justice, even in the interests of efficiency 
and speed. Further, the application of natural justice does not 
depend on the statutory expression of procedural detail, as 
enunciated by Lord Reid in Wiseman v Borneman: 
"For a long tirre the Courts have, without cb jectio;:i 
from Parliarrent, s upplerrented procedure laid da .... 11 
in legislation where they have found that to be 
necessary." 84 
The issues raised in this discussion of 'che a dministr&tive t d .::.,un c1.J. 
were by no means all apparent to the Leg is la ture in 19 5 n, wh8re th e 
Legislati ve history is resumed; but given tha t the use of the 
tribun a l is reaffirmed in the legislation of that year and conti:-1:.1.c c:l , 
indeed r e inforce d, up to the pres e nt day, the se issues may be k ep t in 
mind especially in terms of what imp rovements and safeguards were s o ught. 
- ----------------- - ---- - - - -·--
83. Ke i th,, K. J. - ----~-~---- - (1974) , Le~r J. Peco.arch Fo1.-.nc:aLi.on Occasfrnv.i.l Pa..rrphJ.et Jl:o . 8 , pp. 48 1 49 . 
84. [1969 ] 3 All E . R. 275, 277 . 
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PART FOUR 
LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION 
1958 TO THE PRESENT DAY 
The subsisting machinery for intervention in commercial 
practices and prices, provided by the Commerce Act 1975, has its 
distinct origins in the Trade Practices Act of 1958. In general, 
these Acts followed the administrative approach of the Board of 
Trade Act but with major innovations deriving from the vesting of 
jurisdiction in a body by and large free of rninister i. a.l 
supervision. By 1958 the Legislature saw the need for a r:ew 
structure with; ap Col linge described it, 
" •• its o..m administrat~v-e machineDJ, its o.,m 
tribunal and ap;::eal system, its °"n p~-ccedure 
and its own principles. 11 
85 
Strong economic considerations underlay both Acts. The 1958 
Act was introduced in the context of the governwe~~ ·s greater 
willingness to rely on market forces to s-tabiJ..ise prices. A more 
immediate factor was the tendency, which acco!npaniec. the progr essive 
disuse of direct admini s trative controJ.s over prices during the 
1940s ana. 1950 s , for the tr 2tc~e associatio ns which had emen;ed 
8:). Collinge , op. • • 0 ClC ~ I p. '. I • 
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primarily for the purpose of negotiating with government o::ficials 
on price orders and approvals to substitute their own price fixing 
arrangements. ·rt was the view of both main political parties 
that if competition was to work effectively to regulate prices 
some form of supervision should be exercised over restrictive 
business practices which might interfere with the competitive 
process. When the Trade Practices Bill ~ . ..,ras introduced by th8 then 
Labour administration, the previous National Government had been 
working on similar substantive lines, drafting legislation to cu~b 
restrictive trade practices. It is also evident ~~at the propos a ls 
of the National Government were to include an investig3.tory 
cornmission to deal with the effects of trade restrictions on the 
bl
. . 86 
pu ic interest. In the words of the Honoura_ble Mr Hol l oway, 
Minister in cha rge of the Bill, 
"'Ihe !"1'3ed to do sorrething about restrictive trade 
practices is not just a whim of this Gove1.TJ1Te..'1t. 
legislation should be introduced to c:1.eal with 
restrictive trade practices that , .. ere not i n the 
public interest. Merrbers of Parlianent, of roth 
parties , also agree with that." 87 
'I'hus t he need for legislation, shifting the substar..tive emph asis 
away from direct control of prices towards the removal of 
impediments to free trade, was not a.n issue in the deba tes. Nor 
was it a matter of contention that the approach should be by me ans 
86 . See Rt Hon. Sir Keith !-!olyoake , Deputy Pri.rn2 !.'-linister, i n 'Ihe Evening. Post., 
2 October 19 5 7 . 
87. N.Z.P .D. (1958), Vol. 318, p. 2127. 
' 
of administrative tribunal. Rather, as Mr Holloway suggested 
88 
was properly the case, disagreement focused on the form of 
administration. 
The same economic factors influenced the introduction of 
the Commerce Bill, with the added impetus of the inflationary 
conditions of the 1970s which re-emphasised the need for price 
regulation and which, along with the fact of developments in 
competition law in other countries, largely explains why a need 
was seen for complex new legislation after only seven years' 
60 
experience with the Trade Practices Act. The Commerce Act 't.'a s in 
fact the result of a comprehensive revi e w and rationalisation of 
the existing legislation, dating back as far as the 1908 Monopoly 
Prevention Act. In particular, the Act consolida ted wi th i n its 
ambit the Trade Practices Act and the Control of Pric22 Act. l,s , 
well, the Commerce Act extended the a r e a of subs tantive l.:tw ma k.i ~g 
separate provision for the control of monopol i e s , me rge rs and 
89 
takeovers. 
Both Acts created machinery whereby certa in co.:n:.ncr c :i.e l 
practic e s, wh e ther opera ted by individuals or gro ups of t raders, 
could be t he subject of public scruti ny by an admi n is trative t r ibunal . 
The inte n t ion was to bring down legi sla t ion .,..,;1 ic h would not 
88. Thid. 
89. 1\10 r ole for t he Corr1nerce Coril'Tli::.:sion i s providY~ urck>r Pa::.-:t -:i_'\11\. of tJ-:e Act: 
St.rD'cs and Lockout.; Co11tEny to ~e Fubl:Lc IntcJ c:--:tr ·l'i11icl. ,.'as i ... r~:::·cted 
by the Ccmrerce l'l·.ie..11drnent i\ct 1970 . So~Y2"1.'ha~ ir:.c -:-n,:,, ,10:J..S j n iJ1,2 ,;er,cral 
cont.e.xt of t he Ac.:. , this Pc1xt will r:ot h<J cc·nsi,i' tfi i.n tr,i::., pa.i-'o.r. 
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prejudge any particula r cor,unercial practice, but instead adopted a 
case by case method of arriving at cm1clusions as to the effect 
on the public interest of the practice and at a determination as to 
whether it should be permi tted to continue, with or without 
modification, before which, by a process of investigation and inqui r y 
each person affected was to have the right to state his case. Some 
offences were created, rendering illegal without furthe r p roof 
specified practices, reflecting the belief of the Legislatur e th a t 
the law should be quite clear on those pract i ces which were 
positively harmful to the public interest - and reviving, to sorr.2 
extent, the approach adopted in the Commerci a l Trus t s Act. 
Of central interest in the present context is the fa c t that t h€ 
Commerce Act is somewhat more p r ecise and de t ai l ed ir: re s pect of 
constitution, manner and form than was the Tr a de P r a ct.:.. ce s Act. --, 
even c.fter the latter h a d progresse d t h rough tlu:E.c :na j o r arrtendit1~: 
Acts b e aring on these asp e cts. That the 1958 Act was sparse on 
detail can be explained in terms of the expe rime n ta l n ature of its 
approa ch and the conseq uent desire of t11e Legisla t ure to allow f or 
flexi bi lity in the ~ppli ca tion of its p r ovi sions . In Collinge 's 
words, 
"'Jhe irrrrediate f ormulation of a detailed code woul d have 
been risky , ar1d the legislat ur e declined to provie.e a 
basic procedure i n broad gerer al terms ." 
90 
·----·--- --·----·--- --·---·-· 
90 . Collinge , op . cit., p . 115 . 
Despite a lengthy debate on the Bill during its passage in 1958, 
little attention was given to procedural questions except in the 
sense that it was recognised that the Act might need amending in 
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the light of experience - as indeed happened. It is relevant to note 
here that the Bill was not referred for select committee 
consideration. Neither were subsequent amendments, until 1970 when 
the Trade Practices Amendment Bill of that year was put before the 
Commerce and Mining Committee. 
The Corrunerce Bill, by way of contrast, was subject to the 
prolonged scrutiny of the House.
91 
On its introduction in March 1971 , 
the Bill was referred to the Commerce and Mining Corrnnittee (where 
57 submissions were received and considered in some detail), and 
reported back to the House ever seven months later. At that stage it 
was realised that the complexity of the Bill and the dissention on 
many of its provisions d emanded further consideration and 011ly one 
area of the Bill, that relating to pyramid selling which was seen a s 
a matter of urgent need, was passed that session. A new Commerce 
Bill, revised in the light of the original evidence to the select 
committee and additional submissions made to the Minister, was 
introduced in 1975 and passed ~ithout ref e rral bacJ: to the Committee. 
This lengthy process, as might be expected, exerted a strong 
influence on the final shape of the l eg islation, req~iring as it did o 
much closer attention on the part of th2 Legi s l a ture to matters of 
substantive, const i t u ti un,: .1. and proc e:::l u r,t.i. d e t :1.i:'_. l~ema. i n ing c'. re a.s (,.~ 
91. See l~ppcEdi~ A. 
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disagreement were reappraised i.n a subsequent. amendment foilowing on 
the heels of the Act, in 1976. 
Each of these Acts is now considered in turn, bearing in mind 
the emergence of new detail in respect of constitution and 
procedure over the span of the two decades. 
Trade Practices Act 1958 
In broad terms, the Trade Practices Act was designed to allow 
trade practices to be investigated and, if found to fall within a 
list of practices specified in the Act and to be contrary to the 
public interest according to prescribed tests, to be subject to an 
order directing the discontinuance or modification or 2rohibiting tre 
repetition of that practice. The body established under the Act to 
be responsible for inquiry and adjudication was the Trade Practices 
Con@ission. Parliament thus affirmed the appropriateness of the 
d . . . 'b 1 f d . . t f · · 92 a m1n1strat1ve tri una or etermining ma ters o· economic import -
a decision of some significance in view of the decision only two 
years previously of the British Parliament to assign this task to a 
special court. 
In the form provided for supervision and determination the 
New Zealand Legislature introduced a notably innovative model of the 
92. The econcmic cast of the Act was given early reccx;nition in a. decision of 
the Trade Practices Corrru:i.ssicm: "The Act is econoIT'ic in concept and j_ts 
provisions are designed to .cestore free coElpE!ti U.Oi1 w'nen such ccr~tition 
in any of its asps.::.--cts has b c2r1 reduced oc restricted." Decision of Trade 
Practices Ccmn.issicn f"2 _ 1. :~ ..Y! ... Zealancl. i•·~ste.c Grey,,...':., '_!:',!oera. !:.ion, 18 Feb::::--uc"l-.ry 196 L, 
administrative process, comprising: 
(a) An administratcr, being the Examiner of Trade 
Practices who, acti~~ on a complaint or on 
his own initiative, by investigation was to 
establish whether a prim~ facie case existed 
of a trade practice being carried out c0ntrary 
to the public interest. 
(b) If a prima facie case was in the Examiner's 
opinion shown, a process of conciliation 
whereby the trader concerned could confer 
with the Examiner with a view to reacning an 
agreement to abandon the practice or modify it 
to remove the detriment to the public interest. 
Whether or not conciliation took place, the 
Examiner then reported the results of his 
investigation to 
{c) A tribunal, being the Trade Practices and Prices 
Corr1Inission which , on receipt of the report and 
reco~mendation of the Examiner, conducted an 
inquiry to establish whether a trade practice 
existed, whether it was against the public 
94 
interest and if so what order should be made . 
(d) An indep'.2nde_n~peal_ authori t:z., being the 'I'ra.de 
Practices l\.p pe a l Authority , to whom a person the 
subiect of a decision of the Commissio~ could 
app~ a 1. 95 
Constitution of Comrn.L3sion 
The con s titution of the t r :ibunal was, of cour3e, of central 
64 
importance to this structure, but the Legislat"J.re did not consider 
it nece ssary to set up an entirely new body, choosing instead to 
93. Under t he J.958 Act,, s ection 16 (1) (a), the Examiner was also to conduc t 
5..nvesti 9ac ons Ly refen:ric:e from '.:Le Corrurd.ssion . TI1is source of inves tiga tion 
wc.s deJ.etrd. by 2n <1I1't~r1ciricr:t: in 196 1. 
94. I\. discreticn v;,.iS r1ra1:.t .ed U1e Co1:1::i .--;sion t o c--oncluct an ir,quir..1 where the 
ExarrJ.ner rcrort.-::d d::ubt ,i,:, -Lo ~-1.h.c·tl .er c, ~ l ,;.C. t...ice i nvebti gat ed was ag.:1ins t 
the publj c i.ntcr::.-=+ ~ by ·~•.;stio::1 5 (1) o f ·'..:he 'Ir,•de Practi02s Arnerldr:'Bn t i'.\.ct 197 . , 
95. 'Ihe aprx~o.l prcv:i ;,ic:,s vierc su sto!1tia .. l ~y H:v.ised i n 197 l. Se e s 1.1bsc(:;1.1~nt 
diSC'.EJ,:Ji.C):2 . 
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reconstitute the Price Tribunal established in 1947 under the Control 
of Prices Act and thereby amalgamate the two functions of encouraging 
competition and controlling prices. In defence against criticism o f 
this move the Minister in charge reiterated the essential 
complementarity between competition and prices: 
". • . the intention of this Bill is not that there 
should l:::e an addition to the Price Trib unal but an 
organisation in substitute for it. 'Ihe intention 
is that where a canpetit.ive spirit does operate 
there will be no nred for price control. 11 
96 
An informed comrnentator s aw other reasons for Parli a ment I s d e ci sion to 
utilise an existing tribunal: 
"It was, I believe , adopted for two r easons. One , 
that it was prcbabl y cheaper than appointing an 
entire l y ne·.v Ccmmission: tll2 otlier tha t it might 
have teen thought diff icult to recruit o ther 
suitable persons for what was like ly to be part-
tine work. 11
97 
The sarne commenta tor on a nother occasion pointe d out that 
96. 
97. 
98. 
"As the sane persons caTipri.se the rrenibership of the 
two bodie s and the Com11ission is errpcwer ed to 
exercise all the pa • .7ers and functions of the 
Tribunal, considerable difficult.-y mus t be e xrerienred 
by rrerrbers i n cGcertaining whether t hey are acting as 
the Conmi ssion or as tJ-,e '1.'ribUi.'1al when exe r cis i ng the 
pc:wers and flmctions conferred by the Control of Prices 
Act 19 4 7 ! 'Ihey rnay a l ten 1a te as they see fi t . 11 
9 8 
N. Z.P.D. (1958), op . cit ., p. 2129 . 
Or r , C. S ., 'Irade PractiCX's - Leg:Ls l c1::i2!1. ~~~-~rac t:i c.e in Ne~ Zea_~~~ (~967) :.. 
u npubJ.J..S iCd pc::~:ier ' ([UOteU: uy perrt,lS.S lOD C.!: u .. -
Orr (1964 ) 1 op . cit . , para. 79. auU:')r. 
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In practice the Conunission tended to function as the Price Tribunal 
in respect of its price control. activities, and in this capacity 
to delegate increasingly pricing matters to the Department of 
Industries and Commerce. There being no right of appeal under 
the 1947 Act except from decisions made under delegation to the 
Price Tribunal, this meant that the independent appeal provided 
under the Trade Practices Act, against price orders or special 
price approvals made by the Commission, did not apply despite the 
equal possibility created by price decisions of either tribunal 
that business interests might be adversely affected. A minor 
amendment in 1964 providing that the Chairman of the Commis sion be 
appointed by the Governor-General, and a furth e r amendment in 19 71 
preventing this office and that of President of the Price Tribunal 
being held by the same person, indicated some appreciation by the 
Legislature of the anomalies caused by the ideri.ti ty of the two 
bodies. The problem was also raised in 1965 during the introduction 
f • 
I • 99 b o a private merriber s Bill y Dr A.M. Finl~y who asked the then 
, , th , r , 100 
Gover:r ..rnent to consider t ak ing steps to sepc1rate eJ.r :r:unctions , 
but the matter remained to .be tackled onl.y i.n 1975, by the Commerce 
Bill. 
As a further res·1lt of the identity of the Trade Practices 
Cerri.mission with the Price Tribunal, the I.iegislature failed to turn 
its mind towards the important guest ion of rw2.mbership qualifications 
for the new tribunal. As noted in the px- ior r1iscu::: sion o f the 19 ~ 7 
---·----------·-----·-·---------·-·-·-··----··-- --··----·--·--------·--
99. 
100. 
Trade Practires Arrenam:,nt (l\\). 2) Dill 1965. 
N.Z.P.D . (1965) VoL 345, p . 32Tl. 
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Act, no qualifications were laid down for members of the Price 
Tribunal nor, consequentially, for the Cormnission al though it was 
expected to perform wide investigatory, inquisitorial and judicia~. 
functions and to exercise extensive discretions. Not only did the 
absence of any specific qualifications run counter both to one of 
the Franks Committee criteria for establishing tribunals, namely 
that they afforded opportunity for the application of expert 
knowledge, and to the recommendation of the First Report of the 
Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee, that tribunal members 
should ''possess qualifications and experience equipping them for 
membership of the tribunal concerned, having regard to its status 
. ..101 . . . . and functions, but it al so ignored the prov.:...s .1. ons of overseas 
legislation. The aforementioned Restrictive Practices Court 
established in Britain in 1956 was presided over by a judge of the 
High Court and comprised at least one other such judge ~nd lay 
members qualified by virtue of their knowledge of or experience in 
industry, ccmmerce or public affairs. The Australian Trade Practices 
Act of 1965 provided for the appointment of preside ntial members 
who were to be barris ters or solicitors of the Supreme Court while 
other mrc!mbers of the t.:i:·ibunal were to have qualifications sinilar 
to those of the non-judicial members of the British Court. The 
New Zealand Parliament did respond to calls for legally qualified 
tribunal chairrnen
102 
by enacting in 197] tl at the Chairm~n of the 
'rrade Pra:::tices Ccir:-.n:issicn should h e a. b,ur:i ster or solicitor with 
spec:i&l e:~pericr..cc :.;·1 c:omrr.c:ccj a. l Jaw, but r aga in, it was J. cf t to 
101. ?jrst Rccort of UY~ Pt.u:.l:i.c .-,ndhJrt'...i.ni::~tt:,t1ve L3.w RcformCcm-Lt.tec , ___ '\r:~:~'' .. :..s 
frun .Z\or:o. ni.~ '..,,. ~-t ~ ,:...., · 'ri..t:1-·r.·,·1 s (J.S ~ 31 , v,:ir.:-t. t.! :?. (i ij ) · - --- --·- ·--·------~-------------
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the Conunerce Bill to raise generally the matter of appropriate 
membership. 
On the other · major aspect of constitution, tha~ of the 
tribunal's independence, the 1971 Trade Practices Amendment Act 
provided for the Chairman of the Commission to be appointed by the 
Governor-General on the advice of the Minister of Industries and 
Commerce, but no attempt was made to secure tenure, nor to specify 
standard grounds for rert1oval from office of any member. No 
prohibition against bias was stated. The Act was free of any direct 
policy directions, except that it is of interest to note an inse rtion 
into the criteria set down in section 20 for the guidance of the 
Conunission as to effects of trade practices that would be contrary 
to the public interest, a direction tha.t, in determi ning wh e ther a 
trade practice prevented or unreasonably limited competition, U 1e 
Commission "shall be guided by the principle that free and I 
, II 103 unrestr icted competition is desirable . 
. The Commission had no power to appoint staff, the neces s~ry 
administrative officers being appointed under the State Service s Act 
1962. 
The Examiner of Trade Practices was, similarly, appointe d u!'1dor 
the Sta t e Services Act and in 1961, recognising what was 1 any1vay, th e 
practice, the legislation provided expressly that the Examiner be c3.n 
office r of the De partment of Industries and Comme r ce. Given t...1-i aJc. 
inqui ry by th e Comn~i s s i o r! appear-cd to de1Jer1d 011 th e ini Jciative <)f ~_:l "'Cl 
- ------ ---·--·--- -···- -------·-····---·-·-
J03. Section 20 (d ) , as i nserted by rection lO (2) o:' the 'L'rdd8 J?ract:LCCS l~'.:c.::ndrrer,t 
Act 1971. 
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Examiner,
104 
it is of some significance for the Commission's 
independence that the Examiner was answerable to his Minister. His 
counterparts in Britain (the Registrar of Restrictive Trade 
Practices) and Australia (the Commissioner of Trade Practices) were 
comparatively insulated from political control and might therefore 
exercise their duties strictly in accordance with the requirements 
of the Act. It would be reasonable to assume that the New Zeal&nd 
Examiner would at least not act in contradiction of his departme.r,t' s 
policy. 
What of the procedures required to be followed by the Examiner 
and the Trade Practices Commission, so constituted, in the exercise 
of their functions? 
Procedure 
The possible sources of procedure for tribunals are, of course, 
the statutory provisions of the constating enactment, rules 
developed by the tribunal in its discretion whether or not under 
specific statutory power, and those irr1posed by the common law 
principles of natural justice which may be codified in the statute 
or supplied in the case law. 
In the case of the Trade Practices Act as passed in 1958, little 
procedural detail was enacted, or indeed discussed in the debates. 
This can perhaps be attributed to the~ fa.et chat the procedures of 
the Commission 1,,ere contc;··:r-,la.ted as being es1:cmtja.lly inv2 ~-:. tigato:cy 
---- --------
104. Section 8 (a) , ho¼ ~~ve:r, sug0~stecl th,,t t.t-'c O . v .rcLssicn rd.9ht r.ot n2c.:.~ssax.ily 
await a report of the 2:,.,c:Jci.rE':r b2f0[c C.\.·:1,:::i..:.(:<.ii•g ,,,·1 i;:-i.qy:hy . fbe wr.:i.t.:::,r I-: .::-; 
b ee..ri. unable lo discov<.?r et:1~, .instan02 :; oi C1e ( 'c:;.:-.is 0;ion ini ti a t.in~T i i:.r3 G.·m 
J.J¥ JU:U:y , 
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and inquisitorial rather than adversarial and no need was seen for 
legislative statement on procedural requirements. Nevertheless, the 
Commission was bound to act judicially - not in the words of the 
statute but by virtue of its decision-making powers. The decision 
of the Legislature that the Commission should (except in special 
circumstances) meet in public placed on e1e Commission an even 
greater obligation of notice, evidence, giving of reasons and 
standing. Where detail was not laid down in the Act the Trade 
Practices Appeal Authority was ready to rule on what was desirable 
f 
. . 105 
procedure or tte Comm1ss1on, and the Legislature responded to 
an extent by laying down some minimum rule s of procedl.i.re in the 196J., 
1965 and 1971 amending Acts. In its 1971 form, the procedura l 
provisions of the Act may be summarised as follows. 
1. Procedure determined by Commis s ion 
Within the legislative framework provided by the Act, j_l wa s t h e 
view of the Legislature that the Commission should be fre e to 
regulate its procedure as it thought fit (section 4 (5)) subj e ct to 
h d 
. . 106 
sue proce ure as was laid down in the Act; and subject to such 
rules as it might make for itself (section 18(7)) and to cover the 
proceedings of parties. By the latter the Legisl a ture wouJ.d o f cours e 
not inte nd that the Commission should fette r i~se l f wit~ respect to 
the fundamental principle which l a y behind t he app:co a ch of the Act,. 
that each case should b e con s idere d on its own me rits. 
105. E. g ., Registered _if2i.:~_~\:e3SG:l"S_ [1%1] :tL Z.J...R. J.61 , 164-7. 
106. Cbnfinred in Fenci.!1~1 !l_yt:er.1:_,:Js [1960] N. Z .L. -::. . 1121 , 1126 whid·,. ad•\xl t h&t 
the principl ef' of rEtb:iral ji.::~,t..i•:.e Ir.ust oJ~;o b.:: oL.:::c:;.:'Jcd. , i . (.;: . , that tt1e 
Corrmission rc.u.st act in gcod f a H i,, ~Lj ;::; f. c-n i ifI_::,.,r t i.c.1 }. '-Y trJ h.,th si(!·,:, 2;,d 
that U1e pc:rtic: c1.:.e (Ji vc.'1 a :\1.:iJ , .. 1 :,:i. :ce0,;..:,n;_ ;J.:, ~ ,:, cn:0rtl.~·.:i.1 1 ·(r.:i 1:v::: 
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2. Meetings to be held in public 
Although hearings generally were to be held in public (section 
the Commission was granted the discretion to sit privately; and to 
limit the publication of any aspect of any inquiry. 
3. Hearings 
The Act contained no code as such to ensure compliance with 
the rule of fairness. The opportunity for all the parties to b~ 
heard was, however, enhanced by a requ~rement inserted (only as late 
as 1965) that where the Commission proposed to hold an inquiry it 
should 
(a) provide to the parties to the practice a copy of 
the Examine r's report initiating the inquiry 1 
requiring an answer within a specified time ,, 
( section 17 ( 3) ) ; 
(b) supply the Examiner with a copy of the parties' 
answer (section 17(4)). 
'l'hus, upon the Conmission embarking on the hearing each side was 
enabled to know the cas e against it. (It is relevant to note here 
that the parties to the trade practice under investigation already 
would have been informed of the prim~ facie case made out by the 
Examine r and wculd have been afforded the opportunity to rebut the 
Examiner's opinion r':'!garding the effect of the p.!'.'actice on the pub:.i c 
interest, hy neans of tl c process of conciliation, introduced in 1J6 ~ 
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The importance of this provision is such as to warrant further 
discussion, below.) The Act was silent on the questions of notice 
for Corrunission hearings (except in respect of hearings for 
applications by the Examiner under section l8B, for orders requiring 
the production of information), the giving of reasons for Corrmission 
or Appeal Authority decisions, and the exercise of impartiality in 
the weighing of the evidence. There were no provisions relating to 
standing, al though it could be inferred that those parties en t.i tled 
to appeal under section 26, being persons directly affected by 
decisions of the Comnission, could also prGsent a case before t11e 
Corrunission. 
4. Evidence 
The Commission's powers in respect of obtaining evidence under 
section 18 were wid~, but not more so, according to the Minister, 
than provided in previous legislation relating to commercial 
practices and prices. It is significant, however, that no provision 
was included to compe l a witness at a hearing to give evidence which 
nevertheless might incriminate him. 'J'he Commission was explicitly 
freed in 1961 from court rules of evidence and could consider evidence 
that would not be admissible in a Court of law, the Legislature thereby 
recognising the elusive nature of economic and social facts that mi ght 
be encountered in an inquiry. The authority to administer oaths and 
require the production 
an ordinary court. 
r .i:: 
..) .L books and documents was, however, as for 
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The Examiner's powers for obtaining information to assist him 
in reaching an opinion were spelt out in t.he 1971 amendment, to 
include an express power to require relevant books and documents to 
be produced for his inspection. (The original Act provided simply 
that the Examiner had the powers of a Corrunittee of Inquiry ~ppointed 
under the Industries and Corrunerce Act 1956.j The Department was 
required to assist the Examiner in respect both of information 
specifically req~ested by him, and of information relevant to an 
investigation which it might have available. 
It may be concluded from the constitutional and procedural 
arrangements in the Act that the Legislature afforded minirn~l 
rights to traders who were the subject of investigation to present 
their case, and fell far short of providing the elements of .:1 fai:r.-
hearing described in the First Report of the Public and Administrativ~ 
Law Reform Committee as 
"a process which will enable the facts to be ascertained; 
the differi.tg points of view or argurrents to J::.e 
effectively present; all the relevant points to be 
weighed with wanifest care; and an impartial a,.,.d 
info1.1red decision to be ma.de. \
07 
On cases taken to appeal, however, some of the conspicuous omissions c 
h . 1 1. d In R . ~ - LI . d I lO 8 f t e Leg1.s ature were supp ie. _e9·1.scerea_J.aJ.r res~G:r."E_, or 
example , the Appeal Authority said that the Exami.ner, in his report ~J 
---------·--------------·--------------······ 
107. OJ:.,. ci t. , i:-. 2. 
10 8 • Op . ci t. 
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the Commission, should state, by reference to the relevant provision 
of the Act, the grounds for his opinion that a trade practice was 
contrary to the public interest, and that if before the hearing 
and on closer examination of the case additional or other grounds 
were found these also be advised to the party or parties concerned. 
The parties must be permitted to know in advance what it was about 
the trade practice that was claimed to be against the public interest. 
In the same appeal case Dalglish J. considered the question of 
whether the Commission would, under section 18, be predisposed to 
finding a trade practice contrary to the public interest, and 
concluded that a proper interpretation of the Legislature's 
intentions here would be that the Commission should begin with an 
open mind on the case and give full weight to Rll the evidence 
and c1.rgurnents put before it from all sides. In Associated 
109 
Booksel le rs' the Appeal Authority found, similarJ.y, that the 
Commission mus t look at the mat.ter under consideration broRdly, and 
take alJ. re le van t factors in to account.. In the aforementioned 
Fencing Materials case the Appeal Authority considered at length 
the procedure for evidence before the Commission and concluded tJ1at 
it was for the Commission to decide the weight which should be 
given to facts adduced before it, and to make its decision on a 
balance of probabilities. The Ai..1t."rJ.ori ty also -::ommen ted on the 
109. [1962] N.Z.L. R. 1058 . Here, hcwev-er, Dalglish J. went further, indicating 
that it was w2t9r:L1l to take into account :nt only the detriments to the 
public intere:.t of t.tc tradr::i prac'.::iCE 1 but also the Le nefits t hat might be 
forgone if tl1e t:.:c:de pr.a.c-'.:.io2 (3Jd not operate , th9.rcby foreshaoowing - }='er~12i;...:.. 
prorrptirg - c'c sp-.:.!:-;if:i.c ~n.w~ don in iJ1c Conrrerce Act allowing for a balano-.:d 
appraisal by the C~)rmd.ss:c.r~ c,F "pros 11 and "ccns " of trade pracri ces. 
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position as to the onus of proof regarding the effect on the public 
interest of a trade practice, and stated the view that it did not 
lie with the parties to the trade practice to satisfy the Commission 
that the practice was not contrary to the public interest, that was, 
that it had none of the effects specified under section 20 of the 
110 
Act. 
The appeal rights under the Act thus assumed a particular 
importance in determining the procedure to be followed by the 
Conunission, in the absence of E, p ecific rules in the statute -· and, it 
may be noted, in the absence of any requirement b e fore 1971 that th e 
tribunal membership contain legal expertise. 
Appeal Provisions 
The appeal provisions in the Trade Practices 1\c t undep,.;ent :nore 
I 
substantial change during the Act's exi stence than aid any other of 
its aspects. The Bill as in traduced to the House in 19 5 8 p r ovi dcd. r10 
appeal rights whatsoever, the Minister exp ressing the belie f tlwt 
an appeal authority merely subst.i tuted its opinion f or thu.t of th e 
first instance authority which would already hav,3 dealt thoroughly 
with the ma tter before it. In the eight week!:: between the Bill's 
introduction and second reading a charige of m.ir:d occurred and Llie 
Legislature concurred with the insertion of a new Part111 dea.ling 
·------------·----
110. 'Il1ough a matter of substai102 r ather -1.b,:1.n prc03dure, ~his was an iroportant 
consideration in the li.9ht of a provision ~.n -u-,e Com,erec Act 0-:?-,id1, in 
purportedly revc:.!rsing the cnus of proof by placir:g it c:n ti-1e tr,..:;d2:r, wa.s tJ 1e 
subj2ct of stro:1g CDn~.enci.on in t11e House ar..d ~r:~:1c_;· ,,,it.!:te:~:::E.s b(::f•.,D:l foe 
select co:rrrri tt.ee . 
111. Part V, sections 24·-36. 
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exclusively with appeal to a special body, the Trade Practices 
Appeal Authority which was to sit, generally in public, as a judicial 
authority for the determination of appeals from orders made by the 
Commission. As the Act did not specify the grounds for appeal, it 
was to be presumed that the Legislature intended appeal to lie on 
matters of both fact and law. The Appeal Authority was required tone 
a barrister or solicitor of not less t,an seven years' practice, 
holding office at L~e pleasure of the Governor-General. The 
alternative of appeal being to the Supreme Court was rejected for two 
reasons. First, it was felt that the Court lacked t.,e special 
knowledge required to deal with policy issues and matters of 
administrative discretion. The second consideration was one of sheer 
practicality. It was not expected that the Court would have time to 
112 
deal with trade practices appeal work. 
Persons entitled to appeal were those directly affected by an 
order of the Commission , but appeal against price decisions was 
prohibited. l', .. n. error of law in respect of the latter would have to 
be corrected on revi ew by the courts. 
In respect of evidence the AuLl1ority was free to admit such 2s 
might in his opinion a ssist him to deal effectively with the matter 
before him, whether or. not adn,issible in an orjinary court, an 
essential provision g iven that he was, with legal qualifications 
required to det2::i.:1ni.nc the appeal 2s on a rehearing . As well as 
·1 
O!iJ.y; 
determining Rny ,1.ppc,iJ. thz Appeal Autl10-city v;as em2owered to refer 
112. N.Z.P.D. (1958) , C'). cit. 1 r,, ?130 . 
the case back to the Commission for reconsideration, advising the 
Commission of his reasons for doing so and the Commission wa.s 
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113 required to take these into account. The Appeal Authority was 
required to advise only t-he Commission, and not the parties, of his 
determination. 
A privative clause in a form to be found in o t her legislation 
was included, providing in section 36 that: 
"Proceedings before the Appeal Authority shall not 
be held bad for want of foITt1. Ro appeal shall lie 
from any determinatim of the Appeal Authority and, 
ex02pt on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction , no 
pro02eding or order of the Appeal Authority shall 
be liable to be challenged, reviewed, qua.shed , or 
called in qtEStion in any Court." 
A si;"(lilar provision applied to the Corrunission ::_ tseJ.f, and generally 
has been commented upon in an earlier part of this paper. A nlunber 
I 
of legal commentators have found such clauses, excluding judicial 
review except on jurisdictional grounds, to be open to serio us 
. 114 
question. Both the Chairman of th e Conunission and the AppE:~ l 
Authority were empowered to state a cas e for the opinicn of the Court 
of Appeal on any question of law arising from 2.ny p.?:oceeding. 
With the establishment of the Administrative Divisjon of the 
Supreme Court in 1968 the main reservations of the Legislature 
regarding a ppeal rights to the courts we re ove r ccme. As st0 ted by 
·-------·-- ··-------···--------··--·-- --- ----·--- ·-
113. In Reqi stered Hairc'~~c~sser s ' , op . ci t. , j t h'?.S :culc<.1. ~h.~t " n:.:~1~1f·icbra'.:.i cn" ci~d 
not mean tl1at the Ccrr.rni s s :ion h2d to n ~-c;_:en the ir.r~u:i. r_y- ur :r.s.: 1e:;:rr the pc>.i: t..i2s, 
1, 4. . E.g., Or r (19G4), C)p . cit., p:1.ra. 29" 
the Honourable Mr Hanan, introducing the Judicature Act Amendment 
Bill in 1968, 
" • • . the Bill will provide the legal frarrewor.i< for 
administrative appeals to be heard by Suprerre Court 
judges ·who will be thoroughly conversant with the social 
and eronomic background involved. . . . 'Ihe administrative 
division will bring greater coherence, ronsistency, and 
authority to administrative appeals. 'Ihe creation of the 
division will also return the Suprene Court to its 
rightful place in our consti t.utional syste.m by ensuring 
its direct invol verrent in sone of the nost inpor.tarit 
judicial questions to be decided. In the past the Supreme 
Court has been bypassed. Now it will once again becxxne 
the centre of our judicial system." 
115 
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Supported by the Public and Administrative La.w Reform Commit.tee 
and by the business community which, in submissions to the seJ.ect 
committee to which the Bill amending the Trade Practices Act appeal 
provisions was referred, criticised the existing appeal rights, it: 
1971 Parlimnent substituted for the special Appeal Authority a rig~t 
I 
of appeal to the Administrative Division. ~ew new procedura l details 
accompanied this move. Pricing matters were a.gain excluded from any 
appeal opportunity, and the parties entitled to appeal remained those 
directly affected by a decision of the Commission. Under a new 
section 29, however, the Examiner was permitted to appeal to the 
Administrative Division by way of case stated for the opinion of the 
Court on a question of law, whe:re he was dissc.J.tisfied with any 
decision of the Commission as being erroneous in point of law. 
115. N.Z.P.D. (1968) , Vo:!.. L E': , p. 1067. 
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In addition, any party to an appeal proceeding before the 
Administrative Division was enabled to state a case for the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal on questions of law only, 
determinations of the Court, which included the power to remit the 
matter to the Administrative Division with an opinion, being final. 
In Appendix Ba comparison is made between the appeal and 
review provisions of the Trade Practices Act. and the 1975 Commerce 
Act. 
Conciliation Procedures 
The objections of the commercial community to the decision-
making framework provided by the Act centred l ::1.rgely on its 
cumbersome machinery, and especially the formality and exr::2nsc of 
proceedings before the Commission. , The procedure fo
r conciliation 
introduced in 1965 proved to be of very great practica.l impo.rtc.nc:~ 
in this respect. By section 16A of the 1965 o.mendmE:nt t.he Examiri·.::.: :.~.-
was required, if he \·1as of the opinion that a trade practi.c2 was 
being carried on contrary to the public inte res t, to inform the 
trader of his opinion, stating his grounds, and requesting a reply 
as to whether the trader accepted his opinion and whetl12r the 
trader might abandon , voluntarily, the pract..:.ce. If a reply was 
received, the Examiner , in his discretion, could invite the tra.di3:r 
to confer for the purpose of reachin-:; an as:cce!".sr.t to oba.ndon or 
moc.ify the practice, any agreement reach e: ::l to be the .l')c:is h.; of <-L 
recornmendati.on to the Cornni i s sion . 'fh2 e:1c.L: i in.e ·1 l of t hi..-; pro>/i !"d uu 
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reflected what h a d in fact been the practice of the Examiner. 
Indeed, the Minister on introducing the 1958 Bill had anticipated 
that a process of negotiation would take place at an early stage 
in any investigation, as had also been the case under the 
Prevention of Profiteering Act 1936. Unless required by the 
Commission, a formal hearing could be avoided by successful 
conciliation, and in fact the benefits of sav ing time a n d e xpens e 
were such that from 1965 the majority of complaints we re met by 
the voluntary withdrawal from, or modifica t ion of, the pra c t ice 
under investigati on by the Examiner. 
The conciliation p rocedure was regarded by the Depar tment of 
Industries and Comme rce as being 
II • . of great value in enabling nDre speedy resuJts 
and have, it is believed , prorroted a better 
unders;tanclLng of the purpa3es of the principal Act ." 
116 
In practice ag reemen t s reached in conciliation on appropriate cons~nt 
orders were a dopte d by the Commis s ion with out a h e a r i ng . Not only 
were the parti e s to th e practice and the Sta te s ave d c onsiderable 
expe nse , bu t it \·:as c lear , with the use ma.de o f in f o r ma l discussion 
betwee n t h e Ex amine r and the pa r t i e.3 , t Lat thi s was more s ui t ed to 
t.h e nature o f c omme rci a l p r acti ces tban were r- rotrac ted f ormal 
hearings of a judi c ia l natu re . 'I'he j urisdiction of th e Commissio r1 wac; 
- - - ·- --· - ----- ---·- ·--·----·---·--- -- ---
116. D2p:fftTent of Ir:d:.lStri i:'.::, 2inc1 Cc::n;;n::xc"'e , l\nrnP ·,. F,:1)0rt for Year Er..cJcd 
31 M2.rch 196B, A.c1'.H.R. (J.968), Vol. IV , Il. 11·~, p. 17. ---------
of course not ousted as the Act contemplated that a consent order 
was still required to be made by the Commission, but conciliation 
117 
meant, as expressed by Orr, that the trade practice could be 
discussed 
II in an informal way rrore compatible with the 
nature of the issues involved. It short cut.s or 
supplants the nore cumbersorre proo2dures before the 
carnri.ssion which over the years have tended to 
becx,rre increas ingly formal and closely akin to 
pr(X)2edings in a Court of law." 
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For the traders concerned, moreover, successful conciliation remove d 
the possibility of unwelcome publicity that m:_ght acco:np a ny t h e 
public hearings of the Commission and Appeal Authority . The trend 
towards a greater degree of judicialism in the proceedin g s of tri e 
Conunission as noted by Orr, and the attendant l e g a l cos t:s to the 
parties to the pra9tice, further encouraged the ·.1se of n egotiat ion 
to resolve trade arra ngements or agreeme nts found by the Exar1.i11?r 
to be against the pub lic interest. 
Some irony can be seen in the fact that only with t he G!l.act.men L 
of conciliation procedures, allowing tribunal investiga ticn a~ d 
inquiry to be avoided, were the advantage s of t ribunal s idc nti fie ~ 
by the Frank s Comrni ttee - chea pness and e: ~pe d i t i.0n - f;.;illy r e alis ed . 
The Trade Practices Ac t. , in swnrnary, c an be ~, aid to h a 'l.iC pn) 1 ::. cle d 
a. l aw suff iciently flexible to al i ow a ny per::;on to cc:.-rp L 1in j ~forn' 2:·.1::_, 
-------- - --- -----· ---- --- ---- ·-·- -··- --··· - -----·---·--·---- ~- ... ····---- ~.,-. 
117. Orr (19G7) , op . ci~ . 
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about a trade practice and have it investigated with a view to 
eliminating any detriment to the public interest. Regard was had 
to the interests of the trader by placing the onus of proof on the 
State, viz, the Examiner·. 
The nature of the legislative framework was such as to provide 
that the essence of the investigatory and inquisitional process 
was the role of the Examiner who, from a workload point of view, 
118 
was the main element in the three-tiered structure. The burden 
of proving a case of a practice being carried out against the public 
interest was considerable, as borne out in Fe!'lcincr Materials. Certr.:.:in 
developments aided the Examiner in obtaining the information required 
to establish his case. Under the 19 71 amendment the Examiner co,1ld 
seek an order from the Conmission requiring parties he had n~ason.ab.le 
cause to believe were engaged in a section 19(2) practice, poss ibly 
having one of the section 20 effects on the public interest, to 
. . 119 
supply him with particulars of the trade practice. A11d the 
concili ation procedure enabled him to seek relevant information in 
discussion with the parties , wh:.ch was nearly always voluntarily 
surrendered. 
With the amendments ena.cted by successive Parliaments the Act 
after 1971 was considered by many to be "workable". Certainly 
annua.l reports of the Dep a:r t.rnen t reflected no dissatisfaction with 
---·---- -------------·------
118. 'Ihat this was, .:1nc1 is stl:1..1., so h'c,s co1Jfir.n12d hy the writer in d-1scussior.s 
with senicr p:::;:rsnnr'!.:;.l of ~ ':t~. p:•.c:sent F.'.c, 11i1;er ' s offia~. 
119. Section 18B, iff·e;·ted l'::i £s~t..ion 7 cf tl1e 'I'r:::c:e Practices Arrenc1r:e~'1. t Act: 19"l ~ . 
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its operation. By the late 1960s, however, the number of cases 
coming before ~he Trade Practices Commission had almost come to a 
h 1 
120 
at. This was attributed by Collinge and Hampton to a decline 
. . . 121 
in enforcement activity, but should also of course be related to 
the practical outcome of conciliation and, perhaps, to the repeal in 
1961 of the provision in the 1958 Act for compulsory registration of 
a wide variety of restrictive agreements or arrangements, which had 
b f 
. . . b th . 122 een a source o investiga tion y e Examiner. 
Despite the three major amendments, the Act was still 
unspecific on importa nt matters of manner and form. Returning t o the 
observation introducing the present discussion of the Trade Practice s 
Act, it would have be en difficult for the Legislature to have 
achieved anything more detail e d, bearing in mind t h e expe rime ntal 
nature of the machinery established and the subj e ct matte r of the 
legislation. 
To some exte nt the pursuit of more comple x l e gislation in J.97 5 
was the re s ult of a bolde r approach on the part of the Legislature 
120. Excepting t h.::it approvals for collective pricing agreerrents sought 1..mder 
section 181'. continued to accurnul ate , creating an increasing b3.ckiog , unable 
to be handled by the sm:."111 staff engaged on trade practice and pricing wor~~ , 
whid1 was i nherited by the Corrrrerce Ccrnmiss ion in 1975. 
121. Collinge , J. and Hoopton , L. F. , in an unpublished paper p:;._-esented to the 
New Zealand Society of Accountants 1976 Continuing Education Programrre , 
~etition Law and Price Control: Practical Asnects of the Corrrrer re Ac t l'.?T.:i. 
122. The o..;rrpulsory registration principle had teen borrCMed by the New Zeulan::1 
Legisluture from the British Restrictive P.::-actires Act but, not being 
suitably rrcdi fied, had proved unsatisfucto.ry. Whether the wi thdra.1c1.1. of tht""', 
1:egistrat.ion provisicn had any effect on the nurrb2r o f cases brought to 
inves-tir:J'".ltio:1 ~,h:.:.L'j d be vie.vcd wj th caution , in l ight o f the fact that i.t ~-:,1·., 
bc1.~.everl j n 19 ,l · ~at ., wi'1ilt~ 8CJ agre8frents had b.~en r egistered this 
represc.nu:d lu:s tikm h3lf the agreE:1r,2nts in practioe . 
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to providing for constitution and procedure, prompted by the view 
expressed by influential persons and bodies such as the Public and 
Administrative Law Reform Conunittee which continued in its reports 
to develop the issues raised in its First Report on administrative 
tribunals. It is also the case that the conunercial and pricing 
practices covered by the Trade Practices Act did not extend 
sufficiently far to meet the objective of free competition. In 
particular, the 1958 Act dealt inadequately with trade combinations. 
Section 19 included as a trade practice subject to the Act any 
complete or partial monopoly of the supply of goods, or any practice 
tending to bring about a complete or partial monopoly, but it was 
found difficult to establish these conditions in actua.l cases. In 
the Trade Pr a ctices (No. 2) Bill 1965 Dr Finlay attempted to 
strengthen the monopoly provisions by setting a quantitat ive test f or 
the existence of a monopoly situation. But the inclusion of trade 
I 
combinations in an Act dealing with defined trade p ractices was 
anyway somewhat anomalous, and the provision wa.s not c apable o f 
controlling takeovers and mergers in bus i ness which, because of t heir 
being prime sources of fut.t1re monopolies, needed to be the subject 
of scrutiny prior to thei r i mplementation. This conside ration led 
Collinge to s u ggest that registration be reintrod~ce d with speciaJ. 
k b ·a~ 123 provisions in res pect of merge r s and t a~e ove r 1 ~ , and Orr to 
predict a need for special l e gislation t o regu l ate complete or 
12 4 
parti a l mo n o polies aris in g from comp a.ny rne r g(::::::.- s. The tra cle 
---- ---------···· ------ ·---- -- -----·--------- --- ·-····-······ . 
123. Col linge (1969), op. cit. .. , p. 308 . 
12 4 . Orr (196 7) op . ci t . 
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combination was, in the event, the chief source of new substance in 
the 1975 Commerce Act. 
The legislation on trade practices provided under the 1958 Act 
and subsequent amendments has been described as "complicated and 
elaborate", providing for the implementation of 1'broad econo1nic and 
125 
social policies embodied in the l\.ct." How much more so can this 
be said of its successor? 
The Commerce Act 1975 
A complicated and elaborate piece of legislation, th e Commerce 
Act is built substantially on the 1958 Act in terms of object, 
principles and structure, amalgamating within its ambit the basic 
provisions of the 1947 Control of Prices Act and includi ng additj_on a l 
matters of substance dealing directly with monopolies, me :r.:9ers n.nd 
takeovers. The Act also i ncorporated an interim Act pas s ed t.~1c 
previous year to control the development o f pyramid selli11g scheme::.,. 
Taken generally, the Commerce Act is r ,=flective rather than 
innovati ve , representing an accumulation of legislative effort to 
come to t erms with the comple.x.i t ies of modern commercia l life . In 
subject ma tter there is li ttle that is entirely new .in th e JI.et . _7\~; 
h as been shown , trade prac tices , t rade combina.tions and prices had 
all been t:he subject 0f po r liarnentary attention in the course of t.be 
centu:cy. B·~1t -:.h e l~ct is not merely a c c nsolida Li.on. In b r:i.ng:_ng 
tc,ge t her " 11 th r e e areas u116e r the gen2ral supc1 vis-i_on o f o n e 
·-----------·------ --··---- -· ------·------·· 
125. P1.1bl.i.c a.nd 1...:::rini.:::·:!:";1U.ve l ,C°\·i I<r-~ .forrn Co;,,,ittce , I· i ,st R2;:rn '., o:_J, cit., 
p ·:.\r; ,s, T?. ,. 'JG. 
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administrative body tl1e Legislature was confronted with problems c f 
jurisdiction, procedure and appeal and review, requiring much more 
detailed thought which in turn was reflected in provisions much 
fuler than found in earlier statutes. It needs also to be 
recaled that developments in administrative law, as briefly 
surveyed in Part Three of this paper, had in due time come to the 
atention o f legislators not only in published statements and reports, 
but also in the results of appeal cases under the 1958 Act and 
through the growing tendency, reinforced by the establishraent of 
the Administrative Division, for the courts to insist more vigorous l y 
that inferior tribunals should o bserve judicial procedures tha t met 
the demands of natural justice . Parliament thus was f a c e d on the 
one hand with dE:terminin g the roles of a new tribunal and, o n the 
other, with resolving important, and related, questions of 
I 
constitution a n d pro cedure previously expressed but sparsely. I t is 
a notable feature o f the Act tha t the principles rscognise d in 
English common law o f nemo ju~ex in ~ausa sua and audi a ]ter a m 
~~~  b ecome mater s of substantive justice. 
An analysis of t h e Commerc e  Act i s c omplicated by the u n usualy 
cumbrous process b y which a final framework v.1as arrived at. In the 
folowing , the di2cussion wil concern prirna~ily the Act a s p assE:d 
in 1975, not i ng the s ig:"d.fic"1nce of earlier provisions for 1~.anner 
and form and of ame,,6!,\ents met de u.nc1c.i:- the 19 7 6 Ccmmerco Amendment 
Act. 
The tribunc=il c~-tubli::;i1eu under i'i:~ Act is t!"w Cornmerc..:! Commisi.d.or• 
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By separating the substance of the Act into three distinct areas 
the Legislature was able inunediately to resolve the problems ea.used 
under the 1958 Act by the identity of the Trade Practices 
Commission and the Price Tribunal. Jurisdiction previo'..lsly exercised 
de facto by the Department of 'I'rade and Industry in respect of price 
control was gran tcd de Jure, meeting in part a reccrnmenda tion of the 
Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee that the Department 
126. not draw its aue1ority in practice from delegated power. 
The functions of the Commerce Commission are, in brief, to 
(a) inquire into and adjudicate upon examinable trade 
practices after investigation and report by t~e 
Examiner of Conunerd. al Practices - as under the 
1958 Act (Con@erce Act , Part II , section 41); 
(b) inquire into and adj u<li ea te upon or make: recomr'.'.2rida. tions 
to the .Minister on monopolies, after investigution a.n6. 
report by the Examiner of Corrmerc.i.3.l Practices 
(Part III, sections 64-66); , 
(c) inquire into mergers and takeovers, investigated by the 
Examiner but not subject to his c~earance, conse::.ting 
to those found not against the public interest and 
making orders against those found to be so dctrinental 
(Part III, sections 73, 76 and 78); 
( d) sit as a j ndici a l authority for the detE:rmination of 
appeals from decisions of the Secretary for Tra~e and 
Industry on matters of price 2pprovcilsr 
and price orders (Part IV, section 99); 
priCE! 
and 
C • • 1-1-x::._ng 
(e) exerci~;e ori.gi rn..'_ l j u.risd.iction 't.'i th re:spect to the 
determjnation of prices when confucting inquir:es on 
the direction of the Minis tcr in tc any ma ttc r relu. ting 
to prices, reporting to the Ministe r its findings and 
recor.mv.?ndati~iti.s (P art IV, section 104 }. 
----------- -------·---·----- ----------·---·---------- ·--
126. First R~p:1rt., op. c::..t., para .• 8J. 
It is against these functions that the establishment of the 
Commerce Cor,Lfis sion should be viewed. '11he imposition of 
investigatory, inquisitional, judicial and advisory functions 
clearly demanded a body expertly constituted and strongly 
independent. To what extent were these exactions met? 
Constitution 
88 
The Act provides for a membership of 4 or more, no 
qualification being specified for the chairman. Both points were 
the subject of much criticism in the House during consideration of 
~~  1974 and 1975 Bils, and by witnesses before the select 
commitee on the Bil. It was felt that the nurr~er should be 
increased to about 7, that the chairman should be a le.wyer of 
standing, and that the membership should include relevant e:xperti.se. 
None of these criticisms were responde d to in the Bil 1 as reporte d 
ba.ck from the select cornrni tee, the Minister, some·, hat 
unsatisfactorily, arguing that it would be the intention of the 
Government to appoint 7 members and that a legaly qualif i e d chairm~~ 
127 . . 128 would be sought -borne out in practice. In the 1975 Bil 
as passed, however, it was d ecided tha t r ather than detailing the 
specific qualifications of members a provision s h ould be included 
to indi cate genera]. atributes expecte d of the Con~ission a s a body, 
-·---------·------------· --- -
127. The I.:2petrtrceEt of 'J:i.:ade and Industry i n a paper to tl:e Cortr."i9·c-e and Min.ing 
Corr.mitce prc-:cc::;d c1n increase in tl-ie statutor_}' rrcr,:.-2rshi[: to 7 , bnt 
suppor~· . -cJ. thr.=: i'U!-J.stcr jJ1 rt-'ject-jng a Je;al qt.:o.lific.:.tio £or the CoH:rni.:~2:.-:-·r: 
GhGi.5 lt"'.i :1. l!t ·'-:".:. C,-Ju.rse C.'.: tbc Com:hi-!:t'~C rieuri 1'.~fS the .:1.inj StCl cli_.~;c lr_v·;c,d 
thcrl c.iftic1Lty )·2:~ bec.,L .:v,ti,1.1 in fjr-"i1·g a suit.~,LiJ~ :1a:.·:yer to '"e c.J1ai:urJr1 
o f -U1t-'L?d~ P:.c2ct.ire;-; Cc1:ri!:.-io;1 and ::c1i;12 or.l::11-ri.·r;sn~nt could be: c2,_r;_::,2d "by 
a rc.'-1u.ir::n2:Pt. ti.-:_- 'J-ic· Cr,.,~ 'l·.~r~ C.'Jr:,u.::.-;icn }.,'(; c:J-1<1.ircd by 2. l o . iJCr. 
J78, 1;.7,.1'.D, (19 . 1,.) 1 'vul. J:.,:J, p. 5rl19. 
the Minister to be guided by these when recommending appointments 
to the Governor-General, these attributes being "knowledge of or 
experience in trade, industry, economics, accountancy, commercial 
law, public administration, or consumer affairs.
11129 The J.976 
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amendment. added that at least one member should be legally qualified 
(but not necessarily the chairman) being appointed after consultation 
wi tl1 the Minister of Justice. 
The appointment of "pressure group" representatives to the 
Commission was rejected outright, Parliament believing that far from 
enhancing the impartiality of the Cormnission as claimed in a number 
of submissions, this would give rise to conflicts with sectional o~ 
partisan ties as well as creating a problem in selecting which groups 
could be considered for representation. The point was met in paxt 
by staDding provisions (see below, under procedure) which could allo~ 
interested par.ties to appear before the Cowmission as witness~s . 
No statutory term of office is specified for Cornmission rr:err.h.:..rs , 
al though while no term can exceed five years any rnerrcber may be re-
appointed by the Governor-Genera l, under section 4 ( 1) • If it 
agreed that the Commission is to be independent having regard. 
J. '-' • Cl 
judicial functions, there are grounds for arguing that the t.enure 
of a membe r could be made mo re secure. There is a danger, hov-.'ever 
r emote, that a m~mber who acts in contradiction to government policy 
or a minister.ial direction cou ld be removed at tlw end of his 
i.lppointed tE.:rm , ar,d thL; p c s ~:ibili ty was voiced :i. :::1 several 
------~··-- ------ ·-·--- -------------· --------------·¥,.._ 
129. Sect:io~1 3 (G) • 
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submissions including that of the New Zealand Law Society.
130 
More concern was expressed about the provisicns in the 1974 
Bill for the Commission to sit in divisions at the direction of the 
Minister. The Law Society held that it was fundamentally wrong 
that the Minister should so be able to be involved with the 
administration of the Commission. This view was expressed strongly 
in the debates by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Marshall who said during 
the second reading on the 1974 Bill: 
II • . the Miriister still directs. He specifies whim 
division deals with speci fie matters and may revoke 
or amend a direction. Th.is function of the cormri.ssion 
should be a purely ac..tnin.is trati ve 1T0.tt.e:c for the 
d1airman of the ccmn.iss.i.on. • • • The intervention of 
the Minist.er in details of individual cases opens the 
way to r;,olitical .interference ... and in effect it 
is giving one party in court proreedings - the 
Governrr.ent - the pc11er to select its c;,m judge and to 
decide whether one division or another will hear a 
parti.c1.½ar rna. ttcr . 11
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'l'he opportunity to sit in divisions was an impo:t.tant one, E.n.hancing 
the advantages ,·1hich could be gained by bringing to bear on particula:: 
cases relevant. expertise. In the 1975 Act the Minister I s role in this 
respe ct was modified to provide that the Chairman constitute 
divisions but only with the concurrence of th~ Minister. The 1976 
amendment gave complete dis ere ticm to the Chairman to .set up and 
appoint members to 
. . . 132 
dlVlSlOns. 
---·-----------------------·----------
130. Submission 1':o . J., 
131. N.Z .P.D . (197 ,1 ), r-p. cit., pp. S11 3.:., S43.?. 
132. Section 7. 
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Bearing in mind submissions made to the Committee in 1974 about 
the benefit to the Commission I s independence of its having a.n 
independent servicing st2.ff, provision was made in the Bill as 
reported back for staff to be seconded to the Commission from the 
Department, the personnel so allocated to be then directly 
responsible to the Chairman of the Commission. This matter has been 
taken somewhat further, by amendments in 19 76 allowing the Cornmissicn 
to appoint its own employees (on terms and conditions agreed by ihe 
State Services Commission) and to be funded for all expenditure 
incurred in the course of its operations from a direct parliarnenta :!'."y 
. . 133 
appropriation. The Commis~ion noted in its Report for 1978, 
11'Ihe provi sions, as to finance and staffing, o;;>er ati ve 
since 1 April 1977 appear to re uniqi.:;.e \ 1hen ccrr-~red 
with those applicable to similar sta tutm.y bodies 
whim are funded entirely from parl:i.a.rrenta...ry vot2 .::..::d 
wbi.ch possess judicial and/or quasi-ju:ii.cial functions. \ 34 
A source of strong reservation about the Commission's 
independe nce was the extent of political control to which it might 
have bee n subject. Tbe 1974 Bill, and the 1975 .l\ct despit:e some 
modifica tions, g rante d to the Minister substa nti a l powe rs echoing 
the exte nt of ministe ri a l involvement found in pre -1958 legisl a tion , 
for examp le th e 1919 Board of Trade Act. Comment. has a lrea dy be e n 
made above ori the phasing out of the Minis t e r 's influe nce in t l :. e 
membe r shi p o f t he Cor:uni ssion . In cl a use 11(2) (a) of the as rc~por t e d 
-------------~·--- -----·-- ---------
133. Sectioris 171, 2J 1C: 191\. n" ,pec ti ve ly. 
134. f\£.port_o.C tr.c Corr!: ~cc-e Ccrrt,u ssic:i for_Yea~ _I"r:( . ..,d 31 F:i~Th J9'18_. G. 5'1, p . 4 . 
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1974 Bill the Minister could refer matters to the Commission for 
investigation (struck out in the 1975 Bill); the Bill as 
introduced in 1974 provided in clause 17(1) (h) that the Minister 
could create public interest criteria (deleted by the select 
committee); the Minister could act independently in respect of 
price control, for example by amending the list of goods and 
services subject to price control and order the Secretary of Trade 
and Industry to conduct inquiries thereon (clauses 70(6) and (7) of 
1974 as reported Bill) - these being matters of some political 
implication. More conspicuous (and controversial) was the extensive 
role of the Minister in respect of monopolies, mergers and takeove r s 
which remained in the Act as passed in 19 75. This was a result 
mainly of the fact that for mono poly control the Legislature turned 
to the British legisl a tion for guidance, rathe r than t o the an t i-· 
trust approach of the United States. Indeed, the Minister mad~ his 
role quite explicit: 
"'Jhe provisions ·will enable the .Minister to take 
effective action against rronop()l:i.es, rrergers end 
takeovers whic.h are shown to have ob j ectiorwb le 
features in the public interest."
135 
To permit hL:n to so ac t, the 1975 Act prov ided th a t the l.iiniste:!'." 
could 
initiate i nqu:i.ri(~s to be cond u c t ed b y t h e Commission 
de ten!.1:i. ne whi er: p.::irtics would havs a dire et in t e r cs t 
in t h e matter and 10u1a ~hcrefore ~c advised of t he 
i nquiry 
-·-·-------····-·------··· -·--·-·-- - ---------
135 . 1.z.P.n . (19 74), voL 390 , p . . 1281 . 
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consult with the parties concerned 
refer the matter to the Examiner for 
investigation 
receive the report of the Commission on 
its inquiry following the Examiner's 
report to it 
determine the matter on consideration 
of the Conunission' s findings and publish 
his decision in the Gazette 
appoint an appeal authority to dete rmine any 
appeal lodged 
receive the decision of the appeal authority 
decide whether to accept a voluntary remedy 
if put f orward by the partie s conce rne d, 
or to request that the Gove r nor-Gene ra l 
make a n order. 
In 1976 a newly e l e cted National Gov ernment t ook the 
, 
opportun ity to r emove i mpe dime nts to the indepe nde n8e o f t he 
Comrner ce Commi s sion, tak ing particular a r.count of the r eport o f a. 
136 
spe cial Kork ing party set up to review the 19 7 5 Act. Th e 
working party, known a s the Tarrant Cornmi ttee, proposec: :-iume rous 
cha nge s t o t h e Ac t c t~ ntra l to which was the objective o f enh a ncing 
the s t a tus and role o f t h e Commerce Conuniss i on, \\'hos e p owers a !l d 
ob l igations it r ecomme nded b e incr ease d r elati ve to thos e o f the 
Mi nis ter, and who se dis c re t ion to act be ex t ended . Th e most 
s ign i.f icctn t. outcrnr,e of the Committe e's repor l ,•ms t he l:m a ct,r,e nt. of 
137 . . 
a. 11e:w· Par t J 1I Sl'i)s t J .: u tJ.ng t he Co,,mcrce Coru,d.s sio n fn r the 
·--- ----------·- -----·--···· ---·· -- .. ···-- -
J.36 . RPport ot t~1r· v:oy}:hig .i?,.i~·ty to the Mi nj_'- t01.· of 'I'r,":1c 2nd IDC::.L1"·try on fr,c, 
Co~m,r.,,n, Act J~i7S, Y.i2:cch 197G . Un_~t;') D'.'-;li.<.<l . 
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Minister in respect of each stage of investigation and inquiry, 
with consequential amendments to appeal provisions, discussed below. 
The general effect of these and other changes in the 1976 Act was 
to increase the distance ' of the Commission and the Examiner from 
political involvement and to grant to it the discretion to make the 
appropriate policy decisions. 
It is of .i.:1terest to note, however, that the 1976 Act 
included a new provision suggesting a general policy direction for the 
Commission - again on the recommendation 0f the Tarrant Cormni ttee 
whi.ch believed that broad principles, in addition to the Long Title, 
were needed to overlay the particular refe r ences to public interest 
' ' 'f' d. h 138 criteria speci ie in t e Act. Thus new section 2A reads: 
"2A. General obje cts - (1) In the r::erforrrano'.:! or exercise 
of their functions , i:;avers , and duties ur1&<=:r b'1is Act, the 
Carmission , ' Exarni.ner , and t he Sec:::eto.ry shall be guided by 
the foJJ _a,-,j ng objects: 
(v.) 'l'he pro1mtion of the i nterests of cor..sur€ rs: 
(b) 'Ihe prarotion of the sffective and efficient 
developrrent of industry and ~rrrrerce: 
(c) 'Ihe need to secure effective 00.'11.::>etitiori in industry 
and c:xrrce rre in NEW Zealcmd: 
(d) 'Ihe :;102cl to encourage inprovenr.nts L.'1 productivity 
ar.d cfficie-:cy in industry and comrerce in New Zealand: 
(e ) •n.12 economic policies of the Gov\=:n ra :t as transmitted 
in v,rj_t:Jng from tiIP.2 to ti.rn,-~ to the Co:cimission by the 
Minist':!r end <=1..s publi she".3. by him in the Gazette." 
-·-- ·-- - ------ · -·---·- -------------------------
The section is subject to a privative clause excluding review by 
the courts on any allegation of failure by the Conunission to be 
guided by any of these objects. The objects are of course only 
directory, although thi~ provision does come nearest to the 
Commission being required to take account of government policy. 
Consideration must also be given to the extent to which 
impartiality on the part of Conunission members is ensured by the 
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Act. Nothing in the Act disqualifies members from hearing and 
determining any case on the grounds of possible conflict of interest. 
Neither are members required to disclose financial interests. The 
latter might ha.ve been a desirable provision, in the public interest, 
given the entirely commercial nature of the substance over which the 
Cormnission has jurisdiction, but the Legislature decided against 
such a statement as was to be found in the Australiac Trade Practices 
Bl'll 1973 (1974)
139 
' 'd t' unaer consi era ion at the same time as the 
Cornmercc Act and to which the attention of the Commerce a!·1d Mining 
Select Cormnittee was drawn. The New Zealand l eg islation refers only 
to the opportunity which members may avail themselves of, of not 
sitting on the Commission where they feel there may be a conflict o:: 
139. "17. (1) Where any merrber of the Corrmission otter than t.11e Chairrnc,n has or 
a<XJ_uires any direct or indirect pecur~ia.ry ir1t.e.:-cct in any }:s ..:sincss carriEd 
on in AustraJia, or in any bcx:1y corporate carrying on suc.>-i btx.:;ine2s, beir1g 
an interes t t.hat rouJ.d be in ronflict wit:r. bir; duties as a rr,er:-Lcr , th.0. 
ffi'"..::.Tber shall, t o the b2.st qf his kra-,lec:ge, disclose t..'1.at intercE",t to Lri.e 
dl.ai:rm-m. " 
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interest;
140 
and section 3A(l) of the Act states that, if the 
chairman deems it not proper or desirable (for unspecified reasons) 
that he should adjudicate on any particular matter, the Deputy 
Chairman shall exercise 'all his powers. Under section 3A(2) the 
Deputy Chairman may similarly excuse himself. 
Wide powers are given to the Examiner whose functions under 
the Trade Practices Act are extended and to whom under statutory 
authority the Corrunission may delegate the right to exercise some of 
its powers. A number of witnesses before the select committee 
indicated that they believed the Examiner's powers to be too 
wide, in response to which clause 36 of the 1974 Bill, providing that 
the Commission could delegate any of its powers in respect of trade 
practices to the Examiner, was deleted. The Examiner, however, may 
still on delegation exercise the same powers as the Commission in 
respect of inquiry and investigation (obtaining information ) under 
section 12 of the present Act. In fact, the Legislature has made it 
quite clear that the Examiner has only investigative and 
inquisitorial powers and may not exercise judicial functions. 
In attempting to formulate procedural requirement s to meet 
the wider. jurisdiction of the Commerce CoITLrnission the Cormnerce Act 
is found to d e al expressly with matters on which the legislation 
previous was silent. 
140. 
------- --- ·---
'Iwo i nsta.i"1.ces of this havi..'1g c::::curred were notErl in the Report of the Corrm::rce 
Corrmission_ f?I YE:_c._\•:_T'rx:::.sd }_l.~·':'lr::0_1977 _lLJ.H.R. (1977) , Vol.1II, G.34 , p. 3. 
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Procedure 
The Commerce Commission, as is now an established precedent, 
sits in public subject to the same exceptions as provided under the 
Trade Practices Act. 
Generally speaking, the process of investigation and conciliati on 
by the Examiner of Commercial Practices and of inquiry, hearing and 
determination by the Commerce Commission, for trade practices and 
combinations is made uniform with that which was established in the 
1958 Act. With respect to trade practices, howeve:c, a new 
requirement is placed on the Commission to make a bal.anced appraisal 
f of both the harmful and the beneficial effects en the public inte rest 
' of trade practices. Trade practices listed in section 23 are ~ot 
only not presumed to be against t..rie public interest unless they have , 
one of the effects listed in section 21, but en a considera~ion of 
any demonstrable benefit to the public under subsection (2) the 
Commission must decide whether the net effect is ei t..eier rea.sonable 
or unreasonable. As before, the onus lies on the Examiner to p rove 
that a practice falls within the words of S8ctions 23 and 21(1), but 
Pa.rliament has placed the burden of proof firmly wi t h the parties to 
the practice under consideration to 
II . satisfy the Comni_ss.ion thatf in t.h~ particular 
case, -
(a) 'Ihc p r ac tice has or ~v-on.Jd have effects of c,'-·_ffn.1strablc 
benefi t to the pc:blic suf f.:ici:::nt to c,1·,tw2ig:-:. an_v of t he 
effec cs described i n sub:;ec,-ion (1) of t h i s seci.;_on wn i eh , 
in the cpi nion of U.:e C'.or0mLssion , Uk.: r;r,,:::U .. e2 11.:-.: o.;:· wowl~t have ; or 
(b) Eve.11 thoug,.~ the Corrmi.ssion is of the 
opinion that the ef feet of the practice is 
or would be one or rrore of these descrited 
in . . . subsection ( 1) of this secticn, 
that effect or effects is or are not 
unreasonable. \
41 
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It i.s fair to say that, along with appeal matters, the purported 
effect of this provision on onus of proof became a preoccupation of 
the House in the debates of 1974 and 1975. On both occasions the 
Minister ac~hered to the ·Jiew that once the Examiner had established 
the ex.:i_sh~nce of a trade practice having the undesirable consequences 
of increasing costs, prices or profits or red~cing competition, the 
first burde n of establishing that those consequencE:s were net in the 
circumst2.nces unreasonable shot1ld rcs t wi t...11 the parties wishing to 
defend the trade practice. It was stressec that the onm,: of proo f 
wa~; ;:inywa y an entirely mobile concept, as the traders having atte:npte d 
to show thci t the unf,:.wourable effects on the public interest 
previously found by the Examiner could be outweighed by beneficial 
consequer.ces, +~te onus would pass back tc the Exa~-niner to present 
evidence befo:c8 th(o: Commission in refut&tion of the parties' contentio· 
that the r e sults of the trade practice we re not unreasonable. The 
Ministe r at the s ame time denied th2-.. t th2 pro visions offended the 
---------
.. ___________________ _ 
141. Section 21(2 ). rrhese b a l anci.ng fact.ors do not apply tc the public interest 
tc-::st.s for n-o nop:Jlies . 1-10. .. -ever, sect io::1 80 adJ.s t o tr.2 public interest 
cri teria of s ec'.::iCJn 21 (.l) wl 0.d. do appl y to ffonq::olief· , further cr.itcria 
1.0 \•il:!.i - 1 the Cc.'r,,i:::-.s~e,:-1 must h a\.\~ P ~prd - i n p_. ~+""c::.. o f ~,::;si s .. :.ing c,r 
export and 
r:ocjc=J.l i r1 tc-!~----~~-;ts: ; .. 1~_1 c:1 s1J·. ~·,:.jst.s t!-1a-- t""'·.<::I.--.:: ti._o Lt JJ~112110::d c:1::;sc:s srent_ of 
r:ur~opoly ef;c,ct_:, nn.Jst. 1X; r!uJ.:_ ly the Co!". r'-'.'.::..:~i1.·1: . 
established principles of British justice and said that the 
considerable amount of criticism it had attracted, in submissions 
142 and in the House, was "unwarranted". The Chairman of the 
Commerce and Mining Committee had alre ady pointed out that such 
provisions for proving the reasonableness of trade practices were 
II in line with the rrore stringent attitude 
adopted by overseas legislatures .... " 
143 
The Legislature might also have had in mind the practical effect on 
the Exa miner's task of proving a case before the Commission by 
making it easier in some respects. 
In r e spect of all its functions the Comme rce Commission could 
(a) regulate its own procedure (section 8), 
(b) not have its procee ding s held bad for want 
I 
of form (s e ction 16) (notwithsta n d ing which 
provision a failure to observe natural 
justice would find certiorari), and 
(c) dispens e with forma l hea rings following successful 
co nciliat i o n (conducte d und e r sections 39, SSA, 
62, and 74 ). 
The provi sion o f t he 195 8 Act, that the Trade Practices Commission 
could make its own rul e s no t inconsist e nt with the Act, is 
r e-enacted in the 1975 Act, but to a much grea ter ekte nt 
prOCPl' ural req_L1.j_ rcrner,ts are spel t out . Here , t he Legislature 
142. N.Z .P .D. ('975), Vol. 401 , p . 4744 . 
14'.L H.%.P.D, (::.97-) , Vol. 39~· , p. 5430 .. Er M3.c Done:11. 
100 
had in mind and considered what "rules" should be met by legislative 
statement. 
1. Notice 
The Con®erce Act provides expressly that reasonable notice must 
be given to traders engaged in a trade practice or monopoly, having 
been found by the Examiner on preliminary investigation to be 
contrary to the public interest, of the successive stages of 
investj.gation and inquiry to which they will be parties. The specific 
requirements of length of notice and the form in which notice is given 
varies as, for e .. ample, between rr,onopolies and examinable trade 
practices. In both cases the parties get an early opportunity to 
know the initial ca8e against them, by means of the opportunity for 
conciliation, and ~re given a statutory period of time in which to 
reply to the statement of his opinion fur:i:1isl1ed to them by the 
Examiner to avail th2mselves of this opportunity (sections 39 and 62). 
Inquiries by the Commission into examinable trade practices are 
notified by means of the Commission sending to tt.e parties & copy of 
the Examiner's report, a reply to be furnished in a time to be stated 
by the Corm11i s s j on. In respect of monopolies, rr.ergcrs al!d taJ.:eovers 
the notice procedures are more stringent (perhaps because trade 
practice proce dure was adopted from the existing provisions of the 
1958 Act). 'l'he Cornrnission must publish n,T:.:i,--;e o f its intended inquiry 
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in the Gazette and appropriate newspapers, and give notice in writing 
to the Examiner and the participants in the trade combination 
(sections 64(3) and (4) and 74(3) and (4)), and, for monopoly 
inquiries, to such other persons as it thinks fit {section 64 (4) (c)). 
Price control under the Act is not subject to inquiry and there is 
therefore no requirement for parties affected by decisions to be 
granted rights to notice - or hearings - these factors being relevant 
at the appeal stage. 
For examinable· trade practices and trade combinations appeals 
are made by lodging notice in the Gazette, the procedure governed 
generally by the rules of Court. Appeals against pricing matters 
to th e Com.mcrce Corn,,1ission are advised in writing to the Commission 
which must, on fj _x ing a time and place for the hearings give 
II . . not less than 14 clear days public notice ti1ereof, 
,md shall also give not less than 14 clear c:a.ys notice 
in writing t o the appellant and to the Secretary. \
44 
2. Standing and Representation 
Under the Conunerce Act the legislation is designed to rrake thE-' 
law much more precise on the question of who may be accept2d as partie s 
to proceedings, to be represented, to presen t evidence and cross -
examine witnesses. The 1976 amendment, while retaining clarity on 
this point, considerably simplified the formulae. It provides that 
144. Section ~.'9 Ui) • 
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in any proceedings before the Commission any person may appear or 
be represented who applies, and who in the Commission's opinion 
either justly ought to be heard (with an automatic right to adduce 
evidence and cross-examine), or could assist the Commission in its 
consideration of the subject-matter of the proceedings (being able 
to adduce evidence and cross-examine only with the leave of the 
Commission). The Examiner, and the Secretary on pricing matters, 
are entitled to appear without application. 145 Under section 14 
of the principal Act the right to appear was spelt out in some 
detail, to provide that persons in the eight categories listed, and 
no others, could be parties except for a discretion the Commission 
had to hear any person with a "special interest" in the matter under 
inquiry . These provisions were described as having overcome 
"the vexed question of locus standi, . . . . . at least 
to a large extent , in this Statute by t.11e process o:E 
definition. 11
146 
The standing provisions under neither enacbnent were to extend to 
the Commission sitting as an appellate body on price appeals, where 
the persons entitled to appeal are carefully specified in section 99 
but, under the 19 76 amcndment 1 allow for the Commission in its 
discretion to admit consumer grot:;ps. The latter point had been an 
issue in submissions to the Comme rce and Mining Committee in 1974 
from consumer groups which argued that these organisations should 
145. Se ction 14 (lj and (2). 
(1976), para. 318. 
have a statutory right to appear and be heard, and participate in 
inquiries held under clause 91 (section 104 of the 1975 Act). 
A former chairman of the Commerce Commission having worked 
with the 1975 standing provisions, described them as 
and 
11
• • • a confused and difficult area. " 
" . . • a tangled ma.ss of confusion an d contradiction 
which, in some c i rcumstances, had the practical 
ef feet of denying the apparent or a ssrnned spirit 
and intent of these provisions."
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At the time of writing (March 1978) the new standing provisions 
had not been test ed, but he implied that by the new standing 
provisions of 19 76 the Legislature should more readily find. its 
intentions that wide opportunities should be provided for party 
- status r ealis ed. 
3. Disclosure o f Re leva n t Information 
'l'he _i\ct follows t .h c common law principle in respect of 
103 
disclosure of information i ndependently acquired by an administra t ive 
tribuna l - tha t s uch informat i on must be gi ven to the parties. Thi s 
princip J. e is me t by requi rir..g, under secti on 40(5), that on pT-oposing 
14 7. Bo:rn1:1oldt, B. , 'The Ccrme-.:·ce i\ct 19 75, i!'l Coll e~J:·Gd Pap_ers on Rest:ric: t-i ve. 
Trade Pr acti cc·, I' b nopolj es , .. r+2..rgers and 'I'2iJ:c.0 ... ·c.rs (1978 ) , Legal Rese..arcn 
Fourd at.i.('n 0-...;cc:sional P,:..1.,;.1hl,-, t:. b . 12 , p . 11. .:,.1r BorrhoJdt 's criticisms 
wE-re dc .... 1,::-:1~; , r,1i .cd , for e;:a.rcp2.e , in Dt:Yis·\on 10 . 3 of t he Comnission, Re~C'":'._ 
Z0a l .x1,::l ~'\c::srv·':..U..o:n o: r~L,.:'.:S U ;-,c; , ) \,::1...:re th.2 Corrmi s s ion' s cs cision to refill:" 
pc,·,~ty st::.itt.1r 1 • ,c-2c.::: f orrr::.:.r f-'cc ; io:,i ~: 9 (2) (d ) to tu0 i ntcr c.,st groups WZJ.S 
ow,r L:::.n,c0 Ci} c:·...,~.:>cal ·t::i U-.e:• Court .t..n r e s p::c t of one of the applicants . 
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to hold an inquiry into a trade practice the Commission forward to 
the traders concerned a copy of the Examiner's report which 
initiates the inquiry, and, under section 64(5) that before 
beginning an inquiry iryto a monopoly (or oligopoly) the Commission 
circulate to every party having received notice of the inquiry a 
copy of the Examiner's reports. The reports of the Examiner, in 
both cases, must describe the practice he has found to exist, the 
persons involved, the nature and . results of any investigations and 
discussions he has held, and any other material which, in his 
opinion, is relevant. The parties thus will know in advance the 
basis of the Commission's inquiry and may lodge rejoi.nders, if 
desired. It is also relevant to note here the practical benefit to 
the parties and the Examiner of the conciliation process at which 
stage , as might be expected, the arguments on both sides are 
. 14 8 canvassed, the trading parties n ft en apparently t&king l egal advic e. 
The Commission also has the authority to order the exchange 
of documents and other information before or during a heari ng (uncte r 
section 15(3)) ,
149 
it being an offence to contravene any such order , 
The provision has the advantage that, on a fuller understanding of 
the considerations of the other parties, all parties might be enabled 
to see a way to a reasonable and pragmatic resolution of their 
differences . 
--------
148. As stated to the ·writer in discussions wit.h senior of:fici.:i.ls o f t:1e 
Examiner ' s 0£:f:ice. 
14.9. Such an order w~s :·,nde, fc;r P.zar:.ple , durir~:J the Corr..rrj ssion ' s consj_de.rat.i.on 
of the app] ic.1ti0c1 by the Brewers ' Associa1..ion of t~c:.,,.: Ze ... aland Inc . for an 
L1cre;.1s2 in be::;r prices, in 1976. 
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4. Evidence 
The powers of the Commission (and the Examiner) to take 
evidence under the ~958 Act were substantially re-enacted in 1975, 
the Commission having the advantage of freedom to seek information 
of assistance in its inquiries and be ing free from Court rules of 
evidence, but with the same authority as the courts to administer 
oaths, issue summonses and require the production of books or 
documents (section 13). Unlike the Trade Practices Ac t , however, the 
Commission may compel a witness to give evio.ence which he would b e 
excused from giving before an ordinary court on the ground that he 
might tend to incriminate himself (section 17). This provision was 
modified on the recommenda tion of the Commerce and Mining Commi ttee 
after consideration of the 1974 Bill by the inclusion of a cluus e 
to prote ct a witn e~s having tende red incriminating evide nce f rom 
. . d' 150 such evi de nce being used in any criminal procee ings. 
Proceedings before the Commission are to be take n orally but, 
according to O'Keefe 
"It is understood from inquiries which have been made 
that the Comnission f avours follcwing a procedu:ce 
by which all evj dence and submissions in chi e f will 
be r educed i..o writi ng , 15 copies reing handed i n well 
before any heari ng , a11d in time for opp:)sing parties 
to file written material in r eply 1::efore the hear ing. 
This procedure . . . shouJ.d ul tiw.ate.ly r esult in a 
subs t antial sav:rng of time in arriving at a 
fo:rrn;.il a tic:1 o f the essential questions en any given 
:ma.r ter II - .. ' 151 
150. C'.ca1··..:,rce Pi ll , as :rt"r,ol"t:.=:d fran U10 C'.omrer0-:3 ,md ~J.ning Corrmit tee , clause 
L 'A (2). C.f Ccmrerce !let· . .1975 , s ectio:;:i 17 (2) :J1d (3). 
151. 01) , cit. , pora , 318 . 
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This would appear to be a very good example of the Conl!llission using 
to advantage its power to decide its own procedures. It is a policy 
which is not in accordance with normal court procedure, but was also 
found to be useful by the Trade Practices Cor~ission, especially in 
152 relation to the advance disclosure of evidence to each party . 
Oral hearings are still of course necessary to enable tl"1s Commission 
to resoive inconsistencies among the various sources of evidence. 
5. Reasons 
Despite the attention to detail in respect of other procedu:cal 
matters, Parliament failed to take the point made in the statern2n ts 
and writings of administrc1tive law experts, that in t½e interests of 
fairness the Co~nission should give re~sons for its decisions. As 
aforementioned, the Examiner ~ust state the grounds for his telief 
tha.t. a practice exists contrary 'co the public interest, and this is 
reported to the parties. Under section 22(2), the CoITmis£ion, before 
making any order against. & practic<::, shall con8ider further 
representations from the parties which might cause it to refrain from 
confirming the order. But the only specific rcfer0:ice j_n the 1\-:.::t. to 
the giving of raasons is found in respect of price decisions of the 
Secretary under section 95 which reads: 
--------~---··~-- - ---· ---- ·-----·----------------·-
152. In Fcnc:~ng M.1te:rials, c,p. c5 .. t., l.1:26 D.;:,l~1JJ.::::·h J. said that 0 a.s rnud1 evidence 
as pos3ible f',l!oulc. be. :-i, 1:, ~:1 '·In.ting . . . 2nd show{1 4.:o the other s ide iJ1 
u:.:iwm.:-;e of i he fin,· l L~...-dng. " 
"Reasons for decision of Secretary to be given on 
request - 'l'he Secretary shall give in writing to the 
applic~t, and to any other person whau he regards as 
having a direct interest in any decision tha.t he has 
ma.de in relation to the price of gcx:x1s or services, 
his reasons for :the decision, if the applicant or any 
such other person so requests." 
Clearly, where reasons are given the first instance decision is 
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more likely to be better formulated, and the opportunity to appeal 
against the decision will be vastly enhanced. 
In practice, the Commerce Commission does give reasons for 
its decisions. In the hearing relating to the Brewers' Association, 
for example, the report of the Commission records that 
"The Ccmnission alla.ved the application in full in 
this case and the r easons for tha.t, together with 
a dissenting opinion, are set out in the full 
decision.\
53 
; 
Sitting as the a ppeal authority on Golden Bay Cement the Commission, 
similarly, set out in detail the grounds on which it reached its 
decision to dismiss the appeal, subject to variations it made in 
the special price approvals granted the appellants by the Secretary 
in the first instance. 
154 
It is, however, clear that "in the absence 
of a legislative r equirement , adminis t rative tribunals . . are not s 
[ 
, - , , - II 155 obliged to give reasons for their ctec1s1ons.J Since the giving 
153. Annual Report of Ca:rmerce Corrrn.issio::i. (1977), op. cit., p. 6. Re Brewers' 
Associ2.tion of ?1e.-1 Zealand Inc., Decis ions 7 and 7a, 3 June 1976 and 
21 June 1976 respc:-ctively . 
154 . The Golden Bay Q-:Te, t O:xq:'dny Ltc: v §?'?-·e~_ry o/ Trud e and Ir~}ustr_x_, 
De::is.i.on 'No . 2, of t he Com11erce Coirt1.is:;i c,n, 12 Ma.:rch 1976 . 
155. Keith (1974), op . cit., p . 17 . 
of reasons is coming to be seen as a very important aspect of 
administrative law it is a major omission of the New Zealand 
Legislature thai it did not see fit to make specific provision. 
Being informal bodies, it is not necessary that reasons given by 
tribunals be of too exacting a standard, but where appeal rights 
exist, as under the Commerce Act, they should be required, in 
sufficient detail to permit a person affected by a decision, to 
properly represent his case at appeal - or, alternatively, to 
decide not to proceed to appeal. 
Appeal 
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Rights of appeal in the Commerce Act appear under three heads, 
for trade practices, trade combinations and price control. 
(i) Trade Practices (sections 42-47) 
As under the 1958 Trade Practices Act, appeals against decisions 
of the Commission lie to the Administrative Division of the Supreme 
Court, on matters of fact or law, al though this is not stated. 
Persons from both party sides are entitled to appeal, whereas under 
the 1958 Act the Examiner could appeal on points of law only. The 
Court is to follow the usual procedure laid down by the rules of 
Court, but under section 45 G~ere is an unusual provision for the 
Court to hear a case in private if it considers that a public 
hearing would not be in the interests of the public or other persons 
concerned. The decision of the Court is to be final and conclusive. 
109 
(ii) Trade Combinations (sections 81-81E) 
Appeal provisions here are similar to those for trade 
practices; al though the grormds of fact and law are specified. 
(iii) Price Control (sections 99-103) 
In the price control area the Commission acts as a judicial 
authority for the determination of appeals from decisions of the 
Secretary. Given the wide powers of the Secretary tb.is is an 
important provision, and follows the earlier recommendation of ti1e 
Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee that, 
"having regard to that [legisla.tive] d1aracteristic 
and to th2 part which policy must plcJ.y in the 
function [of price-fixing] , we do not ronsider that 
the Price Tribunal should be n-erged with the 
Administrative Division.\
56 
'rhe Committee did, however, see it as essential that the J\ppeal 
Tribunal on price matters be strongly constituted and be chaired by 
a legally qualified person. While the Commerce Corr~ission is not 
required to be so chaired, it is relevant to consider the further 
remark of the Committee, that few questions of law would arise in 
this fiela,
157 
and that legal expertise will be found on the 
Commission if not necessarily in the chair. 
156. First &;port, op. cit., para. 82. 
157. Ibid., para . 84. 
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Proceediugs before the Commission taken under Pa~t IV on price 
control are not appealable, ( section 10 5) • 
Reference was made above to the fact that much of the debate on 
the Commerce Bill was concerned with the appeal provisions which were, 
certainly, somewhat more limited in the 1974 Bill than in the 1975 Act 
as amended. For exarnplE:, in the former, as reported from the select 
committee and despite strong contentions on the appeal rights 
proviced, 
II .. relating to trade practices, no appeal is 
p1uvided on a question of fact .... but t..11e 
investiga tion of trade practices involves alrrost 
entirely que2ticns of fact and not of law." - 158 
Much more anomalous was the original nature of the appeal right 
against decisions of 'the Commission on trade corr.binatiou matters. 
Section 74 of the principa l Act provided that any parties to an 
inquiry into a monopoly (including the Examiner) could appeal on a 
point. of law by Eotice to the ~1inister who then appointed ad £10C 
a barrister or solicitor of not less than 7 years ' practice for the 
purposes of hear ing that particular appeal only, the Appeal Authority 
to d2termine its ow-n procedure. No further appeal lay to the 
Admini strative Division. In the Bill as introduced the Appeal 
Authcri ty cot,J.d not ~~vcn deterrni 110 the matter , but incrGly could advise 
tli r: Mini .,_, t 2:,· oi: t ,e ontcornE: of h:i s heaj:i ng for the Minister's decision; 
--------- -·---
158. N.Z .f' .D. (1')74}, r,p. ci_t,, p. 5/32 . Sir J ohn Marshc1ll. 
J.11 
or remit the Commission's report for further consideration or direct 
the Commission to pass its report to the Minister. As argued by 
Sir John Marshall, this measure did not 
II • . provide for an independent or inpartial 
appeal, but merely for an interim review, with 
the f:mal d8cision reserved for the Minister." 
159 
The Minister's involvement in appeal on trade combination 
matters was a natural corollary to the then Government's policy 
regarding the control of monopolies, discussed more generally 
previously. Sir John's belief, expressed in the conte x t of the 
above quotation, t_hat in this area appeal should lie to the 
Administrative Division was implemented upon the transfer of 
ministerial power to the Commission in 1976. 
Being an impoftant matter for the decision of the Legislatur2, 
an attempt is made in Appendix B to compare the appeo.1 ;:-,nd review 
rights provided un de r the post-1958 legislation. 
Regulatjon-m~cing power is gran ted under section 132, dealing 
laroely ,;i th procedures required to be followe d by traders in 
keeping records for and making applications to the Commission, 
Examiner and Se cretary; p~escri~ing procedure and guidelines for 
159. Ibid., p. 5,P.J . 
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the Commission, Examiner and Secretary; and providing for 
certain pricing details. 
The Fourth and Fifth Schedules to the Act allow for 
Stabilisation of Prices Regulations made under the Economic 
Stabilisation Act 1958 to remain in force, leading to the fear 
being expressed in the House that 
" ... much of the spirit and much of the effect of 
the 35 sets of Stabilisation of Prices Regulations, 
with all their frustrations, disincentives and 
ineffectiveness, will find its way i n permanent 
:form into the regulations to be made under this 
Bill. "161 
112 
To date, this has not been the case in Comt1e rce Act Regulations, but 
of course whether o:r- not these effects are avoided would depend to 
a large e xtent on the policies and practic e s Adopted by the 
Secretary who in all these respects is subject to supervision by the 
Commission. 
Offences 
Little has been s a id in the p r e sent context about the creation 
of offenc es unde r the Act. Prohib itions o f c ourse create a role for 
the ordi nary courts , a nd those p.r. c::. c tices a c t ua lly prohib ited are 
such as were by 1 975 ,,e ll-es t abli s hed and acc epte d as appropriate ly 
being illega l per _s e. Pr ofi t eer.i. ng , however I is treated somewhat 
--- --- ---
160. E . g ., Stat utory Regul i..iU.or:s 197?/ 8? , Cl ause 3 , provided t.riat with r espect to 
notices n ,.'<:Jarc1ing m2rqers and t,;,l._,Dver-s , "The I:xaminer rrti'..:y f rom t ime t o time 
pI:cscr i be tiic f orin of t!-18 r;0tic..o. J 2quir c.d to be given un:::1er sec'-:.ion 68 (1) , 
and . . . 11.nci.er sc~:--Uon , }. (J. ) o f '~:·1e Co:n.:n3..ccc-: Act. 1975." 
161. N.:l .P.D. (] 97 411 op . c·.~. t., p . 5~7Pi, llon . M1: ,?\d.,-.,T1s-Schneider , 
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differently. Although profiteering in goods or services is an 
offence under section 54, it became under the 1976 amendment the 
subject of a conciliation procedure whereby no prosecution may be 
commenced without leave of the Chairman of. the Commission, on the 
application of the Examiner who must, before lodging an application, 
inform the person concerned of the alleged offence and invite him 
to confer with a view to entering into a written agreement that the 
offence wil.l be mitigated as far as practicable and repetition of 
1.·t .d d 162 avo1. e • 
It was felt that outright prohibition was a severe means of 
dealing with the practice of profiteering, individual instances of 
which might be unwitting, but if the offe nce is without mitigating 
circumstances the Commission Chairman may, after re ce iving an 
appliccJ.tion from, the Examiner, authorise imr,:ediate proi;ecution 
withou t the cpportunity for negotiation being extended to the 
. . 163 
pan::.1es. 
The Conune rce Commission , as a body set up to deal with a.n 
area of broad economic a nd social relevance , needed to be ve stee 
two d:;.stinct ch a racteri s tics. First, it had to be give n suffici~nt 
flexibility to deal with each c ase on its merits - the essence of 
the New Zea lElnd Legislature's upproach to the contro l of commercial 
prac Lices and rr iccs . Second, it. needed cls::cff guide line s under 
-.-.,11.i.c h to opsr.:-tte to mfr,irnise Uc nc,:;d for pa.,~t i es the subj ec t of 
·-. --------·-------
lfi2. 
16.1 
Sec Lien 
f~C;Ct:.c:n :i. ,B . 
----·-- -- -- ·--------
L' "' L:-p,rw 
VICTOil!A li!.-. .. k .. ·,~· OP ~.JE:LLl~-G~oiJ 
investigation to h a ve recour s e to the courts. The Legisla ture 
has attempted, in the 1975 Act, to meet both aspects, but not 
without attracting to the l e gi s lation considerable criticism. On 
the one h a nd, the Commerce Commission has been said to have 
unenviably unfettered discretion in the exercise of its powers and 
functions. On the other, criticism has come, primarily from the 
commercial comrnuni ty, of the unduly time·-consuming and e xpensive 
procedures which must be observed, pursuant to the Act. 
The complexity of the Act has b een ad.'1l i tte d by a past 
Chairman of the Corrunission : 
"Any l egisl ation dea l ing with the 20th Centur y 
market pl ac e and sophisticat EXi areas such as 
prices , trade practices , rronopoli es/rnergcrs 
and t akeovers nn.1st inevi tabl y be canpl ex . \
64 
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Mr Bornho ld t h a s d ~ni e d, how ever , t hat t h e Act is unworka b le h a ving 
not e xp e rj e nced t h i s in o ffi c e , bu t i n f i nd i ~g c 2rtain a r ea s in 
which the Act does cr ea te p roblems wi t h a dministration a nd 
interpre t a tion he has E',es1: t h e d :i_s cret icn o f t h e Corrnn i ssion c1s a n 
advantage in t heir reso l ution. 
As expr essed in the 19 7 7 Annua l report of t he Commi ssion, 
membership has been a pro b l em with respe ct both t o accompli shing 
its work l oad and ach i eving independence - as fores h adowed dur ing t he 
- ---·----- ~- - --
164 . Bcrnhold t, op . cit . , p . 7. 
consideration of the 1974 and 1975 Bills. The report said 
II •. that it nay conduct its affairs as a-peditiously 
as reasonably r:ossible the Conmission considers a 
membership of eight is required. That should give it 
the flexibility not only to sit in divisions but also 
to allcw for tenporary absence of members through 
sickness or otherwise, through disqualification by 
way of conflict of interest circumstances" . 165 
Another problem of constitution was the part-time nature of the 
Chairman's appointment, the position calling in fact for this and 
possibly two or three more appointments to be full time, a matter 
given insufficient attention by the Legislature in establishing an 
administrative body with such demanding functions. 
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A striking feature of the Commerce Commission's operations is one 
perhaps not looked for by Parliament when cons i dering t h e Commerce 
Bill in comparison with the 1958 Trade Practices Act, namely, an 
increasing tendency already evident in the Trade Practic e s 
Conunission towards judicialisation. The Commerce Commission is o f 
course obliged to act judicially but this does not imply, a s such, 
that the trappings of full adversarial trial by the courts be 
adopted. To an extent, the words of the Statute suggest a modelling 
f h . b 1 1 . d . . 1 1 . 
166 
o t e tri una a ong JU icia ines. In being bound by the rule s 
of natur a l jus tice the Commission has also striven to e n sure unbiased 
165. Op . cit., p. 3. 
166. That t his i s a l so a trend in Britain, whose legisl ation has provided a mx1el 
in some r csp,~ct.s for the 1,1ew Zealand l egisla tio:1 on comr.e.rcial practices , 
i s suggested by Stever1s a11cl YarPey, op. c.it., p. 9: "Administrative tribur.als 
have been rrad(; 1rore judicial in appearance a.1,d i roeperrlff.t in action." 
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d f . h . 167 an air earings. As a result, all parties being always 
in practice represented by legal counsel c1.nd adversarial processes 
being followed, the Commission, according to close observers, 
operates very formally, fand proceedings are very costly for the 
. d. . 168 tra ing parties concerned. 
Formality, cost and publicity ha.ve tended, in the short time of 
the Act I s operation, to provide strong deterrents tc comrnercia 1 
parties who might be subject to proceedings urider the JI.et. 
Examinable trade practices are almost always resolved by conciliation. 
By March of this year no monopoly cases and only one case under the 
merger and takeover provisions had come to the Commission. Most of 
the Corr.mis sion's work has in fact related to pricing· matters. 
It is arguable whether this outcome indicates deficiencies i~ 
the machinery of the tribunal, especi~lly a l ack of effective 
I 
. 169 . l . enforcement machinery thus frustrating t1e intent of the 
Legislature, or whether, in opposition, the machinery is such as 1:.0 
fulfil the desire of Parliament to have the commercial community 
regulated as far as possible by administrat::.v2 controls, the 
respon sibility at the end of an administr2.tive process resting with 
a tribunal exercising judicial functions. J t is perhaps unreasonc:tb le 
to draw too definite a conclusion about the utilisation jn practice 
of the J.egislative frame\·ork provided under the Commerce l\Ct 
considering t.ha t the Examiner and the Cowmi~;s.:..on have an 
-·--------~-·--,.,__ .. _____ __ ___ ______ , 
16 7. r.orr:.holfr'.::, c·!.J . ci t. f p . 9. 
168. Si.:,pr a , . ot.0 148. 
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It would also appear tbat the preserit Government has in mind putting 
to the House further amendments in the near future, which may bear 
on aspects of constitution and procedure. 
The Commerce Act was considered in detail by the Legislature 
on three occasions in the same number of years - a history in itself. 
In addition, the Fifth Schedule to the Act (Enactments Repealed) 
represents a virtual history of the legislation on commerc:i_al 
. d . 170 practices an prices As this schedule might suggest, the 
Commerce Act is not entirely without a cognate relationship with 
ever. the earliest legislation passed in 1-Jew Zealand to deal wi t:-i 
this area, and indeed in substance and procedure bears out an 
identifiable historical continuity. As the result of an 
accumulation of effort on the pa.rt of the Legislature to find an 
appropriate means of encouraging competition and regulati n g prices, 
the Act does, however, have t.he distinction of providirig a ccherent 
administrative appro a ch under the supervision of a single 
administrative and judicial body. 
In the 197 .5 Act Parliame nt saw that it was desirable, in terr..s 
of admi11L:; t1. a tive con ve n j c-nc:e and in the interests of sensible 
tribunal d e ve }.opmen t, to amalgamate two existing adrninis t rati ve 
t:i:ibunc11 t, r U 1e 'I':::- a de P r act:LceE-~ Commission a nd the Price Trib unal. 
This ·.r-ar , h0·.vr.;;,.-cr I a n 21,1 tribi.:nal .is propos~d i r> l E.' g is lation wh i c h 
----- -----·--· - -· 
J 70. Se"2 I1~Jf'2~1cu. x C :::o:: ·=~ : ::.i::.dL1ie of rer2c.1L.~ uf cormerc-1.a.J. practi 02.s and p.ci css 
l s-;;i.:;.lct.ior1 ,·c. j( ).Ccc~ :in tr2 pre~ent p:at.1er. 
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has objects and deals with substance not completely unconnected with 
that covered by the enactments discussed up to this point, thereby 
contradicting any tendency which might have been inferred that the 
Legislature might refrain from creating further bodies to 
administer new areas of jurisdiction. It remains, now, to consider 
the Securities Commission which it is intended to establish under 
the Securities Bill currently before the House. 
. . . J 171 Securities Bill . 977 
The Securities Bill was, like the Monopoly Prevention Act 
seventy years before, introduced to deal with a spe cific mark e t 
situation, in this case a chain of busine ss collapses in the 
f . . 1 . . f . ld l 7 2 inancia securities ie . Its general purpos e is to regulate 
the activity of commercial fund raising and to attempt, as far as 
possible, to a pply uniform standards to fund raisi ng for all 
organisations s e eking finance from the public. It h a s in common 
with the Commerce Act two basic substantive objectives. First, 
like the Commerce Act the Securities Bill is broadly concern ed 
with the stability of the economy, the viability of busine ss, the 
savings of small and large i nvestor s a nd the protection of the 
171. Tne Bill was intrcx:1uced as the Securitie s Advertising Bill , but on the 
extensicn of its content it was f ou,."1Cl appropriate to adopt the l ess 
restricted title. S'c:e Supplanent.ary Order Pa:_::ie:c I\'o. 9 (19 78) . 'Ii:1e 
Bill here will be referre::1 to as t he Securities Bill, and i s the Bill 
as r eportr?'J. back frc.11 the Statut0s l-12visiun c~ ~!::rtittee. 
172. The Bill was prompted fin:1lly by the fin::~tcial fai l ure of the 
Sc..·'cu.ritiL.J.nJ-. Croup iu 1977. 
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public (consumers and the investing public respectlvely) .
173 Second, 
both pieces of legislation are concerned with the regulation of the 
structural and behavioural paterns of entrepreneurs -on the one 
hand in the goods and services market and on the other in the 
capital market -when these adversely affect the interests of others. 
It is understood that some consideration was given by the 
Government to including in the functions of the Commerce Commission 
those intended for the Securities Commission, prior tc the 
introduction of the Supplementary Order Paper proposjng the new 
'b 1 174 • r d  h • ' • tri una , wh1.ch was re.erre to t e Statutes Revis:..on Conur.1 tee 
considering the Bil. It would appear that amalgamation was 
rejected on ~he grounds that the two tribunals would deal with 
quite diffe r ent subject maters, despite not dissimilar objective s 
and d espite certain evident similarities in approach and procedure. , 
That a specialist body for ~he surveilance of the capital 
market was not included in the original Bil was a result of the 
limite d application initialy intended. The provision of a 
Securities Co~n~ssicn arose almost entirely in response to 
submissions to the s;:,l e ct. commitee, that a body should ::>e 
established t.o overse e and co-ordinate develcprnents in the securj_tie s 
175 market, a n d also to avoid the possibility of legislative control 
173. Al the,;,: G.Jjeci:.ives WE:r e atributed to t.J-:e Ccm.TP.Jre Bll by Sir John Marsh~-. 
dL1.rins c'·\,-:1~:: o n 1:-1-~ J.974 Bil. Sec N.Z.l'.D. (1974), op. ci.t., p. 5431., 
l"'Ll _, . 
J.'75. J~ctablr-~ ,~nCi\:; s,.Jc:l! :-·utmiss.iorn=; was th.1.t cf r-i:i.: R . P . DRrv'Cl, a l?T.v 
p.,·c1cti ~~  • :.J. i:';:-;2~:i.cl3."·ec1 jn cc.1·,c:-:cLtl Icr·.r, v·l,o ~,c:.r,1 c.-: n: . -c:d L:e:c0.iute11, f o r 
c1 co···o: ~i.r~~tcrl 1.r:-u' .. ;,.de coverir.~3 the '"hole:~ of the secuTities 2<n"F1. 
in individual circumstances of serious financial difficulty being 
precluded during parliamentary 
176 
recesses. 
The Legislature was quick to take up the idea and consider it 
further in select corunittee. A discussion of the form and 
procedures of the propos ed Securities Commission is of interest 
because it will shcw how Parliament's propensity for establishing 
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tribunals to be responsible for new jurisdictions created by statute 
is developed. As will be seen, the Securities Co™nission borrows 
from the Commerce Commission in several respects, but has additional, 
distinguishing, features in constitution and procedure. 
Consti tuticn of Securities Corrn,ission 
It is important first to note tha t the Securities Co~nission 
is to be a body corporate, capabl e of dealing in property and of 
suing and being sued, and so on. Its proceedings, however, a~e to 
be privileged as follows, in clause 6T ( 1) (a) : 
"1':o p.t"oceedings, civil or criminal, shall lie c,gainst 
the Comnission for anything it may de or fail to co 
in ~ course of the exercise or intendm exerc.:i.sc 
o f its functions, t.mless it is shc:wn tl1at it act.e:l. 
in bc1d faith or without reasonable ea.re." 
Further , members, employees, special c,ppointees and delegatees 
of the Con~i ss ion are expressly prohibited from giving evidence in 
any court, o :c indeed .Ln c1ny p roceedings o f c:. j u.d.i cia l na t.ure 
rela ting to information he has acqui red in the c curs8 of the 
__ , ______ ... _r ____________ ________ _ ----------------·· 
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Commission's operations (clause 6T(l) (c)), and any evidence taken 
before the Commission is to be privileged as for an ordinary court. 
These provisions clearly distinguish the Securities Co1T1F.Lission 
from any other tribunal, being seen as necessary adjuncts to the 
functions of this tribunal most of which are to be effected beyond 
th bl
. 177 
e pu 1c gaze. 
The functions of the Commission as originally proposed were 
somewhat broadly phrased, being under clause 6B 
(i) to keep under review the law relating to bodies 
corporate, securities, and unincorporated 
issuers of securities, and to reconunend t8 
the Minister any changes considered nece s sary, and 
(ii) to perform other functions imposed by the Act or 
any other ena ctment, these including the power 
to consider exemptions of any organisations f rom 
the provisions of the Act, to investigate and 
I 
advise on amendments to the Companies Special 
Inve stiga tions Act 1958, and to act in an 
appellate capa city in respe ct of appeals against 
. 178 
decisions of the Registrar. 
177. But the Comnission is required to report annually to Parliament (clause GV) . 
See also later :1..---efcrence to appeal procedure . 
178 . E-eing the Rcgi stra~- o::: Co'.,.,P<Llies establis~ed under the Companies Act 1955. 
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In response to calls in submissions that these functions be further 
spelt out, the additions were made by the Statutes Revision Committee 
that the Commission also keep under review practices relating to 
securities commenting thereon to any appropriate body; 
public understanding of the law and practice relating to 
and pron:ote 
securities. The for.mer went some way to meeting the recorrunendation 
of the New Zealand Law Society that the Corrunission should investigate 
any new commercial practice relating to securities irrespective of 
wheLl1er that practice was controlled by any existing law. 179 The 
latter suggested a new path for tribunals in publicising some 
aspects of the ir work, already adopted informally, and as yet on a 
limited basis, by the Examiner of Commercial Practices who has taken 
steps to diss emina te among relevant groups information about the nature 
J.80 and operation of the Commerce Act. 
'l'he funct i ons of the Corn!ni ssion are thus to be investigatory, 
advisory and judicial. 
'I'o carry out these functions, the Securities Corrunission is to 
consist of five me mbers, appointed by the Governor-General on the 
recommendation of the Mi nister, for a. term stated in the appointment 
but not exc eeding five y ea rs (subj e ct to possible reappointment). 
-- ------·----·---
179. Cf the def j nib.on of a ' trad e p:cactice' in the Conmerc-~ Act 1v~hlch includes 
'anythinq con2 or i n~cnd:.:.d to t e rlone_ ', thL1s r:x=rmitting the Exam.ner to 
inves tig2..tc: tr.e circ:1,rrs t2nces o f flay intende:1 action which might fall within 
the Act , ,·.s v,-ell as trc.c~~ pr c':.lctices actuu.lly i n operation. 
180 . S1J;_xa , net,? 1 48. 
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Some submissions proposed that some qualifications for members should 
be laid down and that there was a need for full time members. 
Neither point was taken by the Committee, although difficulties with 
membership of the Commerce Commission had already pointed to the 
desirability of some full time membership. The chairman of the 
Securities Commission must be a barrister or solicitor of not less 
. 181 
than seven years practice. 
Under clause 6D the Governor-General, on the recoITu.~endation of 
the Minister, may appoint alternate members to fill vacancies on the 
Commission caused for whatever reason. The appointment of an 
alternate for an ordinary member is made by the Chairman, and for 
the Chairman by the Minister, from those alternate members already 
appointed by the Governor-General, thus enabling the Commission to 
proceed with its business speedily and without delay - as often it 
must. 
A new provision for tribunals appears in clause 6M of the 
Bill,. which permits the Commission to appoint experts "to assist it 
in connection with the exercise of its functions, to make such 
inquiries or to conduct such research or to make such reports as m~ y 
be~ necessary for the efficient carrying out of any functions of the 
Commission", remunerating experts so a.i;,po:Lnted as it thinks fit. 
In a technica lly specialised area this is obviously o~ great 
·----------------------
181. Seo clause 6C. 
potential advantage considerably enhancing the possibility of 
decisions being based on thorough and objective investigation. 
Such a provision could well be considered for the Commerce 
Commission. 
The Commission is to have independence in the appointment of 
its employees (clause 6L). 
Procedure 
The Securities Commission is to be able to regulate its 
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procedure as it thinks fit (clause 6G(7)). Except in respect of its 
appellate function (see below), no direct provision is made for the 
Commission to hold public hearings. The Bill states simply that 
the Commission may deliberate in private (clause 6K(4)). 
The powers for o btaining evidence are the sarr.e as those 
accorde d the Conunerce Commission, except that clause 6J ( 4) provides 
that 
"The Ccmnission may permit a person appearing as a 
wi b1ess . . . to give evidence by tendering and, 
if the Comnission thinks fit, verifying by oath, 
a written statanent ." 
Persons who may appear and be represented are the same for the 
inquiry and appellate funct ions of the Commiss ion. In the original 
Supplementary Order Paper (clause 6I) , standing provisions were 
identical to those oft.he Commerce Commission . The Select Committee 
mad e these more specific, so that thos e who could seek leave to 
apply and be represented were 
(_-i) in respect of c r,ns iderations by the Conunission of 
prospectuses (under section 22(1) (b)), the 
party directly affected, 
(ii) in respect of appeals, the person whose appeal 
(iii) 
is being c~nsidered, and 
persons who in the opinion of the Commission 
ought to be heard, (the word 'justly' is 
omitted), or who could assist the Commission~
82 
As an appellate body under section 48A of the Bill the 
Securities Corrunis sion is to meet in public, with exceptions and 
prohibitions on the publication of proceedings and evidence as for 
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the Commerce Commission. Appeal decisions of the Conmission are to 
be final, but appeal on a question of law only to the Administrative 
Division of the Supreme Court is allowed, by any party to any 
proceedings before the Commission who is dissatisfied with the 
Co~nission's decision as being erroneous in point of law, unde r 
clause 6R. In contrast with appeals made from decisions of the 
Commerce Commission, this clause requires that the appellant must 
I 
state in writing his appeal case, setting out t~e facts and the 
grounds of the determination appealed against, and must s pecify 
the question of law on whicl1 the appeal is based, the appe llant 
having to circulate his statement to every other party. This 
provision places a heRvy responsibili ty on the appellant who will, 
for this purpose, need to know from the Corr1nission the reasons for 
182. See clause GX(j) (a) - (c). 
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its determination although the Bill does not state that the Commission 
shall give reasons to the parties upon reaching a determination. 
It is also provided under clause 6Q that the Corrunission itself 
may state a case for the opinion of the Administrative Division on 
any question of law arising, the Supreme Court being granted express 
statutory power to order the removal of any such case stated into 
the Court of Appeal. 
In considering the appeal provisions of the Bill the Select 
Corrunittee declined to concede the argwr,ent put forward in some 
important submissions that appeal should lie to the Administrative 
Division on matters of fact as well as law, given that decisions of 
the Commission could terminate business operations whose closure 
would have a very great impact on employment a.nd on cc!"nmercial 
endeavour. 
The Bill of course has yet to proceed through the Committee of 
the Whole House and in details where it is seen to fall short it 
may yet be amended. It may be noted here that the introductio:1 of 
"bureaucratic control'', into a Bill originally characterised by the 
certainty of a complex system of prohibitions on securities 
183 practices, is still contested in the House. The business 
·------------
183. E.g., Mr Iange in. l.f19 depate on the r eporting b2.ckof the 
Secu.rit..i c::; l,.ctverlisi.::-ig Bill and Supplen'l:.:nt.:..1.ry O:r-de~ Parer No . 9 from 
the Stc,t-utes Revision Ccmritt..2c'.. (At the tirre of ,\irit.ing the Hansard 
references to t."l.e aE>b.:1t:e were .not availablt.~.) 
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community, however, favours the shift of e~phasis from prosecutions 
based on breaches of the law provided in the original Bill, to one 
.c . • t. t. b th C . . 184 o~ constructive 1nves·1ga ion y e omm1ss1on. 
Like the law on business competition, the approach in the 
Securities Bill has its rationale in the opportunities provided for 
pragmatic, balanced and informed value judgments on each case raised. 
It could be argued that the job to be assigned to the Securities 
Corrmission could have been done by the Commerce Commission, with 
appropriate constitutional and procedural amendments, especially in 
the building up of relevant expertise and the appointment of full time 
personnel among members. 
The intended establishment of a Securities Commission undoubtedly 
confirms the orientation of the Legislature towards administrative 
controls. Does it 
1
also indicate that in setting up yet another 
tribunal Parliament recogni ses that quite different characteristics 
are required of tribunals with different jurisdictions? 
-----·-----·--··-----------·-----·-------
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PART FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
In over a century of New Zealand parliamentary intervention 
in commercial practices and prices the administrative machinery 
which has emerged is as complex as are the market situations 
with which it deals. The history of legislation designed to 
supervise and control this area presents an especially 
interesting case study of, on the one h and , the process by which 
the Legislature chose to intercede in an area previously free of 
statutory provisions and, on the other, the desir ~bility of 
intervention having been affirmed , the pattern of the Legislaturc 1 s 
response to 
a) the changing nature of the subj ect matter , and 
b) general developments in administrative law. 
Both of these latter factors are reflected in the lcgislat..:L() n 
discussed in the f oregoing, but are not entirely unrel ated . As 
the ambit of the law has ext~nded to meet d evelopments in trade , 
so the method of approach has evolved in the long term, towards 
administrative controls with increasing at~ention to detail in 
constitution, :nanncr and forTI'., 
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From the out.set of Parliament's involvement in commerce and 
prices the main substantive concern wa s with the public interest which 
the courts had neglected in the determination of disputes produced by 
restrictive trade agreements. With the exception of the Corrunercial 
Trusts Act 1910 and of certain prohibitions which remain (albeit 
modified) the public interest in the New Zealand context has been 
seen to be best served by providing that market practices including 
pricing arrangements are assessed on a case by case basis rather than 
in accordance with rigid precedent. To this end Parliament has sought 
pragmatic solutions to the effect on the public interest of business 
activities, guided primarily by the s pecial cha racteristics of the 
New Zealand economy, particularly the size and distribution of the 
population, the country's geographical location and the relative 
strengths of its agr icultural and manufacturing sectors. For this 
reason it is probably not meaningful to compare the New Zealand 
legislation too closely with that adopted in oth~r countries to deal 
with trade restrictions and combinations, where the economic 
considerations differ . From the somewhat di s~al experi ~nce with the 
anti-trust approach of 1910 the New Zealand Le.g::. sla. ture became 
persuaded that a more permissive approach was cnlled for in a small 
economy where trade restricti ons and e?en monopolies and price fixing 
might sometimes be necessary , or at le2st desirable, to ;ichieve a 
viable commercial comrnuni ty vKirk.ing in the publ:i C' intE·:::-est . 
The flexibility thus sought has been found in the 
administrative approach whereby decision-making on trade and 
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price matters is allocated to an independent body with statutory 
provisions, to obtain the result than traders are induced to not 
act in such ways as are considered by Parliament to be detrimental 
to the public. 
The establishment of administrative tribunals in this area -
beginning essentially with the Board of Trade in 1919 - represented 
a development of some constitutional importance, effecting 
Parliament's intention to remove the issues from the purely judicial 
sphere and increasingly, from executive control, to a field of 
jurisdiction which combined the administrative, the legislative and 
the quasi-judicial. As such , questions of administrative law have 
consequently arisen . The courts and increasingly, through 
representations to Parliament, the public, have demanded tha t in 
the process of adjudication tribunals observe the principles of 
natural justice which applied under the common law. The preceding 
historical analysis is in part an attempt to demonstrate how far 
the requirements of natural justice have become embodied in 
statutory form. 
Procedure itself is a matter, accordin9 to the Franks 
Con1.'11i ttee, which should be clearly laid down in the relevant 
s~atute or statutory ins trument. The history of legislation on 
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commercial practices and prices does show a progressive move in this 
direction, and it is perhaps less true to say now, as was held by 
Orr in 1964, that no rational principles underlie administrative 
tribunals and that their structure and powers depend largely on the 
particular inclinations of the Minister responsible at the time. 185 
The procedural features held in common by the Conunerce Commission 
and the proposed Securities Commission suggest at least a basic 
186 standard of legislative expression of matters of procedure. It 
remains the case, however, that 
"'When the liEXJislature intervenes to establish 
tribunal procedures the effect is not always 
to create certainty and rErrove doubts . \
87 
While incorporati ng in statute certain procedural provisions 
for administrative tr ibuna ls, the Legislature, in deciding to 
establish separate , tribunals in this as in other. areas of decision-
making, 
II •. has recognised the great virtues of the 
flexibility of the principles of natura.l justice 
and the unc.csirability of attenpting to lay clo.~n 
absolute generally applicable rules.\
88 
----------------
185. Op. cit. (J.964) , para . 2. 
186. 'lbe T°'.rrant Ccrrrn.ittee, cp . cit., corrprising nErbers e.,~riencro in the 
practical o_reration of the Ccrnnerce Act, soLight to establish t..1-lat the 
rights and obligations of those affecte:1 by the Act should (a) be clearly 
estublished (b) b~ consistent throughout the Ar::t: and (c) :cecogTlise L11e 
principles of nahrral justice. 
187. Keith, op . cit., p. 8. 
188 . Ibid., p . 47. 
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The Conunerce Commission (and o~iginally the Trade Practices and 
Prices Conm1ission) and now the Securities Commission are 
illustrations of the necessity of taking into account the character 
of the tribunal concerned, and the reasons for its establishment, 
in determining what principles should be provided in the relevant 
enactment. In particular, each has been left with an amplitude of 
discretion to act according as it has seen fit - a characteristic 
considered by the House as appropriate to the subject matter over 
which ju~isdiction is given. In the final analysis, for example, i t 
.is clearly a matter for the discretion of the Cornrnerce Commission 
as to which of the several and sometimes conflicting public 
interest criteria should be weighed more heavily than the other. 
Presumably, members of the Conunission are to reac11 their 
conclusions by reference to the assumptions and principles v.'hich 
I 
their traini ng and experience would lead them to apply, in each cfis e · 
inve stigat:ed. Certa inly, the Commerce Cor!l2.--nission ad judicates on 
matters of considerable, possibly critical, i mportance to the 
persons immedic1tely concerned and to the general public, matters 
clearly falling into the are a describe d ny the Public and 
Administrati ve. Law Reform Committee as being c&pable of being said 
"without sxa.ggorati o::--1 to affect the lives of rrore 
p2ople than rrost of the issu2s dealt with a t 
present by U.-'1:2 oldcr-cstablishec1 courts. 11
189 
--- ··------- ---- ·--- -------------- ---- - - - -- - ----------·--·--
U :1 . Fi.rs t P':t ,.::,rt , c p . c.i t, , p ::i r.::.. . 5. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the 
future of the administrative approach in ·the commercial area, but 
rather to have reviewed the administrative machinery established 
for its supervision and control. There is now no question that 
jurisdiction over actions arising from trade practices, trade 
combinations and pricing matters should have been conferred on a 
tribunal and the history overall indicates that administrative 
tribunals are here to stay. The Franks Corrunittee expressed the 
view that 
"Reflection on the general social and economic 
d1anges of recent decades convinces us that 
tribuna.ls as a system for adjudicat..i..on have 
cane to stay. '11he tendency for issues arisifB 
from legislative schanes to .te ref erred to 
special tribUI'-als is likely to grow rather than 
diminish. 11
190 
Accepting th~t administrative tribunals are an essential 
part of the constitutional machinery of democratic sta t e s, the 
issue is not one of their existence but of controlling the 
exerci se of the powers vested in them and ensuring that they are 
develope d in a rational way. Both are matters for which the 
Legislature is responsible and which it can, where the re may 
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already be short comings, readily correct. The discussion over the 
190. Qnnd 218, op. cit., para . 37. That there is an es tablished case for t be 
continual establ isr.!IT.ent of speci a l ist tribunal s r.,,;as also r ecognised by 
the AustraliaJ1 Corrmittee of Review on Adrrini strative Discreti ons which, 
r eviewing tribuna l s in the review context rcoorrmendcx:l the retenb on of 
speci al ist tr.i.bur:a.l s wh2re appropriate . 01) . c i t ., recc.l!.nrn2nc1ation 20. 
\ 
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last twenty years of the use of administrative tribunals for 
decision-making has, in New Zealand as elsewhere, found its way into 
the legislation. The effect of further developments in the body 
of administrative law, as it is applied to new and changing 
circumstances, similarly can be expected, albeit gradually, to be 
balanced by a response on the part of the Legislature. Even now 
there is scope, as has been shown in Part IV of this paper, for 
further improvements to the constitution and procedure of the 
Com..rnerce Com:nission if only to bring it into line with the present 
state of administrative law. 
Of the future it may perhaps just be said that the most 
significant development could be an appraisnl by t~e Legislature of 
its use of tribunals, considering its heavy reliance on them to 
J 
perform functions and e.·ercise powers created by new legisla tive 
plan:::;. In particular, in the collimerci a l area it would seem desirable 
that the place of the tribunal in the overall structure of policy and 
I 
decision-making and i.n relation to the courte be evaluated. To some 
extent the mere fact of the frequency of l egislation on cormnercial 
practices and prices has represented, especially since 1958, a form 
of review, but this hardly q;..!a.l ifies for the syste:r,atic evaluation 
necessary to ensure rational al location of jurisdiction or the 
provi3ion of the mos~ appro1::.i:r-:Late proccdurl'S, rights of recourse 
anc1 so on. Suer, a :>_- e vic.:cw mi< :1 t. 'h:' ll m···un a rr.-::ir.e C'xtensive rol,3 for 
the Corrunerce Commission, especially if political expressions of 
future developments in consumer protection legislation are 
f f
. 191 
ul illed. 
191 . 
·--------- ---------···-- -··----·-·-------
________ .. 
See , for C;(.ar,iple, the v:Le1,s exprsssm by P::,n. M.r Tj ·wrd with respect to 
r eva.npi ·19 ccn.;u1v2r l aw coved.nq price co:,troi., rrnr,o~.oJy ccntrol , trc:de 
prac·i.:i.ces and con~ !.l!.11<.:~r protection , iri Tl c __ .'~::~.::.2,· 3 I-,pril 19:•8 , p. 2 . 
APPENDIX A 
LEGI SL..7\TI ON ON C0:-1l'"£RCL;;.L PRACI'ICES A.7\:1) PRICE:S 
Consiceration of Bills by the legislature 
Bill 
r-01:opoly Prevent.ion 1908 * 
Co!T[;"ercial Tn:.s ts 1910 * 
E:oard of Trad,~ 1919 * 
.?::2v2::--·tio.i~ of Proi:i te2ring 1936 * 
Ir.c:J.strial Efficier.::y 1936 * 
Control of Prices 1947 * 
Industries ':end Ccrrrrerre 1956 * 
'Tr2.ce Pr.::.ctic::'.S F-.rr:?.ndrrent 19Gl 
'I.:·"""dE:: Pr .et-ices l'fi-'=:ndr;ent 1964 
r::·::-c,0:2 Pr,::ict.ires h:,end.rr.2nt 1965 
r,- :,:'.} :-:::: .::~·ic:..s I 'O:T<: .• ·c-:..·:--_'1 ::-. (1·10 . 2) 1965 
T:.:-2:~e P:!'.°r'.;:' __ i.,.::..;s (Cor.n-12rce Cor.mi.ssion and Pyramid 
2elling) 1974 
Ccr,"!:.'.E-rce l 9 7 '1 
Cc:--::·2r:::2 l'.:" 75 -,~ 
Sec~rri ties Advertising 19 77 
. 
... 
* lliac·:rr~nts :!:Bferred to on page 1 , Fart One of this pai;:er. 
fr O:~n to ne.~ls rredia for hearin~r o f r:.vidence . 
Date Bill 
Introduced 
5 Oct 1908 
7 Sep 1910 
9 Sep 1919 
24 Jul 1936 
25 Sep 1936 
18 Sep 194 7 
5 Oct 1956 
7 Aug 1958 
14 ~~ov 1961 
23 Cct 1964 
6 Oct 1965 
G Oct 1965 
4 Sep 1970 
28 Mar 1974 
28 Mar 1974 
22 Aug 1975 
20 Oct 1976 
14 Cec 1977 
Referenre to Select Comnittee 
Period of 
Consideration 
8 Sep - 12 Oct 
9 Oct - 7 Nov 
4 Sep - 10 Jun 
1971 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
No. of SuJ::missions 
Received 
n.a 
n.a. 
34 
See Comrrerce Bill 1974 
28 Mar - 9 Oct# I 57 
" " 
20 Oct - 17 Nov 
# 
26 
14 Dec - 25 Aug# 
1978 72 
Date 
of 
Third 
Peading 
6 Oct 1908 
26 Oct 1910 
19 Sep 1919 
29 Jul 1936 
20 Oct 193G 
19 Nov 1936 
24 Oct 1956 
2 Oct 1958 
30 t-bv 1961 
17 Nov 1964 
29 Oct 1965 
;Lapsed 
15 Sep 1971 
6 Nov 1974 
Lapsed 
8 Oct 1975 
30 t-bv 1976 
A. l\PF E.:'\LS 
(a.) :ccre•_ary of Trade 
c:1-:d Jnd .. 1sLry 
(b) i\°o ar.:peal s from 
decisions of Price 
':i:'ri ti..1r1:3.l acting ir.. 
or_j gi_m:1.1 j urisdiction 
.l\PP?...t-V...,, F3TlEi: t.:,:1,1 C'..! ,c-~- S'.7,'Till PROVIS .LONS 
--~---------•.__..._.. ___ r~---- - ·• --- -- • -----
I . Cont~ol of Prices Act 1947 
!0..a.tters on which 
?,ppeals Lie 
Any Act done or 
decision made u..~der 
dele<.Jated authority by 
Secretary or cepart-
mrntal officers 
rersons Entitled 
to App-:::a l 
Any person directly 
or indirectly 
affectc-u 
Appeal 
Authority 
Price 
Tribunal 
None 
l'l:-1}:' 0.scision made ty Price Tribunal and d'2Cisions or actions in course of iI'XJUiries subject to review by Suprerre Court on 
::;!:'Ot.:nds of rztural justice (no statutory provision required). Ha,.1e"Jer, pr-cceedings not to l::::e held bad for want of form. 
1'10 provision. 
A. APPLi'\LS 
Au.tbcrity Appealed 
A-::,,2:.jnst 
Tr~dc P .:-o.ctices a;.1d 
?:-ice:: Cc,mnission 
As for 1947 Act. 
It. Trace Practices Act 1958* 
M..,.tters on which 
~peals Lie 
Any deci~ion relating 
to ord,2rs, appruJal.s 
(on 1rerits and 
questions of la:-11) 
Pe.rsons Entitled 
to Appeal 
(a) on merits -
parties ot.her 
than Examiner 
(b) on law only 
E.."'.'aminer 
Appeal 
Authori!=_y_ 
Administrative 
Division: 
Su1)reme Court 
Further 
Appeal 
From Court, on 
law only, to 
Court of Appeal, 
for either party 
Cl,.airrran of CcrrrPission .::n:1y state case to l\d.-;u_nistrat~ve Division 
prc,,;:esclkgs. 
Supreme Court, on question of law arising in course cf 
P2rt II 
(Tr2.d2 .Fractices) 
p,3_rt III 
i:· ~~  _:,90J.i es 
1,:e't'."gers Tak".:Dve.rs) 
(Ccnt.ro.1. of Prices) 
B . Rr ""l l.EKS 
Part II 
?art III 
Part IV 
/ 
C . C.Z\SE STATED 
(a ) 
(b) 
Authority Appealed 
Aqa.inst ----------
C:C..'ITTT',erce Conrnission 
Conmission in advisory 
j u.risd: . ction relating 
t o fOJ.'lOfOlY or merger 
rcfe~ence 
Secret,11.-y of Trac e 
c:.>.1d I!"l.<:J.UStry ~o ufpr-'.J'tl from decisions 
of Ccmnerce Com-:u.ss i on 
e;:Grcising original 
jurisd.i.ction 
M,,'ctters en ,-.hlch 
~ ls Lie 
On questions of law 
cnly in dE:cisions 
rra:le 
On questions of l aw 
cnly 2.rising i n report 
of Corrmission or 
dec.i.si ons made in 
course of inpi::-ies 
Any deci3ion ma.<'le in 
respect of price orders 
and app1.vvals, 
prohibition of sa.le 
notices and ne.v types 
of gCXJds 
Persons Entitled 
~ ce""'_-_a_l __ _ 
Parties an.d 
.Sxaminer 
Parties and 
Examiner 
Applicant for price 
i ncreas e ; other persons 
in discretion of 
Secretary or Comnission, 
or by J eave of Secretary 
or Com:nission 
( continued) 
Appeal 
Autmrity 
Administrative 
Division: 
Suprere Court 
Barrister and 
Solicitor of 
7 years standing, 
api:X)inted by 
Minister 
Comr.erce 
Cormission 
Further 
Appeal 
None 
N:me 
N:me 
Any decision TIB.de by Commission arrl decisions or actions in the course of iuIUiries sugject to review by the Su-prer.:e Cburt on the grour!ds of natural just.i.ce (no statutory pro,;ision required). Proceedings not bad for w'&nt of form. 
Co:11Tlission ' s jurisdic t ion advisory, t herefore no r eview on groU,."X3.s of natural justice. Questions of law ho.,>ever, are fully covered by clauses providing for appeal. 
(a) Decisions by the Secretary appealable t o the C01mlerce Ccrrrnission -includes failure to observe obligation to give parties ::-easonable opi;:ortunity to present case and notice of certain intentions. (b) Decisions made by t11e Cormissio;1 in respect of appe.als or public inquiries or a.ctions in the course of such procredi.ngs subject to revie.v by t11c S1.,prc~re Court on grourrls of natural justice . Proceedings not to be held bad for want of form. 
~e Chairrran of the Comrission may stat e a case for opimon of the A.dministrative Division on any question of law arising i n any matter before it. 
Suprerre Court onl y 
Part II (Trade 
Practices) 
Part EI (M::lnopolies, 
.ergers, Takeovers) 
Part IV (Price 
Control) 
B. REVIEW 
Parts II , N 
Part III 
C. ffiSE STI\TED 
Aut.riority AppealErl 
~ainst 
Corrrrerce 
Corrrrnission 
Comrerce 
Crnmission 
Secreta..7 of 
Trade and 
Industry 
As for 1974 Bill 
rv. Coi.1lnerce Act 1975* 
rl'ia.tters on. which 
/1.ppeals Lie 
Any decision relatir..g 
to trade practices 
(not restrictErl to 
questions of law) 
Any decision, consent 
or order relating to 
this Part, on fact 
and l aw 
Any decision of 
Secretary relating to 
price fixing, price 
orders and price 
approvals 
Persons Entitled 
to Appeal · 
Parties and 
Examiner 
Parties a.'1d 
Examiner 
Business persons 
affectErl; purchasers 
and users affected, by 
leave of Corrrnission; 
consurrer representative, 
in discretion and by 
leave of Corrmission 
Appeal 
Authority 
Administrative 
Division: 
Suprerre Court 
Administrative 
Division : · 
Supreme Court 
Corrrnerce 
Cortmission 
Further 
Appeal 
NJne 
N:>ne 
None 
Carmission exercises original juriso.iction, therefore review on grounds of natural justice by Suprerre Court 
applies. Prccee:lings not to be held bad for want of fonn. 
Cor..mission may state a case for opinion of Ad:ri.nistrative Division: Suprerre Court only, on any question of law arising in any 
watter before it. 
* as arrended in 1976 
.APPENDIX B (o::mtinuee) 
A. APPEALS 
Authority AppealE<l 
Against 
Securities Comr~ssion 
Reg-.istrar of 
Com[.,ani es 
R...~istrar of 
Companies 
B. REVIEWS 
v. Seeu.rities B.U I l S77* 
V.iatters on which 
Appeals Lie 
Any dete:::Tfli~ation of 
Corr.mission, on point 
of law only 
Against aDy act or 
decision of Registrar 
made unc.er his powers 
of inspecticn 
Arq refusal, act or 
decision of Registrar 
other than the al:::cve 
Persons Entitled 
to Apr>9al 
Parties 
Any :person aggrieved 
by such act or 
decision 
Any person aggrieved 
by such refusal, act 
or decision 
F2view by the Court on grounds of natural justice, as for other tr.i,_bu..'1als . 
C. CASE STATID 
Apr,eal 
Authoritv 
Administrative 
Division: 
Supreme Court 
Administrative 
Division: 
S upre..'1le Court 
Securities 
Corrmission 
The Ccmnission may state a case for the op1ruo;.1 of the Supre,E Court, to be heard and determined by the 
P.dminist.ative Division u.'1J.ess ordeYed by the Court to be re.TDved to the Court of Appeal, on oJ.1.Y question 
of law arising i n uny ffi:itter befon:-~ it. 
* as reported from the Statutes Revision Coctmi ttE..'€ 
Further 
Appeal 
None 
None 
None 
• 
APPENDIX C 
LEGISLATION ON CO~J•iERCIAL PRACTICES AND PRICES 
ACT 
Monopoly Prevention Act 1908 
Ccrrmercial Trusts Act 1910 
Cost of ~iving Act 1915 
Board of Trade Act 1919 and amendments 
Prevention of Profiteering Act 1936 
Industrial Efficiency Act 1936 
Co11tr0l of Prices Act 1947 and amendments 
Trc.de Practices Act 1958 and a!iiendrnents 
Trade Pr2ctices (Commerce Commission and 
Pyramid Selling) Act 1974 
REPEALS 
t 
REPEALED BY 
Commerce Act 1975 
Commerce Act 1975 
Commerce Act 1975 
Industries and Commerce Act 1956 
Control of Prices Act 1947 
Industries and Commerce Act 1956 
Commerce Act 1975 
Commerce Act 1975 
Commerce Act 1975 
11111 iif illii1i1i1li!!ll1I~iii~l1 
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A fine of 1 Oc per day is 
charged on overdue · ' 
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